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Abstract 
Organisational resilience in healthcare is important if hospitals are to recover effectively from 
unexpected events, such as infection outbreaks and manage successfully the continuous 
pressure from hospital associated infections.  Yet studies of resilience in hospital 
organisations are rare and organisational resilience theory is insufficiently developed.  The 
aim of this thesis is to examine organisational resilience in UK acute hospitals, through a 
case study and empirical analysis.  The objectives are to investigate what is known about 
the concept, associated factors and application of organisational resilience to hospitals, to 
explore theoretically and empirically the two contexts for organisational resilience (expected 
conditions and unexpected events) and finally to design and test a tool to measure 
organisational resilience in the context of an unexpected event. 
 A multi-methods approach was adopted to examine organisational resilience.  A literature 
and systematic review were carried out to establish the evidence-base for organisational 
resilience.  These reviews informed two health care studies of organisational resilience; a 
micro and meso-level case study exploring an unexpected infection outbreak and a macro-
level study assessing the system response to infections as continuous stressors on routine 
practice.  The case study informed the design and testing of an organisational resilience 
questionnaire.  
The key contributions to the literature were: firstly a novel multidisciplinary resilience 
questionnaire from which a framework of organisational resilience constructs was 
developed; secondly, a modest theoretical contribution of an intermediate resilience category 
within a framework that identifies levels of resilient practice and associated sensemaking 
characteristics; and thirdly, a positive example of ICT-enabled national surveillance 
programmes that increased hospitals’ resilience to infection through the enrolment of clinical 
leaders in self-surveillance.    
In conclusion, this research has generated novel, empirically-derived theoretical 
developments to this field of study that facilitate the measurement, application and improved 
conceptualisation of organisational resilience. 
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1 Chapter 1.  An introduction to organisational resilience in the 
context of infections in acute hospital care in the UK 
1.1 Introduction and Context for this Work 
In this chapter, I review the history and evolution of the concept of organisational resilience, 
referencing earlier work on resilience.  I define and outline the contextual role that hospital-
acquired infections will take in the thesis.  I examine the macro-level methodological issues 
in designing the thesis and propose the use of two social science theories; sensemaking and 
Foucauldian governmentality theory to inform the study of organisational resilience in two 
qualitative studies. 
1.2 History and evolution of the concept of organisational resilience 
1.2.1 Resilience foundations 
Organisational resilience research can be contextualised within the broader field of resilience 
studies which dates back to the 1970s.  Recent reviews of resilience literature(1;2) identified 
a number of resilience perspectives; ecological, individual, socio-ecological/community, 
organisational and supply chain (2) disaster and infrastructure resilience.(1) The 
multidisciplinary foundations of these perspectives span a range of disciplines including 
ecology,(3-5) child(6-8) and family(9) psychology, economics(10), engineering(11) and 
information technology.(12)    
1.2.1.1 Ecological influences 
The discipline of ecology generated an early definition of resilience relating to the survival of 
complex systems which was proposed by Holling in 1973.(10;13) This definition describes 
the amount of disturbance a system can absorb without incurring a change in its state.(13) 
Over the last thirty years, the ecological perspective has broadened as the impact of human, 
social and political dimensions have been understood and incorporated.  Resilient factors in 
identified in this broader context include: working with change and uncertainty; nurturing 
ecological, social and political diversity to reduce risks and increase choice; extending 
options for learning and problem solving; and building opportunities for networks, cross-
institution links and self-organisation.(14)  Many of these factors are relevant to and overlap 
with descriptions of resilience in other disciplines and contexts.   
16 
 
 
1.2.1.2 Multidisciplinary influences 
Disciplines such as information technology draw on a combination of the individual, 
organisational and extra-organisational levels to explain potential system vulnerabilities and 
stressors in the face of unexpected and stressful events.(12)  In the field of economics, the 
concept of social resilience was coined in 2000, when it was related to social capital and 
economic factors.(15)  Both the fields of economics and engineering have sought to develop 
a quantifiable approach to measuring resilience using systems perspectives, in order to 
assess the associated dimensions of robustness, redundancy (untapped or excess 
capacity), resourcefulness and rapidity in the event of disasters impacting on 
communities.(10;16;17)  These macro-level perspectives contrast with the micro-level 
perspectives developed in areas such as child and family psychology, where the emphasis is 
on the individual capacity and capability to develop resilience, assessed using a selection of 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies.  Resilience in these fields is demonstrated as 
behavioural competence: self-esteem, self-worth and connectedness in an adverse 
context.(6-9)  
1.2.2 Gaps in resilience research 
Well recognised challenges and gaps exist in the resilience literature.  The multidisciplinary 
development in the area of resilience, with the complications of overlapping and related 
meanings from different disciplines has rendered some definitions of resilience so broad that 
they become meaningless. The etymology of the term resilience derives from ‘resilio’ 
meaning rebounding.  Opinions differ as to whether a definition of resilience should be based 
on the concept of rebounding or be adapted to incorporate broader meanings.  For example, 
some definitions are seen as interchangeable with the concepts of adaptability, vulnerability, 
sustainability and stability.(10)  Criticism exists of definitions that have become too broad 
and are considered to have gone beyond the innate meaning.(10)  Several issues fuel this 
dilemma.  These include the lack of clarity about resilience as a concept and the aggregation 
of resilience characteristics into frameworks or models that have not been tested empirically. 
1.2.2.1 Inadequate empirical testing 
A further problem is that few of the models or frameworks based on theoretically determined 
resilience characteristics have been tested empirically.  The multi-faceted nature of most 
resilience models requires complex empirical studies to test them.  These might involve 
17 
 
longitudinal design to assess the process of resilience, commitment from multiple agencies 
to assist with a macro-level analysis and cross-cutting methodologies that gather data from 
all levels of the enterprise to ensure adequate coverage of the phenomenon’s 
characteristics.  The nature of unexpected events is that research may often be undertaken 
retrospectively with limited input from those involved at the time.  These requirements 
appear to have limited the number of studies undertaken and those that have occurred have 
relied heavily on retrospective third-party documentation to inform their reviews.(18;19)  It is 
only more recently, as a result of several large-scale disasters, such as the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks in the USA and the Asian tsunami that more detailed analyses have occurred, often 
instigated and funded by governments to address concerns about social, economic and 
business continuity.(20) 
1.2.2.2 Conceptual clarity of resilience 
The lack of clarity about resilience as a concept is reflected in questions such as: whether 
resilience operates prior to or post the disturbance;(10) what the nature of the ‘rebound’ is; 
whether a system returns to the previous equilibrium or to a new state;(21) the extent to 
which resilience is time-limited; whether the catalyst is an ongoing disturbance, unexpected 
event or disaster; whether resilience can be quantified; what characteristics resilience 
encompasses; and whether these characteristics can be understood in a consensual model? 
1.2.3 Development of organisational resilience 
Organisational resilience began to emerge as a concept in its own right around the late 
1980s and early 1990s from the resilience literature.  In the late 1980s as organisation 
studies began to explore concepts of organisational change and culture, the term 
‘adaptation’ referring to the capacity of an organisation to adapt and respond began to be 
used as a proxy for organisational resilience.(22)   By the early 1990s, the term 
‘organisational resilience’ had begun to be referenced in the literature. 
1.2.3.1 Definition of organisational resilience 
The definition of organisational resilience that I will adopt in this thesis is defined by 
Hollnagel as: 
‘the intrinsic ability of a system (organisation) to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or 
following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain required operations under both 
expected and unexpected conditions.’(23)  
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This definition from resilience engineering encompasses most aspects of current 
organisational thinking on resilience. It reflects many of the facets inherent in recent work by 
Vogus and Sutcliffe from an organisational theory perspective, who comment on resilience 
as ‘the maintenance of positive adjustment under challenging conditions such that the 
organisation emerges from these conditions strengthened and more resourceful.’(24)    
There are key aspects of this definition that are relevant.  The first is the use of the terms: 
expected and unexpected conditions.  Expected conditions are those in routine practice 
where despite occasional or even continuous stressors on the system, required operations 
can be sustained with varying levels of adjustment to the system.   Unexpected conditions 
denote those where routine practice is interrupted by an unexpected event, change or 
disturbance often requiring major adjustments to the system, depending on the level of 
reliable functioning within the system. 
The second aspect is the use of the phrase, ‘prior to, during or following changes.’  Different 
emphases are placed on these different stages in the literature.  Proponents of an 
anticipatory phase to an event consider that preparedness practices are crucial in sustaining 
required operations.(1)  Others consider that organisational resilience precludes risk 
management related anticipatory activities.(25)  There are different emphases on adjustment 
following changes.  One perspective is that organisational learning from the change or 
disturbance is important and will assist the organisation in developing new capabilities and 
capacities to cope more effectively with future incidents.(26)   
The third aspect is the use of the phrase, ‘sustaining required operations.’   I consider this 
phrase inadequate, as sustaining required operations may be sufficient in the context of 
minor changes or disturbances but in the context of major, unexpected disturbances, the 
organisation may need to significantly change its existing practices in response to learning 
from the altered conditions. 
The fourth aspect of the definition is, ‘the intrinsic ability of an organisation to adjust its 
functioning.’  This phrase reflects a systematic theoretical perspective which is typical of 
recent organisational resilience literature where the key to resilience is to adjust to harmful 
influences.  In contrast, the structural theoretical perspective is based on a linear cause and 
effect model where one disruptive event is a disturbance on an otherwise stable system, 
reflecting a static state of organisation where the key to organisational resilience is about 
being able to endure harmful influences. The structural perspective, which is increasingly 
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critiqued,(27) is reflected in earlier organisational resilience literature from the late 1980s and 
early 1990s and underpins older human error investigation models.(28)  
1.3 Providing a context: the use of hospital-acquired infections in acute 
hospitals in the UK 
1.3.1 Hospital-acquired infections: an acute hospital context 
I intend to use a ‘tracer study’ approach, using hospital-acquired infections in acute hospitals 
in the UK as the ‘tracer issue’, i.e. the area of contextual focus of my thesis to explore how 
organisational resilience can be understood. The term ‘tracer study’ refers to a 
methodological framework (relying on non-probability sampling) for sampling 
participants/data, elucidating processes and describing activities over time, either 
prospectively or retrospectively.(29)  The framework usually pertains to one organisational 
theme or ‘tracer issue.’   This is defined as a specific subject area that can be used to 
examine a theoretical topic empirically, serving to narrow down the scope of an inquiry and 
provide a rich seam of primary data.(29)  In this case, I chose hospital-acquired infections as 
a tracer issue for a number of reasons.   
Firstly, from an organisational resilience perspective, hospital-acquired infections serve as a 
stressor on hospital organisations and elicit an organisational response.  These type of 
infectious organisms have the capacity to stretch the organisational capacity to cope, and as 
such, serve as a useful mechanism for testing resilience in organisations under expected 
conditions and unexpected conditions    
Secondly, a tracer issue was chosen as it is a useful method for studying complex 
organisational processes(29) such as the impact of infections on hospital function.  Hospital-
acquired Infections can impact a number of processes at different levels in the hospital: at 
patient-level through the effect of antibiotic-resistant organisms causing adverse patient 
outcomes; at team level, with ward closures as a result of infection reducing bed capacity 
and the necessity for more complex treatment protocols; and at organisational-level as 
revised or new processes are required to respond rapidly and manage unexpected 
circumstances.    
Thirdly, as I intend to study resilience across whole organisations, hospital-acquired 
infections are relatively unique compared with other potential stressors, in testing clinical and 
managerial systems under expected and unexpected conditions.  Hospital-acquired 
infections have the potential to impact on the whole organisation and require a co-ordinated 
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approach.  I considered other stressors, e.g. economic, environmental, technological, 
political and social, such as recent healthcare reform changes, adverse weather conditions 
and the transition to telemedicine, but these did not fulfill the ‘unexpected conditions’  to test 
resilience in an organisation, to the same extent as infections.  I will examine and justify my 
use of infections and associated infection prevention and control strategies as a tracer issue 
in more detail in Chapter 2.  At this stage, as a precursor to Chapter 2, I would like to define 
the types of infections in UK hospitals that will be focused on in this thesis and explore their 
impact on acute hospitals in the UK.   
1.3.2 Defining hospital-acquired infections (HAI) 
This thesis will focus on hospital-acquired infections (HAI) which are defined as ‘infections 
developing after 48 hours of hospitalization or stay at a healthcare facility that were not 
present or incubating at the time of admission.’(30)   The two categories that are relevant to 
this thesis are bacterial HAIs and viral HAIs.   
1.3.2.1 Bacterial HAIs 
Bacterial HAIs are the predominant pathogens that have been monitored by the UK 
government as the focus on healthcare-associated infections has increased in recent years.  
The types of bacterial HAI encompass a broad list including skin and surgical site infections, 
urinary tract infections, pneumonia, bacteraemia, and hospital associated diarrhoea. While 
the types of infections are diverse it has become increasingly common for these infections to 
be caused by antibiotic resistant pathogens. Two key issues exist for hospital organisations 
in the control of bacterial HAI; routes of transmission and methods of control.  Routes of 
transmission include the use of devices, the provision of care, hand hygiene and failure of 
isolation.  Public health campaigns have focused on routes of transmission as being one of 
the most effective ways to improve the rates of HAI.  Methods of controlling HAI include 
interventions such as effective hand washing, appropriate use of devices, the use of aseptic 
technique in the practice of care, new technologies to reduce the spread of infection and 
improved isolation techniques. 
1.3.2.2 Nosocomial viral infections 
Viral infections that can be transmitted nosocomially in acute healthcare, are defined as the 
development of symptoms compatible with a viral illness after a period of hospitalization that 
is as long or longer than the indicated periods of time.’(31)  The incidence of nosocomial 
viral infections in hospitals is less well reported than for bacterial infections, but one US 
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study found that more than 5% of nosocomial infections in hospital are viral and that 
nosocomial viral infection increases the duration and costs of hospitalisation.(31)  From an 
outbreak perspective, viral HAIs include those that can cause epidemics (Norovirus in the 
UK) and pandemics (global Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and swine-origin 
influenza A/H1N1). One viral HAI, Norovirus is the most common cause of infectious 
gastroenteritis (diarrhoea and vomiting) in England and Wales and nosocomial transmission 
of Norovirus has posed a significant challenge in hospitals in the UK in recent years.  A key 
issue for hospital organisations in controlling nosocomial transmission of Norovirus is 
aggressive infection control measures.(32) 
1.3.3 Impact of hospital-acquired infections (HAIs) 
Hospital-acquired infections (HAIs) have a significantly adverse impact on patient health. 
The impact of infections such as methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA),(33) 
vancomycin-resistant Enterococci (VRE) and Clostridium difficile (C.difficile) can cause 
serious human suffering, including longer lengths of stay, long-term disability or death.  The 
impact for healthcare organisations includes an increased threat to immune-compromised 
patients, increased drug and treatment costs, increased ward closures, the potential for 
carriage via hospital workers, increased antibiotic resistance and increased morbidity and 
mortality.   
1.3.4 Impact of infections on UK acute healthcare 
In the UK,  a conservative estimate by the National Audit Office (NAO) was that the cost to 
the NHS for hospital-acquired infection was £1billion per year.(34)  The HAIs that have 
become prominent in the UK the last two decades have included MRSA, C.difficile, 
Vancomycin (or Glycopeptide)-resistant Enterococci (VRE or GRE) and gram-negative 
bacteria.  Of these,  MRSA as a proportion of all Staphylococcus aureus causing blood 
stream infections rose from about 2% in 1990 to more than 40% in 2000.(35;36).  The 
overall rise is MRSA since 1993 is shown in Figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1.1.  Voluntary and Mandatory MRSA Bacteraemia Reporting 1993-2008 
 
Image courtesy of UK Health Protection Agency. Pearson et al. (2009) Impact of mandatory surveillance on the 
measurement of meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus bacteraemia in the English NHS: comparison of 
mandatory and voluntary surveillance reporting systems 
http://www.hpa.org.uk/webc/HPAwebFile/HPAweb_C/1317132089460 (Accessed 27 May 2012) 
With incidence and mortality due to MRSA infections rising in the early 2000s, both the USA 
and UK have made concerted efforts to document MRSA infections and have had success 
at decreasing bacteraemia rates in recent years. The Health Protection Agency documented 
1185 reports of MRSA bacteraemia in England in 2011 showing an almost 84% reduction 
since 2002.(30)  
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Figure 1.2  Clostridium difficile infection (CDI) reports 2004-2012 
 
Image from the UK Health Protection Agency C.difficile Quarterly Reports 
This steep rise in MRSA bacteraemias, shown in Figure 1.1 was reflected by a similar rise in 
C.difficile infections up until 2007-8 (see Figure 1.2) with an eight-fold increase in isolates 
and fourteen-fold increase for C.difficile toxin in laboratory reports to the Communicable 
Disease Surveillance Centre (CDSC).(37) 
A further issue has been the rise of Norovirus which is one of the most infective organisms 
seen in health and social care establishments.(38)   Whilst this is usually a community-
acquired virus which spreads rapidly in community settings, nosocomial transmission can 
occur in hospital.  Figure 1.3 highlights the increasing burden of Norovirus for the NHS and 
other organisations (although this is partly due to increased Norovirus testing).(38)  The cost 
for the NHS is estimated to be in excess of £100 million (2002-3 figures) with approximately 
3000 hospital admissions per annum.(39). 
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Figure 1.3.  Laboratory reports of norovirus 2000 - 2011. England and Wales 
 
Image from the UK Health Protection Agency: Norovirus Working Party. ‘Guidelines for the management of 
norovirus outbreaks in acute and community health and social care settings.’(38) 
1.3.5 Summary 
To summarise, increased rates of hospital-acquired infections (expected events) and sudden 
outbreaks of hospital-acquired infections (unexpected events) have had a significant impact 
as stressors on acute hospitals in the UK over the last decade.  Both as expected and 
unexpected events, hospital-acquired infections stretch organisations’ capacity to cope and 
as such, serve as an excellent ‘tracer’ issue for assessing organisational resilience in acute 
UK hospitals.   The impact of hospital-acquired infections has been felt clinically, financially 
and organisationally in the UK, as hospitals have struggled in some instances to respond 
effectively to a range of hospital-acquired infections.   The use of hospital-acquired infections 
as a tracer issue and valuable source of primary data to inform the study of organisational 
resilience will be explored in more detail in the next chapter (Chapter 2). 
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1.4 Methodology 
I will use this methodology section to examine the macro issues that arise from my choice of 
methodological approach.  The micro-level methods that relate to each theoretical/empirical 
study will be addressed in detail within each chapter owing to the diversity of quantitative 
and qualitative methods that were chosen.  
1.4.1 Mixed methods research 
I adopt a mixed methods approach for this thesis which involves qualitative (in-depth 
interview-based case studies and documentation analysis) and quantitative (primary 
statistical analysis of survey data) methods.  I chose a mixed methods approach for the 
following reasons: 
1.4.1.1 As the concept of organisational resilience has been researched through multiple 
paradigms, to adopt a range of qualitative and quantitative methods that reflect 
these paradigms to ensure a comprehensive examination of the concept; 
1.4.1.2 To establish a detailed multi-level understanding of organisational resilience in 
healthcare using in-depth inductive and exploratory techniques and then to test 
specific findings using deductive, statistical techniques in order to generalise the 
findings to a broader healthcare population; 
1.4.1.3 To build on the increasing evidence for the relevance of mixed methods to 
understand the complexity of healthcare and the growing evidence and benefits of 
its use in the healthcare context;(40) and 
1.4.1.4 As a researcher, to develop “methodological bilingualism”(41)p45 through the 
attainment of methodological competence in qualitative and quantitative 
designs.(42) 
Mixed methods approaches using different ontological positions in the past have been 
presented as incommensurable(43).  Denzin outlines the paradigm wars throughout the 
course of the 1980s and 1990s between advocates for quantitative or qualitative positions 
based on adherence to different paradigms.  Denzin notes that during this period, support for 
mixed methods approaches was variable. (44)  Oakley describes the contextual and cultural 
distinctions that influenced her commitment to scientific-based research and randomized 
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control designs over qualitative methods in healthcare.  She describes the divergence 
between qualitative and quantitative methods and the difficulties she found in mixing 
methods.(45) 
More recently, mixed methods approaches which draw on both positions are increasingly 
recognised as possible(40;46) and there is a growth in the use of these methods in health 
services research.(40)   Fulop is a key proponent of this approach, arguing that researchers 
from different paradigms should be able to work together to address one research problem, 
although only if they are not functioning at extreme ends of their particular paradigm.  She 
advocates mixed methods for health service delivery and organisational research as an area 
of applied research that draws on a range of disciplines and perspectives. (40) 
The overall study will draw on methods from the functionalist and interpretive paradigms – 
see Table 1.1.  The key to mixed methods is to recognise the contribution and limitations of 
contributions from different disciplines.  Given that the study of organisational resilience has 
rarely been applied to healthcare(18;47-52), the intention is to take: 
  a functionalist stance to examine and synthesis the literature 
  an interpretive stance using underpinning theories to explore organisational 
resilience at micro and meso-level in a case study organisation and at macro-level 
across governmental, advisory, and regulatory agencies in the healthcare system 
  a positivist stance to develop and analyse findings from an organisational resilience 
questionnaire to develop a robust organisational resilience measurement tool. 
1.4.2 Multidisciplinary research 
This research is multidisciplinary, reflecting the diverse field of organisational resilience in 
which at least three disciplines contribute to the literature; engineering (resilient 
engineering), organisation studies and disaster management which tend towards different 
ontological and epistemological positions.  Given the broad multidisciplinary base, both 
interpretive and functionalist perspectives have relevance for the study of organisational 
resilience.  Interpretive theories extend and elucidate the dynamic and systemic nature of 
resilience through the examination of complex change(53) and consideration of the broader 
implications of interventions, the context they occur in and the interaction between those 
interventions and other components of the system.(54)  The functionalist theories support 
the quantification of the concepts of organisational resilience through the use of empirical 
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and statistical techniques that support testing of the concept and generalisability of the 
concept across different settings. 
Table 1.1.  Methodological Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter Description Epistemology Methodology Predominant 
Theory 
1 Introduction  
2 Infection prevention 
and control as a 
tracer issue 
Functionalist Narrative Organisational 
Resilience 
3 Organisational 
resilience literature 
review 
Functionalist Quantitative/qualitative 
synthesis 
Organisational 
Resilience 
4 Systematic Review 
of organisational 
resilience factors in 
unexpected 
infection events 
Functionalist Quantitative synthesis Organisational 
Resilience 
5 Interview/ 
Document Study of 
Rising Infections 
Interpretive/ 
Interactionist 
Inductive thematic 
analysis 
Foucauldian 
governmentality 
6 Case Study of 
Unexpected 
Infection Outbreak 
Interpretive/ 
Interactionist 
Qualitative content 
analysis/thematic 
analysis 
Sensemaking 
7 Design and 
Development of 
organisational 
resilience 
questionnaire 
Positivist/Functionalist Quantitative/qualitative 
synthesis 
Organisational 
Resilience 
8 UK survey,  testing 
and development 
of revised 
resilience 
questionnaire 
Positivist/Functionalist Principal components 
analysis 
Organisational 
Resilience 
 
1.4.3 Use of social science approaches to interpret organisational resilience 
1.4.3.1 Candidate theory selection  
Organisational resilience theory, as defined in 1.2.3.1 is a relatively new concept and the 
literature is disjointed and ontologically diverse.  The publication of several seminal works in 
the organisational studies(55;56) and resilience engineering fields(56;57) have influenced 
the theoretical development of organisational resilience, whilst highlighting a number of, as 
yet unresolved, theoretical inconsistencies.   As such, comprehensive conceptualisation and 
detailed empirical studies are lacking in the literature.  Complementary theories within 
organisational studies research have developed at the same time that can assist in the 
understanding of organisational resilience.  These theories help to provide an organisational 
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context or develop key organisational concepts that enlighten our understanding of 
organisational resilience as an emerging theory.   
To address this issue in this thesis, I consider a range of complementary social science 
theories; complexity theory; sensemaking; neo-institutional theory; and Foucauldian 
governmentality and analyse the relevance of these related theories to the theory of 
organisational resilience.  I will take each theory in turn, discussing its key attributes and why 
it was either discarded or retained for use within the thesis. 
1.4.3.2 Complexity theory 
In the first instance, I considered theories that might elucidate the study of organisational 
resilience at micro and meso-level within a hospital organisation.  I considered complexity 
theory as a dynamic model of organisations that might be relevant to the study of 
organisational resilience and contextually, relevant to hospitals as complex adaptive 
systems.  Complexity theory, which evolved in the natural sciences, is applied at micro-level 
and then aggregated up to inform theory at meso and macro level.  In the 1990’s, a body of 
literature developed which applied complexity theory to an organisational context and was 
extended in the 2000’s to consider its applicability to a business or management context and 
provide detailed theoretical focus on specific contexts, e.g. the public sector(58) and 
healthcare.(59)  It has been defined as, ‘a network of elements (agents) that exchange 
information in such a way that change in the context of one element change the context for 
all others.  Complexity is the result of the interaction of elements that only respond to the 
limited information they are presented with.’(59) However, complexity has different 
definitions in different fields(60) and therefore it can be easier to recognise the 
characteristics of complexity theory, rather than attempting to identify a unifying definition.    
There are several key characteristics of complexity theory which appear superficially to 
resonate with organisational resilience theory as they can be related to the ‘adjustment in 
functioning’ described in the definition of organisational resilience that an organisation 
undergoes as a result of changes or disturbances: systems dynamics (the non-linear 
interactions between actors and related feedback loops that can amplify or dampen the 
effects of small changes, either creating more extensive change in system behaviour or 
reducing the impact on other actors(61)); bifurcation (the point at which there is an abrupt 
change in system behaviour when a system reorganises and assumes a qualitatively 
different state(61));  and self-organisation (where actors interact with other actors using local 
information in a local context resulting in a system with no central controlling force (62)  
29 
 
which develops in unknown directions and with unknown speed(63)).  However, the literature 
highlights the practical difficulties of attempting to map prospectively the micro-level 
interactions between agents(62) which would be almost impossible in the rapidly evolving 
scenario of an unexpected event and would require extensive observation beyond the scope 
of a PhD.  A further issue is that as a theory, a complexity approach assists in explaining 
what happened and how it happened, drawing on mathematical logic and principles, but is 
less forthcoming in explaining why human actors behaved in a particular way.  For these 
reasons, I chose to adopt a sensemaking approach over a complexity theory approach, as 
sensemaking addresses the cognitive and behaviour factors at a micro-level which I 
considered essential in explaining the response of participants in an unexpected event. 
1.4.3.3 Sensemaking Theory: Weick 
In this thesis I chose to examine organisational resilience using the contribution of 
sensemaking theory to explain how organisational actors and teams think and behave in 
particular ways in response to an unexpected event.  I considered that the micro-level focus 
of sensemaking would provide new perspectives for understanding organisational resilience 
in a complex health setting, as the literature suggests that individual and team resilience has 
an impact on meso-level resilience.(24)  I specifically identified Weick as a major proponent 
of sensemaking theory (see Appendix B for a summary of sensemaking literature).  His work 
provides a detailed explanation and empirical examples of the cognition, behaviour and 
actions that result from an individual or teams’ sensemaking in unfamiliar or unexpected 
situations.(64)  Despite this, associations between organisational resilience and 
sensemaking are tentatively made in Weick’s work.(55)  One of the more specific 
descriptions of the association between resilience and sensemaking in Weick’s work is 
described as, “resilient action that enables recovery from setbacks is built out of a broad 
repertoire of action and experience, the ability to recombine fragments of past experience 
into novel responses.”(55)p3   I aim to use a sensemaking lens to examine organisational 
resilience at micro and meso-level, drawing on the specific characteristics of sensemaking to 
elucidate the study of organisational resilience during unexpected events.  
1.4.3.4 Neo-Institutional theory 
In the second instance, I considered theories that might elucidate the study of organisational 
resilience across the acute hospital system.  I evaluated the use of neo-institutional theory 
as an approach to consider the broader macro-level institutional forces that influence meso-
level organisational elements and micro-level individual elements in acute hospital 
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responses to rising infection rates.  Neo-institutional theory has currency as one of the main 
theoretical perspectives to understand organisational behaviour, therefore warranted 
consideration as a candidate theory.  New institutional theory draws on Scott’s 
conceptualisation of three broad types of institutional structures; regulative (rule setting and 
monitoring), normative (prescriptive and evaluative) and cultural-cognitive (classification 
systems, assumptions and premises).(65)  Each of these structures contributes to the 
maintenance of an institutionalized social order and within any particular institution each of 
these structures plays a greater or less role.   The emphasis within institutional theory has 
focused on rationalized environmental influences, assessing how different institutional 
structures, e.g. beliefs and practices shape organisations.  More recently, the impact of 
broader societal forces, such as religion, the economy and the state have been referenced in 
relation to organisations and organisational fields.(66)   
I found that institutional theory provided some explanations for the function of organisational 
resilience within the healthcare infection setting.  For example, institutional theory helps to 
explain how regulatory processes, e.g. the infection prevention and control elements within 
the Health and Social Care Act 2006, are diffused and adapted within organisations.  
However, as Hasselbladh and Kallinikos state, ‘institutionalism needs to abandon the bird’s 
eye view of the field, and come closer to the social and cognitive means and procedures 
underlying rationalized beliefs and schemes of action.’(67)p700.  I concur with their view that 
a detailed understanding of practices within delineated social fields, such as health or work 
is required, rather than the neo-institutional promotion of structural isomorphism.  A further 
issue is that neo-institutional explanations of the means by which beliefs and practices are 
given form and become diffuse and stable are not adequately developed. Empirical work 
detailing organisational performance principles, devices of control, procedures, rules of 
conduct, objects and roles as components of formal organising are limited.(67)     Foucault’s 
work on governmentality(68) addressed this shortfall.  Foucault defines domains of action by 
linking central institutions (e.g. clinics, hospitals) with delineated social fields (e.g. 
health).(69-71)   His work addresses the organisational processes and procedures that 
define knowledge, including the construction of subjects and objects, positions of authority 
and the criteria of truth.(67) 
A further critique of neo-institutionalism is the absence of technology as a principle mode of 
regulation in conjunction with socio-cultural modes.(72)  In relation to the case study I 
examined, I found technology to be a critical structural factor, alongside socio-cultural 
processes and therefore found neo-institutionalism to be inadequate, as it is currently 
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conceptualised, to explain this phenomenon.  Instead, the Foucauldian perspective on 
surveillance(73), combined with Zuboff’s elaboration of electronic surveillance 
mechanisms(74), provided a basis for understanding the role of technology by the state to 
remotely monitor infections, with the aim of reducing them. 
1.4.3.5 Governmentality theory: Foucault 
My decision to use Foucault’s work on governmentality to inform the study of organisational 
resilience at macro-level arose from an iterative approach between the early data and the 
case.  An exploratory process of reading, discussing and analyzing the early data with my 
supervisors, led to the realization of the pivotal role of electronic surveillance programmes to 
achieve resilience in acute hospitals, particularly in the context of Zuboff’s work as an 
example of electronic surveillance.(74)  Zuboff draws on Foucauldian governmentality theory 
to explain the effects (both intended and unintended) of the introduction and extension of 
electronic surveillance in the workplace through the development of information 
communication technologies (ICTs).  The impact of electronic surveillance on vertical 
(hierarchical) visibility and horizontal (peer-level) visibility is explored from a Foucauldian 
perspective in Zuboff’s work.(74)  Zuboff’s work provided an early exemplar for my 
application of Foucauldian governmentality theory to electronic surveillance mechanisms in 
infection prevention and control, at both macro-level from a government perspective and 
micro-level using an embedded case study.    
I have chosen a Foucauldian lens to apply concepts of power, discipline and self-
organisation to better understand the role of surveillance in strengthening organisational 
resilience to infective organisms in acute hospitals in England.  I combine Foucault’s earlier 
work describing the in-depth surveillance and control that defined the disciplinary society(73) 
with his later work describing governmentality(75) and the technology of the self(76) to 
create a conceptual framework that enables exploration of the role of national electronic 
surveillance programmes and the enrolment of clinical leaders in self-organisation under 
surveillance, during the implementation of an infection prevention and control health reform 
programme by the UK government from 2004 to 2011. 
1.4.4 Anticipated contribution of thesis 
I intend this thesis to contribute to a number of different fields, reflecting the multidisciplinary 
conceptualisation and application of organisational resilience in the literature.  I consider 
there to be three main audiences for this thesis: academics from the different disciplines that 
this thesis contributes to including resilience engineering and organisation studies; infection 
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control practitioners and managers in healthcare who are interested in understanding more 
about the practical application of organisational resilience in acute hospitals; and policy 
makers who are interested in applying the learning from previous unexpected events to 
future policy development and initiatives, not only in healthcare, but potentially more widely.  
I will take each of these areas in turn, relating the contribution of this thesis to the relevant 
audiences. 
There is a diverse academic audience for this thesis, as organisational resilience is studied 
from the perspective of several different disciplines.  Hence this thesis is written to appeal to 
several academic audiences that are rooted in different academic traditions, operating with 
different epistemological positions. These traditions are: organisational studies, which adopt 
an interpretive epistemology; resilience engineering which draws on systems thinking and 
adopts a functionalist epistemology and disaster management which considers emergencies 
within the community context and tends towards interpretive approaches.  In chapter 3, I 
undertake a literature review which maps themes from the organisational literature onto 
these three traditions.   The thesis aims to integrate organisational resilience research 
across disciplines by drawing on key elements from each discipline.   For example, the 
organisational resilience questionnaire, the subject of chapters 7 & 8, aims to integrate the 
tradition of resilience studies within engineering, which emphasise the structural and process 
elements of resilience, with the cognitive and behaviour elements of resilience that are the 
focus of organisation studies literature.   I have positioned chapters 5 & 6 within the 
organisation studies literature, using a sensemaking and Foucauldian governmentality 
perspective as I considered that these theories (as described above) provided the most 
relevant frameworks for bringing new, if modest academic contributions to the organisational 
resilience literature.  
The second audience is that of practitioners and managers in acute hospitals.  With the 
recent impact on health services of pandemic flu(77), adverse weather conditions(78;79) and 
Norovirus outbreaks(80), practitioners and managers are seeking to understand how they 
can make health services more resilient in the face of unexpected events.  In particular, from 
an infection control perspective, the management of outbreaks has centered on clinical, 
epidemiological and biological solutions.  Only recently have organisational approaches 
been considered and further multidisciplinary research is required to build an evidence-base 
to demonstrate the potential impact of organisational and behavioural interventions.(81)  
This thesis adopts an organisational and practical perspective to the study of resilience.  
This is evidenced in the systematic review in chapter 4, in which the literature on 
33 
 
organisational resilience interventions to reduce the impact of outbreaks in the acute health-
care setting is reviewed.  A further practical application is the aforementioned organisational 
resilience questionnaire in chapters 7&8 which provides practitioners with a tool through 
which the resilience of their organisation to infection outbreaks can be measured and 
managers with a mechanism to identify shortfalls in practice for remediation. 
The third audience is policy makers who are interested in learning lessons from previous 
unexpected events, .e.g. outbreaks to inform future resilient practice and government bodies 
seeking to inform healthcare policy development.  Independent policy think tanks are 
studying resilience from an organisational perspective within healthcare1 and from a cross-
government and cross –industry perspective(82).  These policy makers are interested in the 
potential impact of infection outbreaks and antimicrobial resistance on system resilience and 
lessons for emergency management.   The systematic review in chapter 4 identifies 
organisational resilience themes across infection outbreaks, with the aim of identifying 
generic learning from comparable events.  From a governmental policy perspective, the 
study in chapter 5, which evaluates hospital resilience from a system perspective, identifies 
a series of factors at macro-level that contributed to resilience at meso and micro-level.  
These factors can help inform policy decisions about healthcare and design system-level 
interventions that can effect resilient change.  
1.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, I have examined the evolution of the term ‘organisational resilience’ and 
described the context for my study of organisational resilience; infection prevention and 
control in UK acute healthcare.  I have presented the macro-level methodological 
considerations that have influenced the design of this thesis, which reflect the 
multidisciplinary nature of organisational resilience literature and identified the anticipated 
contribution of this thesis to the different fields that contribute to organisational resilience 
research.  I have made my case for the candidate theories used within the thesis and the 
rationale for discarding other potentially relevant theories.   In the next chapter, I proceed to 
justify in more detail my choice of infection prevention and control as a tracer issue in this 
thesis.   
                                                 
1
 Website: http://www.resilienthealthcare.net/About_RHCN.html 
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2 Chapter 2.  Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) as a tracer 
issue 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This second introductory chapter provides the rationale for the use of infection prevention 
and control (IPC) as a tracer issue, examining IPC in the context of expected and 
unexpected conditions.  It forms the basis for three subsequent chapters: informing the use 
of infection outbreaks for the systematic review; identifying an unexpected event to inform 
the resilience case study at micro and meso-level; and contributing to the focus on expected 
conditions in the study of resilient government interventions at macro-level.   I conclude this 
chapter with a description of the aims and objectives of the thesis and an outline of the 
thesis structure. 
In this chapter, I aim to answer the question, ‘Why is infection prevention and control a 
pertinent tracer issue?’    A tracer issue is defined as a specific subject area that can be 
used to examine a theoretical topic empirically, serving to narrow down the scope of an 
inquiry and provide a rich seam of primary data.(29)  For this thesis, the tracer issue is 
infection prevention and control as it relates to nosocomial transmission and hospital-
acquired infections (HAI) as outlined in Chapter 1.  Firstly, I will explore the relevance of the 
organisational resilience definition for establishing infection prevention and control as a 
tracer issue.  Secondly, I will examine infection prevention and control strategies, as they 
pertain to the organisational resilience definition.  Thirdly, I will discuss the implications for 
the study of organisational resilience and outline how infection prevention and control will be 
used as a tracer issue within this thesis. 
2.2 Aligning organisational resilience with infection prevention and 
control 
I refer to the definition of organisational resilience that I use for this thesis (outlined in the 
introduction) to examine the two conditions that are relevant to the use of infection 
prevention and control as a tracer issue.  The definition I use is, 
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 ‘the intrinsic ability of a system (organisation) to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or 
following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain required operations under both 
expected and unexpected conditions.’(23)   
The reference to ‘expected’ and ‘unexpected’ conditions in the definition provide the basis for 
the use of infection prevention and control as a tracer issue in this study. In Hollnagel’s 
definition, the first element of resilience relates to expected conditions or ‘business as 
normal.’  To achieve resilience in expected conditions, the organisation has to adjust its 
routine functioning to cope with occasional or continuous stressors on the system.(83)  The 
second element of resilience relates to unexpected conditions where high anticipation and 
rapid response are essential elements of organisational function to prevent less frequent, but 
potentially disastrous disturbances.   
For the purposes of this thesis, I propose that the mechanisms for the organisation to ‘adjust 
its functioning’ are based on the organisation’s ability to mobilise infection prevention and 
control strategies at individual, team and organisational level and to respond to and/or 
influence strategies at governmental level.   Table 2.1 sets out the proposed approach for 
aligning expected and unexpected conditions with infections and the associated infection 
prevention and control strategies. 
Table 2.1 outlines three infection criteria and examples of organisms that might be hospital-
acquired or be transmitted in the hospital (nosocomial). These organisms have different 
underlying etiologies, different levels of impact on an organisation and require different 
strategies to deal with them effectively.  In the case of expected conditions, the bacterial 
(mainly antibiotic resistant) organisms that constitute this group can cause localised 
outbreaks within organisations, placing occasional, and in some institutions, continuous 
stress on their function.  If unchecked, increasing incidence of these organisms can impact 
more widely in the hospital organisation(84;85), and as in the specific examples of MRSA 
and CDI, have a national impact.   
For the purposes of this research there are two levels of unexpected events; significant 
disturbances and extreme disturbances.  Significant disturbances include epidemics which 
can be defined as the expansion of an epidemic strain of bacteria or viruses resulting in 
significant spread nationally.(86).  Extreme disturbances mainly relate to pandemics which 
can result from extensive spread of novel viral agents caused by the antigenic shift to new 
virus strains or subtypes.  The impact of rapid nosocomial transmission amongst patients 
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and staff during these unexpected conditions, usually as a result of infectious viral agents 
being brought into hospital from the community, can cause rapid organisational dysfunction.   
Table 2.1.  Examples of organisms and infection strategies aligned with expected and 
unexpected conditions 
Conditions Criteria Examples of organisms 
(hospital-acquired/nosocomial 
transmission) 
Adjust organisational functioning 
(infection prevention and control 
strategies) 
 
Expected 
 
Occasional 
or continuous 
stressors 
(localised 
outbreaks) 
 Meticillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus 
(MRSA) 
 Clostridium difficile 
infection (CDI)  
 Vancomycin/Glycopeptide 
Resistant Enterococcus 
(VRE/GRE) 
 Meticillin-sensitive 
Staphylococcus aureus 
(MSSA) 
Strategies to address increasing 
incidence include: 
 Local unit changes 
 Organisational strategies 
 Governmental 
interventions 
 
Unexpected 
 
 
Significant 
disturbances 
(Organisation 
outbreaks or 
epidemic) 
 CDI 
 VRE/GRE 
 Norovirus 
 
Strategies to address serious 
disturbances include: 
 Emergency planning 
 Cross-organisation co-
operation 
 Government directives 
 Cross-government 
collaboration 
Extreme 
Disturbances
(Pandemic) 
 Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) 
 Swine-origin influenza 
A/H1N1 
I will use the terms ‘expected conditions’ linked to ‘continuous stressors’ and ‘unexpected 
events’ throughout the thesis to explore organisational resilience in different contexts 
through the infection prevention and control strategies that are adopted by hospitals in 
response to each scenario. 
Next, I will review key aspects of the infection control strategies that have been adopted by 
acute hospital organisations and the government in the UK in response to both expected 
conditions and unexpected events.  In this thesis, I have defined expected conditions as the 
increasing incidence of specific bacterial infections in the UK from 1990-2009 which served 
as continuous stressors on the resilience of acute hospitals.  I have defined unexpected 
conditions as acute hospitals’ responses to significant and unexpected local outbreaks, viral 
epidemics and to the impact of global pandemics that have occurred over the last decade. 
2.2.1 Expected Conditions 
In response to the increasing incidence of government monitored bacterial infections in 
hospitals between 1990 and 2009, specifically MRSA, C.difficile, GRE, MSSA, the 
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government implemented a series of significant shifts in policy in an effort to halt the rise of 
these infections in acute hospitals.  These have included the transition from policy 
development to operational intervention, from issuing guidance to influencing legislation and 
the trend towards prioritisation of money and resources to infection prevention.  
Organisations have developed their own strategies and adopted the government’s 
interventions, but widely varying incidences of infection across different NHS acute hospitals 
are still evident, despite lower overall rates in the UK. 
2.2.1.1 Policy development to operational intervention 
Traditionally, the Department of Health’s role involved formulating policy to address health 
issues.  This role is evident in infection policy from the 1980s to 2003, when hospital Trusts 
received a series of Health Service Guidelines and Circulars from the Department of Health 
with recommendations for change.  However, from 2003 onwards as specific, measured 
infection rates continued to rise, the Department of Health adopted an increasingly 
interventionist response.  This was reflected in the adoption of measurable clinical targets 
against which acute hospitals were closely monitored, the use of DH improvement teams 
and Healthcare Commission inspectorates to investigate hospitals who were perceived as 
failing, the introduction of the ‘Towards Cleaner Hospitals and Lower Rates of Infection 
Programme’ and the support of the ‘cleanyourhands’ NPSA campaign.  This transition 
suggests that the traditional policy approach did not work with infection control.  The growing 
interest from the media and the public in the apparent failure by the NHS to control infections 
and the effect this had on politicians may have played a significant part in this.(87;88)  
2.2.1.2 Legislative transition 
The shift from guidance to legislation by the Department of Health over the last twenty years 
represents a further change.  The data on infection levels in 2003 indicated that the 
Department of Health’s strategy of issuing guidance to Trusts was failing to work, resulting in 
a transition towards developing legislation to address infection problems. In 2006 the Health 
Act incorporated a code of practice for the prevention and management of infection(89) 
which required managers to meet minimum standards and in 2008, the Health and Social 
Care Act(90) was introduced, extending the requirements for infection prevention to health 
and social care. 
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2.2.1.3 Performance management 
 The government introduced a range of increasingly stringent enforcement mechanisms to 
ensure hospitals adopted new policies.  The step changes involved moving from 
recommendations for implementing infection prevention and control teams and practices in 
the early 1990s to setting clear objectives in 2000, to introducing clinical targets for the first 
time in 2004 and legislation in 2006.  The trajectory of MRSA blood stream infections (BSIs) 
began to fall finally in 2008. 
2.2.1.4 Resource commitments 
NHS policy guidance in 1995 stated that implementation of the guidance by Trusts should 
incur ‘no financial or manpower implications’(91)  By 2003, the Department of Health 
reflected in its guidance ‘Winning Ways’ that healthcare-associated infections had not been 
afforded such a high priority as some other aspects of healthcare in England.(36)  Infection 
control departments were considered a ‘Cinderella service’ with pressures on microbiologists 
and a shortage of infectious disease experts.(36) This situation changed, driven in part by 
the criticism of previous policies by the National Audit Office (NAO) reports in 2000(34), 
2004(92) and 2009(93) with significant investment in cleaning programmes, education, 
inspections, improvement teams, ICT staffing and campaigns from 2004 onwards.  These 
changes were influential in affording infection prevention and control a higher status in 
hospitals, particularly with the appointment of a key leadership role, the DIPC on Trust 
Boards.   
2.2.2 Unexpected Events 
I will review three studies that discuss the unexpected impact of 3 different organisms that 
caused rapid nosocomial transmission in acute hospital settings to understand: 
 The infection factors that create an unexpected event; 
 The level of impact of the unexpected event; and 
 The organisational response. 
The three studies were selected from the systematic review described in Chapter 4.  These 
studies met the inclusion/exclusion criteria for unexpected infection events in healthcare, but 
failed the quality assessment as they were narrative descriptions of unexpected events.  
However, I have used them here as they offer insightful narrative and thematic accounts of 
unfolding events and help to explain the value of using infection outbreaks as a proxy for 
unexpected conditions.   
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One study relates to the unexpected impact of a newly identified viral strain of norovirus in a 
university hospital,(94) the second to a hospital emergency response to novel Influenza A 
(H1N1) pandemic(95) and the third to a clinical review of severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS).(96)   The studies have different perspectives; the norovirus study focuses on the 
epidemiology of a new viral strain, the H1N1 study focuses on the antimicrobial stewardship 
approach and the SARS study focuses on a disaster management approach.  However, as 
outlined in Table 2.2, there are a series of infection factors that cause an outbreak to 
become an unexpected event.   These factors can cause the hospital to be insufficiently 
prepared to either anticipate the outbreak or respond to the extent of the outbreak.   
Table 2.2  Examples of infection outbreaks that illustrate the potential for infection outbreaks 
to serve as a proxy for unexpected events. 
Infection 
identified 
in study 
Infection factors that 
create an unexpected 
event 
Level of impact of 
the unexpected 
event 
Positive aspects of organisational 
response 
Norovirus  New strain of virus. 
Rapid spread from index 
case to other wards. 
Very few virions (<100) 
required to establish acute 
infection. 
Secondary nosocomial 
transmission frequently 
observed. 
63 cases of acute 
gastroenteritis in 
patients and staff 
between Feb-Mar 
2001 
Immediate infection control measures. 
Isolation of patients. 
Sick HCWs excluded from work. 
Published guidelines. 
Patients’ transfer between wards 
restricted. 
Infected patients nursed together. 
H1N1 New strain of virus. 
Early cases in pandemic 
resulting in independent 
hospital response. 
Inadequate testing until later 
in outbreak. 
Large surges of 
patients and worried 
well. 
Over 1,000 patients 
between May-Dec 
2009 
 
Rapid multidisciplinary team response. 
Clinician-led response. 
Triage guideline implemented. 
Use of web technology for outbreak 
information. 
Cross-department collaboration. 
Antimicrobial stewardship programme 
(ASP). 
Streamlined anti-viral drug usage. 
SARS New strain of virus. 
Beginning and end of 
outbreak is unclear. 
Unclear illness 
presentations. 
Uncertain diagnostic criteria. 
 
 
Large surge of 
unanticipated critically 
ill patients. 
Multidisciplinary crisis team. 
Rapid communication and information. 
Use of web technology for outbreak 
information. 
Isolation of affected patients. 
Key: ILI – Influenza-like illness, HCW – Healthcare worker. Nosocomial – Hospital-based 
Despite the shortfalls in anticipation and response, all studies had identified positive 
organisational responses that had facilitated the care and throughput of patients.   All studies 
also identified areas of problematic practice, which included: silo working, breakdowns in 
communication, individual concerns being prioritised over organisational needs, insufficient 
leadership at the front-line, inadequate staff support, distrust between teams and political 
barriers.  However, post-outbreak, all studies reported learning from the challenges and 
positive practice that occurred during the outbreak.  Some had identified innovative practice 
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that resulted from the outbreak which was embedded in routine care.  Others had found 
solutions to the challenges that were faced and identified ways to improve preparedness for 
future outbreaks or other types of unexpected event. 
My review of these three studies provides empirical evidence for the use of infections as 
exemplars for the study of unexpected events from an organisational resilience perspective.  
The outbreaks, particularly those involving a new strain or sudden surge in patient numbers, 
place an unexpected and sudden strain on hospital resources, testing the resilience of the 
whole organisation and its capacity and capability to respond.  
2.3 Discussion and Implications 
In this chapter, I have examined the potential for hospital-acquired and nosocomial 
transmission of infections to serve as a tracer issue for organisational resilience.  The 
evidence suggests that infections serve as a useful tracer issue for both continuous 
stressors during expected conditions and as unexpected events on a hospital organisation.  
In either scenario the hospital has to respond to prevent extensive transmission or spread.  
The continuously evolving nature of infectious diseases means that there will be new strains 
of existing infections and new infections that test the overall ability of acute healthcare to 
cope, particularly when hospitals are often coping at maximum capacity already.   
How a hospital responds to either expected, but stressful conditions or an unexpected event, 
is critical in the study of resilience.  Depending on the impact and extent of the infection in 
the hospital, the organisational approach and the strategies that it adopts will determine 
whether it is able to deal effectively with the problem. 
In this research, I will use primary research to explore hospital responses in the context of 
expected conditions and unexpected events.  In Chapter 5, I assess the impact of two 
organisms, MRSA BSI and CDI as continuous stressors on acute hospitals in England and 
the response of hospitals and the government to address the problem over a decade.   In 
Chapter 6, I use an organisation-wide Norovirus outbreak as an empirical example of an 
unexpected event that had a significant impact on an acute hospital Trust and examine the 
hospital’s response to this outbreak.   
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2.4  Aims and objectives of the thesis 
The overarching aim of this thesis was to examine organisational resilience in the UK acute 
hospital context, focusing on infection prevention and control as a tracer theme.  In order to 
achieve this aim, the objectives were as follows: 
 to investigate what is known about the concept and associated factors of 
organisational resilience and the application of organisational resilience to UK acute 
hospitals 
 to explore theoretically and empirically the two contexts for organisational resilience 
(expected conditions and unexpected events) in the hospital infection context and; 
 to design and test an organisational resilience tool to measure organisational 
resilience in the context of an unexpected event 
These objectives define different elements of study and draw on a range of methodologies 
and underpinning theoretical perspectives to achieve them.  Each chapter states specific 
aims and outlines the specific theoretical and methodological approach that is relevant for 
that chapter. 
2.5  Structure of the thesis 
The thesis comprises eight subsequent chapters, outlined in the PhD ‘road map’ in Figure 
2.1.  
The thesis begins with an introductory chapter which provides the empirical context for the 
theoretical and empirical chapters.  Chapter 2 provides the rationale for the use of infection 
prevention and control (IPC) as a tracer issue for organisational resilience, examining IPC in 
the context of expected and unexpected conditions.  Two background chapters follow.  
Chapter 3 is a literature review of organisational resilience, evaluating how and to what 
extent organisational resilience is developed conceptually and empirically in the current 
literature.  This provides the context and evidence-base for Chapter 4, which addresses 
gaps in the resilience literature. Chapter 4 is a systematic literature review of IPC strategies 
for dealing with unexpected events, with the creation of a framework of resilient factors that 
derive from infection outbreaks.  All three chapters serve as an introduction to the 
theoretical/empirical chapters, providing an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of 
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the organisational resilience literature and the utility of IPC as a tracer issue for an improved 
understanding of organisational resilience. 
Chapters 5-8, the theoretical/empirical chapters, examine the concept of organisational 
resilience in an IPC context, addressing theoretical gaps in the literature and utilising 
underpinning theoretical perspectives to provide an in-depth understanding of each case. 
Chapter 5 assesses organisational resilience at macro-level examining the impact of 
government interventions on rising infection rates in acute hospitals. Foucauldian 
governmentality theory is adopted to assess the effectiveness of a national surveillance 
strategy utilised by the government in increasing organisational resilience in hospitals.  
Chapter 6 assesses organisational resilience at micro-level using a case study of an 
unexpected infection event.  This chapter draws on sensemaking theory to provide a novel 
and detailed perspective of the cultural, cognitive and behavioural factors that contribute to 
or detract from resilient practice which are insufficiently conceptualised in the sensemaking 
or resilience literature.   Chapter 7 & 8 describe the design and development of an 
organisational resilience questionnaire and then present a revised questionnaire based on 
the analysis and findings from a survey using the questionnaire.  This chapter addresses a 
significant gap in the organisational resilience literature, namely the lack of effective 
measures of organisational resilience.  Finally, Chapter 9 concludes the thesis, with a 
discussion of the findings, limitations, challenges and implications for clinical practice, policy 
and future research identified during the research.  The conclusion summarises the key 
contributions of the thesis. 
Figure 2.1  PhD 'Road Map' 
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3 Chapter 3.  A Literature Review of Organisational Resilience 
In the following two chapters, I examine organisational resilience, using the theoretical and 
empirical literature.  In the first of the background chapters, Chapter 3 I undertake a 
theoretical literature review of organisational resilience research.  The purpose of this review 
is to assess the strengths and weaknesses of theoretical development in the organisational 
resilience field.  I take an in-depth review of the healthcare-related resilience theory to 
understand the extent of this literature and examine the underpinning theories which 
characterise the field.  In the second of the background chapters, Chapter 4, I adopt a 
contrasting approach.  I undertake an empirical systematic review, specifically focusing on 
healthcare studies of infection outbreaks as a proxy for unexpected events.  Using thematic 
analysis, I identify cross-cutting conceptual resilience themes within these infection studies 
and use these as a basis for comparison with the concepts that were identified within the 
theoretical literature review of Chapter 3.   This process informed the development of the 
theoretical/empirical studies in this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this literature review is to answer the question, ‘how and to what extent is 
‘organisational resilience’ defined theoretically in the recent literature?’  To achieve this, the 
following objectives will be met: 
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 To critically appraise the current state of organisational resilience literature 
through a literature review 
 To assess healthcare-focused organisational resilience literature as a context for 
the research studies in this thesis. 
 To identify gaps and areas for future research in the organisational resilience 
literature. 
The literature review is designed to outline the conceptual breadth of the field and provide a 
basis for future theory development.(2)     
Existing literature reviews of organisational resilience have been assessed and the gaps that 
were identified informed the development of this literature review. The focus of one recent 
review (2012) was to assess resilience literature from the context of small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs).(2)  This touched on organisational resilience, alongside resilience in the 
fields of ecology, psychology, physical systems and disaster management but as a result of 
the breadth of this review, there was insufficient focus on organisational resilience.  A further 
review published in 2012 attempted to combine a review of the literature with an integrative 
model of organisational resilience, but lacked methodological rigour.(97)  A systematic 
literature review published in 2011 reviewed all resilience literature to understand the key 
concepts that are relevant to public health and disaster planning.(1)  However, the main 
focus of this review was on communities and populations, rather than organisational 
resilience.  Some grey literature exists, such as an evidence-based guide for practitioners 
commissioned by the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD), Business in 
the Community (BITC) and the Institution of Occupational Safety and Health (IOSH).(98)  
However, this evidence-based guide focuses on a practitioner perspective, to explore what 
businesses leaders can learn from the literature.  In summary, there is a gap in the literature, 
which this research addresses, for a robust and current review of organisational resilience 
literature. 
3.2 Methods and Scope 
A literature search was undertaken using OvidSP to search EMBASE, Medline, HMIC and 
PsychInfo (n=59) and using the Web of Knowledge to search the Web of Science with 
conference proceedings (including Science Citation Index Expanded, Social Science Citation 
Index and Arts and Humanities Citation Index), Medline and CABI (n=65) in November 2012. 
Search terms were ‘resilience’ and associated abbreviations combined with either 
‘organisation’ or ‘organization’ and associated abbreviations to take account of the frequent 
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use of the American form used in articles.  Owing to the diverse nature of the literature, 
extensive hand searches of cited references from the articles generated within these 
electronic searches were conducted as was a search using Google Scholar.  Date limits 
were applied to the preliminary search to identify the last 20 years of literature from 1992-
2012.  This did not reduce the number of retrieved articles, reflecting the more recent use of 
the term ‘organisational resilience’.  These dates were chosen as the term ‘organisational 
resilience’ came into use at the beginning of the 1990’s, when there was a transition from its 
use in ecology to use in organisations.  Prior to that, the few articles that addressed 
resilience-related topics used the term ‘adaptation’ rather than resilience.  As Woods(99) 
notes, adaptability cannot automatically be labeled as ‘resilience’ as resilience incorporates 
the broader capability of a system to handle disruptions and variations.  The few key articles 
that comment on capability in addition to adaptability issues have been identified using hand 
searches and incorporated into the literature review. 
Overall, 124 articles were retrieved using database searches (see Figure 3.1). Each of the 
124 articles was reviewed against the classification criteria outlined in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1  Classification criteria for literature review 
Research focus Organisational Resilience 
Resilience focus Unexpected event/Continuous stressor 
Methods Theory building/Empirical/Measurement 
Organisational Resilience Concepts Concepts identified through full text review of 
included articles 
The main criterion for inclusion in the review was a focus on organisational resilience.  The 
subject area of each article was included so that the extent of healthcare-focused research 
in comparison to other subject areas was understood.  Articles were included if they covered 
the impact of unexpected events or the impact of occasional or continuous stressors, or 
both.  Methodological criteria included theory building, empirical and measurement to 
illustrate the extent to which organisational resilience research is conceptually or empirically 
focused.  Organisational resilience concepts were not pre-stated.  Instead, an exploratory 
approach was employed, identifying key organisational concepts within the full text review of 
retained literature to build a picture of the nature of organisational resilience studies to date. 
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 A duplicates search across both databases identified 28 duplicates in total.  The remaining 
96 articles were screened for relevance to organisational resilience, using the title and 
abstract.  68 articles were excluded because they either a) related to another area of 
resilience, e.g. ecology, information technology or b) were insufficiently robust e.g. a non-
peer reviewed paper, a patent, a practitioner book.  28 articles were retained.  Extensive 
hand searching was undertaken in these articles for relevant cited references (n=23) and 
further cross-checking was undertaken on Google Scholar to identify relevant peer reviewed 
research that had not been identified through the search process (n=6).  A full text review 
was undertaken of the 28 retained papers and the 29 papers identified through hand 
searching and Google Scholar. 
 
Figure 3.1  Review process 
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3.3 Results  
I report on the results of the literature review, a total of 57 organisational resilience papers.  
These papers are described in Table 3.2, both from a methodological and conceptual 
perspective.    
3.3.1 Multi-disciplinary approaches to organisational resilience 
I identified literature in three main disciplines; organisation studies, resilient engineering and 
disaster planning, detailed in the headings in Table 3.2 and Error! Reference source not 
found..  I found that organisational resilience research is at the juncture of all three 
disciplines.   Engineers, safety scientists and psychologists discuss high reliability 
organisations and the concept of adaptation at the juncture between organisation studies 
and resilient engineering.  The majority of adaptation research focuses on the impact of 
continuous stressors on organisations whereas high reliability research relates to both 
expected and unexpected conditions.   Another shared area is between organisation studies 
and disaster planning.  The juncture between these disciplines relates to the fields of crisis 
management and emergency planning.  The focus of much of this research is on the impact 
of unexpected events on organisations.  
Figure 3.2  Interrelated disciplines associated with the organisational resilience literature 
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Table 3.2  Concepts and Methodologies in the organisational resilience literature. 
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Meyer(22) 1982 HS Healthcare                          
Virany et al(100) 1992 HS Technology                          
Acar and 
Winfrey(101) 
1994 HS Systems                          
Anderson(102) 1994 Ovid Education                          
Hind et al (103) 1996 Ovid Psychology                          
Diamond(104) 1996 Ovid Technology                          
Bourrier(105) 1996 HS Nuclear Power                          
Horne and Orr(106) 1997 GS Organisations                          
Mallak(107) 1998 Web Healthcare                          
Mallak(108) 1998 Web Organisations                          
Weick et al(109) 1999 HS Organisations                          
Paton et al(110) 2000 HS Organisations                          
Carthey et al(111) 2001 HS Healthcare                          
Comfort et al(112) 2001 HS Education                          
Weick and 
Sutcliffe(113) 
2001 HS Organisations                          
Coutu(114) 2002 Ovid Organisations                          
Fiksel(115) 2003 HS Systems                          
Hamel and 
Valikangas(116) 
2003 HS Business                          
Riolli and Savicki(12) 2003 Web Information 
Technology 
                         
49 
 
  
 
 
 
Author (s) 
 
 
 
 
Y
e
a
r 
o
f 
P
u
b
lic
a
ti
o
n
 
D
a
ta
b
a
s
e
 
A
re
a
 o
f 
fo
c
u
s
 
Resilience 
focus 
Method Organisational Resilience Concepts 
  Organisation Studies Resilience Engineering Disaster planning 
U
n
e
x
p
e
c
te
d
 e
v
e
n
t 
C
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
 s
tr
e
s
s
o
r 
T
h
e
o
ry
 b
u
ild
in
g
 
E
m
p
ir
ic
a
l 
M
e
a
s
u
re
m
e
n
t 
 
O
rg
. 
 l
e
a
rn
in
g
 
O
rg
. 
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 
O
rg
. 
 d
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t 
O
rg
. 
 s
tr
u
c
tu
re
s
 
O
rg
. 
 c
u
lt
u
re
 
C
o
g
n
it
io
n
/B
e
h
a
v
io
u
r 
T
ru
s
t 
L
e
a
d
e
rs
h
ip
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
 
P
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
 
P
re
p
a
re
d
n
e
s
s
 
In
n
o
v
a
ti
o
n
 
Im
p
ro
v
is
a
ti
o
n
 
A
d
a
p
ta
ti
o
n
 
M
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g
 
C
ri
s
is
 m
n
g
t 
R
e
u
d
u
n
d
a
n
c
y
 
R
e
c
o
v
e
ry
 
P
o
lic
y
 m
a
k
in
g
 
C
o
m
p
e
ti
ti
v
e
 
a
d
v
a
n
ta
g
e
 
Starr et al(117) 2003 HS Business                          
Sutcliffe and 
Vogus(118) 
2003 GS Organisations                          
Weick and 
Sutcliffe(18) 
2003 HS Healthcare                          
Dalziell and 
McManus(119) 
2004 HS Systems                          
Vera & Rodriguez-
Lopez(120) 
2004 Ovid Humility                          
Aguirre & Dynes(52) 2005 HS Healthcare                          
Sheffi & Rice(20) 2005 GS Telecoms                          
Gittel et al(121) 2006 Ovid Aviation                          
Hollnagel et al(56) 2006 GS Engineering                          
Lee and Trim(122) 2006 Ovid Retail                          
Luthans et al(123) 2006 GS Human 
Resources 
                         
McDonald(124) 2006 HS Aviation                          
Lalonde(125) 2007 Ovid Organisations                          
Perry et al(49) 2007 Web Healthcare                          
Välikangas(27) 2007 Web Biotechnology                          
Vogus & 
Sutcliffe(24) 
2007 Web Organisations                          
Weick & Sutcliffe(55) 2007 HS Organisations                          
McManus et al(126) 2008 GS Organisations                          
Paton et al(127) 2008 Web Policing                          
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Reason(128) 2008 HS Healthcare                          
Seville et al (129) 2008 Ovid Organisations                          
Crichton et al(130) 2009 Ovid Organisations                          
Huber et al(28) 2009 Web Chemicals                          
Jeffs et al(50) 2009 Ovid Healthcare                          
Powley(131) 2009 HS Education                          
Rerup(51) 2009 HS Pharma                          
Smith & 
Fischbacher(132) 
2009 HS Risk 
Management 
                         
Somers(133) 2009 Ovid Organisations                          
Sullivan-Taylor & 
Wilson(134) 
2009 Ovid Aviation/ 
Leisure 
                         
Tillement et al(135) 2009 Ovid Rail                          
Denhardt & 
Denhardt(136) 
2010 Ovid Organisations                          
Størseth et al(137) 2010 Web Petroleum                          
Burnard & 
Bhamra(138) 
2011 HS Organisations                          
Chan(139) 2011 Web Business                          
Hollnagel et al(57) 2011 HS Engineering                          
Lengnick-Hall et 
al(140) 
2011 Ovid Human 
Resources 
                         
Linnenluecke et 
al(78) 
2012 Ovid Extreme 
weather 
                         
Huber et al(141) 2012 Ovid Aviation                          
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Table 3.3 Healthcare-focused organisational resilience literature 
Author Date Theoretical basis Definition of Organisational Resilience? Description of study 
Meyer(22) 
 
 
 
1982 Environmental adaptation 
Two concepts discussed in 
Weick(142): 
the stimulus-response 
paradigm and the variation-
selection-retention 
mechanism 
“Resiliency occurs when responses create negative-
feedback loops that absorb jolts' impacts and loosen 
couplings between organizations and their 
environments.” p520 
Adapting to environmental jolts 
A model of adaptation to environmental jolts based on empirical data relating to a doctors’ strike.  
Adaptations occurred in three phases: anticipatory; responsive; and readjustment.   Ideologies and 
strategies were found to exert strong influence on organisations’ adaptations and slack resources 
and structures imposed weak influence. 
Mallak(107) 1998a Three concepts 
discussed in Weick (19): 
(1) bricolage; 
(2) attitude of wisdom;  
(3) virtual role system  
“the ability of an individual or organization to 
expeditiously design and implement positive adaptive 
behaviours matched to the immediate situation, while 
enduring minimal stress.” p149 
Measure aspects of resilience in healthcare 
Six factors explaining over half the instrument variance were found, following a survey of nurse 
executives, including: goal-directed solution seeking; avoidance; critical understanding; role 
dependence; source reliance; and resource access.   
Carthey et 
al(111) 
2001 Safety management: 
system’s resistance to 
hazards (+)  versus 
vulnerabilities (-) 
“the system’s intrinsic resistance to its operational 
hazards. Some organisations will be more robust in 
coping with the human and technical dangers 
associated with their daily activities.” p29 
Institutional resilience in healthcare systems 
Use of cultural drivers; commitment, competence and cognisance and institutional principles, 
policies, procedures and practices; to move organisation from vulnerability towards resistance to 
hazards.  Checklist for institutional resilience (CAIR) 
Weick and 
Sutcliffe(18) 
2003 Behavioural 
commitment(143) 
Sensemaking (64;113) 
“a cultural mindset about risk, danger, and safety that 
was anchored by a process of behavioral commitment 
that shaped interpretation, action, and communication.” 
p74 
Hospitals as cultures of entrapment 
Strong behavioural commitment to unsafe care, driven by cultural mindset. Clinicians exhibited high 
autonomy and choice, leading to justification and rationalization of poor results – a culture of 
entrapment.  
Aguirre and 
Dynes(52) 
2005 Mindfulness(109) “the dynamic planning that is needed, 
planning which facilitates changes in the structures of 
the social organizations at risk and that bring about 
increases in resilience……and which reflect 
a culture of mindfulness.”p4 
Institutional review of disasters in acute hospitals 
Hospitals responses to disruptions reflect social construction of disasters, distinct from magnitude of 
impact of a hazard. Disaster planning should be guided by; mindfulness, pre-vision and structural 
transformation to address imagined or real demands  
Perry et al(49) 2007 Risk, safety and human 
factors(144) 
“safety, reliability, and resilience can best be achieved 
not through attempts at increasing procedural 
invariance (e.g. the rigid enforcement by technology of 
policies and procedures) but through the situated 
management of fluctuations in important organizational 
relationships and work practices.” p3416 
Factors undermining resilient performance in healthcare  
Assess organisation role in undermining organizational resilience using empirically derived factors: 
imposition of tighter control over work practice, increased standardization, negative trade-off 
between procedural compliance and clinical urgency. 
Reason(128) 2008 Mindfulness(109) “institutional resilience is an emergent property of the 
mental and technical skills of those at the sharp 
end,”p262 
The Human Contribution – Achieving Resilience 
Suggests an approach that moves from human as hazard to human as hero.  Institutional resilience 
requires individual and collective mindfulness. Constraining human variability to reduce errors and 
increase reliability paradoxically undermines safeguards of human adjustments to imperfect 
situations. 
Jeffs et al(50) 2009 Safer Systems(145;146) “to inform strategies that build clinical and 
organisational resilience through a multi-level 
framework derived from the collective theoretical and 
empirical work.” P75 
Building clinical and organisational resilience 
Multi-level safety trade-offs and tensions occur that can be addressed by: organisational processes 
and policies that maximize clinical scope of practice, foster collective responsibility for identifying 
safety threats, develop clinical appreciation of dynamic nature of patient safety in the work 
environment. 
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3.3.2 Organisational Resilience Concepts 
I have identified 20 key concepts that are commonly used to explain aspects of 
organisational resilience within the literature.  As Table 3.2 demonstrates, the majority of 
studies identify one or more organisational concepts that contribute to resilient practice, but 
these concepts are often not interrelated in a meaningful way.  Given the breadth of 
theorising in relation to organisational resilience (43 out of 57 papers), I found that the 
number of cohesive theoretical models are limited and those that exist are largely focused 
on unexpected events, rather than expected events in the context of continuous stressors.  
In terms of the context of theoretical development, it is often sector-specific and the lack of 
measurement can prevent generalization to other sectors.   
3.3.3 Empirical studies 
In the literature review, 27 of 57 studies were empirical, the remainder was either 
theoretically or measurement focused or combined both.  A review of the literature 
highlighted a number of issues with the empirical research on organisational resilience.  In 
the 1990s and early 2000s, a paucity of empirical studies existed at this time, outlined in 
Table 3.2 .  This situation improved over the last decade, as there was increased recognition 
of the need for more empirical research to test theoretical propositions.  The majority of 
empirical research has been qualitative and few quantitative studies involving measurement 
have been published.  In this review only 7 of 57 studies involved measurement, although 
recent publications have included statistically based surveys.(147)    
Many empirical studies appear to focus on individual concepts relating to organisational 
resilience, rather than considering organisational resilience as an overarching concept.  This 
may have occurred as organisational resilience is not a clearly defined concept, creating 
complexities of study design and analysis.  There is often insufficient discrimination between 
the two elements to organisational resilience definitions; unexpected events and expected 
events (under pressure of continuous stressors) resulting in the use of empirical contexts 
that fail to reflect this differentiation.  There has, and continues to be a reliance on secondary 
data, rather than primary data as evidence in empirical studies.  These studies are often 
based on the extensive secondary data associated with unexpected events or 
incidents(18;19;55;57) that are often features of investigations into areas such as aviation, 
healthcare, the nuclear industry or wild land firefighting crews. 
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3.4 Discussion 
In this literature review, I set out to answer the research question: how and to what extent is 
organisational resilience defined conceptually and empirically in the current literature? 
I begin by discussing the results to determine how and to what extent organisational 
resilience is conceptually defined and secondly, I will assess how and to what extent 
organisational resilience is empirically defined.  I will conclude the discussion by identifying 
gaps in the literature, explore in the conclusion how these gaps might be addressed by 
future research and assess the implications for the research in this thesis. 
3.4.1 Ontological diversity within the literature 
A key issue for studying organisational resilience conceptually is the diversity of concepts 
that are loosely coupled under the umbrella of organisational resilience.  This is evident from 
the results of this review, where the breadth of organisational resilience concepts reflects the 
range of ontological positions of multiple disciplines.  In simplified terms, I consider that the 
organisational resilience literature reflects an ontological differentiation between: 
1) An objectivist, critical perspective which draws on positivist epistemology. 
This perspective informs the study of organisational resilience in the physical and 
natural sciences including disciplines such as engineering, material science, risk 
management and disaster management. Organisational resilience is understood as a 
system property defined as the adaptive capacity of the organisation to overcome 
vulnerability in response to hazards and return to its existing state.   Concepts from 
the resilience literature that reflect this position include the terms: adaptation, 
performance, preparedness, redundancy, structures, crisis management and 
competitive advantage. 
 
2) A subjectivist or constructivist perspective which draws on interpretivist epistemology. 
These perspectives inform the study of organisational resilience in the social 
sciences including disciplines such as organisation studies, psychology, economics, 
sociology and public administration.  Organisational resilience is understood as an 
organisational response defined as the capacity and capability of the organisation to 
respond and recover positively and incorporate learning from disturbances so as to 
develop an improved state.  Concepts that reflect this position include the terms: 
organisational learning, cognition, behaviour, trust and organisational culture. 
54 
 
Traditionally, organisational resilience studies favour one of these positions, for example,   
Vogus and Sutcliffe propose that analytical separation should be drawn between the first 
critical position, a reliability approach that anticipates and mitigates error by design and the 
second constructivist position, a resilient approach that attempts to monitor for anomalies 
and manage these once they emerge. (24)  These ontological differentiations, whilst 
overlapping to a greater extent than this simplified differentiation suggests, create difficulties 
in forming a unified conceptual definition of organisational resilience.  However, in the last 
decade the literature has begun to converge; there is an increased recognition that 
incorporating alternative ontological and epistemological perspectives provides a more 
complete picture of the structural and social aspects of organisational 
resilience.(57;125;128)   
   
3.4.2 Organisational resilience concepts 
Organisational resilience concepts are related to the terminology and ontology of specific 
disciplines as shown in Table 3.2. Typically, of the three main disciplines that contribute to 
organisational resilience studies (Figure 3.2), organisation studies papers will relate 
organisational resilience to concepts such as; organisational learning, organisational 
change, cognition, behaviour and trust.  Resilience engineering concepts relate 
organisational resilience to concepts including; communication, performance, preparedness, 
innovation, improvisation, adaptation and monitoring, whereas disaster management relates 
resilience to concepts such as crisis management, redundancy, recovery, policy making and 
competitive advantage.  A few concepts are evident across disciplines, such as leadership.  
This conceptual diversity and the multi-disciplinary nature of the field impede the theoretical 
development of organisational resilience as an overarching concept.  The lack of a cohesive 
field is reflected in the lower number of specific studies of organisational resilience. 
A further issue is the limited number of theoretical studies that consider how resilience 
concepts are linked, interrelated or correlated.  Those that do exist have often not been 
tested empirically using primary data(22;55;97;138) with a few recent exceptions. (20;147)  
Of the organisational concepts that are described, there are relatively few concepts that are 
shared across disciplines; leadershipbeing an example of an exception.  
Within disciplines, varied terminology has developed to describe the same concept.  For 
example, within organisational studies, sensemaking has been described as mindful 
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attention, heedful interrelating and collective mind.   Theoretical frameworks suffer from the 
same problem.  Different disciplines use varied terminology to describe broadly similar 
phases and structures, reflecting disciplinary preoccupations.  For example, adaptation may 
be used in the natural sciences but improvisation and flexibility may be used by social 
scientists to describe the same concept.  The result is that multidisciplinary work on 
organisational resilience is less evident, as academics are working within their own 
paradigms in separate disciplines. 
3.4.3 Organisational resilience models in the literature 
Few conceptual models exist in the literature and those that do focus on resilient 
performance in relation to unexpected events.(20;22;138)  Of those relating to unexpected 
events, these models have some similarities; most comment on an anticipatory, 
preparedness stage and all describe a detection/initial response phase and a full response 
phase which includes adjustment, recovery and learning.   One of the earliest models is 
Meyer’s adaptation to environmental jolts model which is based on empirical healthcare 
research.(22)  This model, which describes three phases of anticipation, response and 
readjustment, defines ‘resiliency’ as an organisational outcome that occurs when the impact 
of jolts on the organisation are absorbed.  A recent model which concentrates on the 
detection and response to an unexpected event is Burnard & Bhamra’s model which reflects 
an ontological position influenced by the discipline of operations management, cybernetics 
and complex systems theory.(138)    This model focuses less on anticipation and 
preparedness and more on the process of monitoring that enables detection, response and 
adjustment to an event.  The third model is based on research undertaken by Sheffi since 
2002 on supply chain disruption funded by the UK government and presents a typical profile 
for organisations facing significant disruption.(20)  The model describes three phases of 
preparation, response and recovery in response to disruption that are linked to 
organisational performance.  Organisations that are able to maintain or improve their 
performance following an unexpected event are considered resilient, although the outcome 
will depend on the nature and impact of the disturbance, the degree of anticipation pre-event 
and the extent of mitigation post-event.     Both Meyer’s and Sheffi’s models are empirically 
based and are built on detailed research in US healthcare and global industry supply chains 
respectively.  Whilst the models assist in the development of theory on organisational 
resilience by defining the stages of an unexpected event and proposing the nature of the 
organisational response, several issues exist. 
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The first issue is that these models are structurally rather than behaviourally focused.  Each 
model defines a systems response, outlining a relatively linear process (although with some 
feedback loops), which potentially underemphasizes the behavioural complexity of the 
response to the disruption.      Whilst Meyer assesses cultural influences, such as values, 
ideologies, traditions and myths, the cognitive and behavioural characteristics of individuals 
and groups are less well developed.(22)  Sheffi & Rice also acknowledge the importance of 
corporate culture, recognising the benefits of questioning prevailing wisdom and 
encouraging ‘maverick’ information.(20)  The most developed from a behavioural 
perspective is Burnard & Bhamra’s model(138) which briefly refers to mindfulness, in their 
description of the detection, activation and enhanced monitoring that characterises the early 
phase of the event, but behavioural factors are not well developed in relation to the other 
phases of the event.  The organisational response phase in the models is defined as a set of 
positive and negative organisational adjustments, with insufficient assessment of the 
cognitive and behavioural capacity and capability within the organisation. 
The second issue is that the models mainly focus on unexpected events.  Models that 
conceptualise resilient functioning during expected conditions(103), for example, in the 
presence of a continuous stress are less evident in the resilience literature(97), despite this 
scenario being much more prevalent than an unexpected event.    In place of models, 
resilience in the face of expected events are described by resilience audits,(103;111;117) 
resilient behaviours,(55;106) resilience principles,(108) resilience mechanisms,(24) 
characteristics of resilience, (115) resilience questions,(117) resilience capabilities(23) and 
resilience factors.(12)   The search for a model of resilience during expected events 
continues.  In a recent book(83), Hollnagel acknowledges the lack of resilience models for 
expected events and argues that the focus of resilience research should be on expected 
rather than unexpected events, with the aim of increasing the number of things that go right 
(resilience) rather than to reduce the number of things that go wrong (safety).  He proposes 
a mechanism for measuring resilience, a Resilience Analysis Grid that focuses on four 
measures of resilience: the ability to respond; the ability to monitor; the ability to anticipate; 
and, the ability to learn.  These four measures can be aggregated into a resilience profile. 
In summary, I have identified that the conceptual literature on organisational resilience is 
diverse and disjointed.  The contribution of several disciplines with different ontological 
positions has contributed to this situation.  Of the conceptual models that exist in the 
literature, these are structurally rather than behaviourally focused and the focus is on the 
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effect of unexpected conditions, rather than expected conditions and empirical testing has 
not taken place.   
Few resilience models exist and these are largely based on unexpected events.  The 
strengths of these resilience models are the similarities in terms of key phases of an 
unexpected event: anticipation/preparedness; response to the event; and, 
adjustment/recovery post-event.  A further strength is that the theory development is based 
on detailed multi-method empirical studies.  The gap in the literature highlighted by these 
models is the development of a cognitive and behavioural lens on an unexpected event.  
Models have not developed yet for expected events, and numerous elements of resilience 
have been conceptualised but these lack cohesive, incremental theoretical development. 
3.4.4 Polarised positions within the resilience literature 
I have found that a feature of the organisational resilience literature is a polarization between 
reports of high resilience organisations(128), low resilience organisations(18;28) and 
comparisons of low and high resilience(20;52;55;121;126;131) when empirical examples are 
used.  High resilience organisations are often interchangeably described as high reliability 
organisations (HROs).(55)  Features of high reliability organisations described by Weick and 
Sutcliffe(55) is that they are able to maintain organisational resilience, defer to expertise, 
remain sensitive to front-line operations, track small failures and resist oversimplification.  
Weick and Sutcliffe consider the features of low resilience organisations are those that 
violate the latter five principles.  This situation may exist as the organisations that are 
identified retrospectively as dramatically failing or becoming highly reliable (often in response 
to the way that they have dealt with unexpected events) are more easily identifiable and 
potentially perceived as more interesting to study.  A few articles exist that take a more 
nuanced approach to resilience and recognise the dynamic nature of organisational 
resilience.  Tillement(135) assesses the dynamics between occupational groups in a rail 
transport system and identifies the asymmetric power relationships and professional rivalries 
between occupational groups which negatively impact on organisational resilience but does 
identify that the management of unexpected events in a strong networked community can 
positively impact on organisational resilience. 
3.4.5 Trade-offs 
Trade-offs are a feature of all resilience literatures; resilient engineering, organisation studies 
and disaster planning. Trade-offs refers to the dynamics between competing priorities within 
a system and are fundamental to the function of organisational resilience.  The most 
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pertinent trade-offs are discussed in more detail in this section, which examines the nature of 
system dynamics, trade-offs and their relationship to resilience.  The method by which 
organisations manage the trade-off between competing priorities at every level of an 
organisation and in response to unexpected events or continuous stressors will contribute to 
how resilient that organisation’s practices are.  McDonald argues that ‘resilience seems to 
reflect the tension between stability and change in organisational and operational systems, 
mediated by the notion of appropriate adaptation.’(124)p156 There are two elements to 
trade-offs; the first relates to how discriminatory a judgment is in relation to the trade-off and 
the second relates to the criterion for decisions or actions that occur along the trade-off 
spectrum.(99)  The effect of each of the trade-offs listed below will be discussed in relation to 
their impact on organisational resilience: 
 Performance versus safety 
 Flexibility versus stiffness 
 Redundancy versus full capacity 
 Centralisation versus decentralisation 
 Routine versus mindfulness 
3.4.5.1 Performance versus safety 
I identified that a critical trade-off in the literature is that between performance and safety 
requirements.  Performance requirements to achieve greater effectiveness or efficiency 
can conflict with safety requirements, for example, as a result of reduced safety margins 
to achieve cost savings or changed processes that reduce cross checking.(99)  Wood 
comments that in the NHS, ‘acute’ requirements of efficiency, effectiveness and timely 
access to care often conflict with ‘chronic’ requirements such as safety, quality outcomes 
and equitable treatment.  To prevent the systems tensions caused by these conflicts, he 
argues for a dynamic balancing act where safety is a key priority alongside other system 
goals and inherent in the culture of the organisation.(99) 
3.4.5.2 Flexibility versus stiffness 
A further trade-off concerns the degree to which an organisation is able to balance flexible 
ways of operating with elements of formality and rigidity in its operations and organisational 
structure.  Flexibility involves an organisation’s ability to build organic capabilities that permit 
the identification of threats and ensure a fast response.  Organisational forms of flexibility 
may include informal work practices, distributed decision systems, agile manufacturing 
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systems, enabling technologies and organisational systems with learning and feedback 
loops.(124) In contrast, stiffness is a tendency to operate rigidly in the face of disruptive 
events or persistent strain by viewing them as a burden rather than an opportunity.(20)  
Stiffness in organisational terms can include slow and bureaucratic decision making 
processes, technology limitations, rigid organisational designs and defensive risk 
attitudes.(24)  If the balance is in favour of stiffness, then the organisation’s resilience will be 
eroded as it lacks the capability to respond and adapt quickly to new and changing 
circumstances. 
3.4.5.3 Redundancy versus full capacity 
A third trade-off in the literature between redundancy and full capacity refers to the reservoir 
of resource the organisation has available to respond to an unexpected event. Redundancy 
is defined as keeping some resources in reserve to be used in case of disruption whereas 
operating at full capacity means there are no slack available to call on in case of an 
unexpected event.(20)  Resilient organisations appear to ‘deploy more of their financial, 
cognitive and relational resources in response to emerging and manifest threats.’(24)p3421  
A dilemma facing organisations that attempt to secure slack is that narrowing performance 
margins encourage managers in organisations to secure organisational performance through 
extensive protocols and procedures, clearly delineated job roles and accountability 
constraints.(148)A meta-analysis conducted in 2004 found a positive relationship between 
slack (redundant financial) resources and firm performance.  The results suggested that 
organisations used slack to improve performance, which contrasts with the view that 
increasing slack may cause organisational inefficiency.  Unsurprisingly, there was a stronger 
relationship in studies that were controlling for industry, which were largely people-intensive 
service organisations, e.g. healthcare, compared with the control, capital-intensive 
manufacturing industries, which suggests that organisations should achieve levels of slack 
that are sufficient for high performance in their own sector.(149) 
3.4.5.4 Centralisation versus decentralisation 
Another component of the resilient debate is the extent to which a centralised or 
decentralised system constrains or supports resilient functioning in organisations.  A 
centralised system is one characterised by a command and control structure.  Control is 
maintained through rules, protocols and regulations and strong disciplinary tendencies to 
ensure obedience. This rigidity of structure ensures that safety is maintained, but often at a 
cost to performance targets.(150)  The resulting problems are that communication is 
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discouraged and of the few communication channels that exist, many are one-way from the 
top to the bottom of the organisation.  This type of environment can encourage widespread 
and routine violations of rules and local adaptation as workers find that rules are impossible 
to apply as documented in the local environment that they work which can affect safety and 
reduce resilience.(150)  However, in a crisis scenario, adopting a centralised structure can 
assist in managing the event effectively, as long as the appropriate experts are deferred to 
within that control structure.(55)  Alternatively, the decentralisation of knowledge, functions 
and control can encourage greater mindfulness as accountability and responsibility in an 
organisation is delegated further down the hierarchy.(55) 
3.4.5.5 Routine versus mindfulness 
A key debate about the relationship between resilience and mindfulness is the 
understanding of routines (repetitive processes and behaviours) compared with mindfulness.  
Can a resilient organisation operate mindfully and without routine?  Or is an element of both 
required for effective operations?   One argument is that they operate as a duality – both 
routine and mindful practices can occur simultaneously, each informing the other.(151)  
Weick and Sutcliffe suggest that ‘mindless acts are automatic, routine acts are customary’ so 
to prevent automatic and mindless routines, organisations need to regular review and their 
routines to acknowledge changed circumstances, e.g. feedback from incidents and 
challenge customary behaviours.(55)p61  Research in healthcare settings has shown that 
what distinguishes resilient organisations is a concern for routine operations in the face of 
unexpected events and demands.  Whilst this does not preclude the ability to operate 
mindfully, the maintenance of key routines in difficult circumstances ensures continuity and 
consistency of operations that enables mindful responses to the event.(152) 
I have examined some of the key characteristics of the organisational resilience literature, 
reflecting on the strengths and weaknesses of the research field to date.  In the next section, 
I extract and assess the healthcare-specific literature to provide a context for the research 
studies in this thesis. 
3.5 To assess healthcare-focused organisational resilience literature  
I examine the healthcare-focused organisational resilience literature identified in this review 
(n=8) as a context for the research studies in this thesis (see Table 3.3).  I identified few 
points of coherence in this small and disjointed literature.  I will examine the points of 
cohesion and divergence and identify areas for future research. 
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3.5.1 The value of healthcare-focused organisational resilience research 
Across all healthcare-focused articles, there is a general acceptance that acute healthcare is 
a useful area to study organisational resilience as a result of its complexity, uncertainty and 
fast-paced practice with the capacity for disruptions and unexpected events.  The complexity 
arises from the multiplicity of interactions between human, technical, structural and systems 
factors operating at different levels with the health system and uncertainty from uneven 
demand for health services, particularly from emergency and urgent cases. 
Aguirre and Dynes concur with using healthcare as a suitable field of study, as “contrary to 
some other complex organizations, hospitals are in the business of providing normal 
responses to extraordinary occasions, absorbing abnormal occasions and processing them 
to try to alleviate and improve people’s health.”(52)(p11)   Disruptions and unexpected 
events are perceived to occur more often in healthcare owing to the breadth of events that 
might occur within the system or environmental influences on the system.(52)  The majority 
of studies focus on disruptions to the system, either from hazards, sub-cultures or errors.  
Both Meyer’s and Aguirre and Dynes’ study focuses on acute hospitals’ responses to 
unexpected events and these studies found that responses to unexpected events are 
socially constructed.(22;52)  Although Mallak’s study refers to crises and incorporates  two  
theoretical constructs built on unexpected events; bricolage and virtual role systems, it is not 
clear whether the survey tool used in the study was contextualised in terms of crises 
situations.(107) 
3.5.2 Characteristics of healthcare-focused organisational resilience research 
Seven of the eight healthcare studies draw on empirical evidence to a greater or lesser 
extent, either referring to direct primary research(22;49;50;52;107;128) or secondary 
information.(18) Three studies discuss measurement; Meyer’s study utilises regression 
analysis to understand the relationships between sets of variables relating to an unexpected 
event, Mallak’s study develops scales of individual resilience based on Weick’s work on the 
Mann Gulch disaster(19) and Carthey et al’s work develops a checklist for institutional 
resilience which is untested.(111)  The sensemaking perspective(153) is the theoretical 
basis for four out of eight studies, which refer to aspects of Weick’s work such as 
mindfulness, bricolage and virtual role systems.  Chapter 6 of this thesis will build on the 
sensemaking theories that inform these studies. 
Organisational resilience is not clearly defined in the majority of studies and is usually 
implicitly rather than explicitly stated, as is apparent in the definitions outlined in Table 3.3.  
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The majority of definitions are cognitively and behaviourally focused, considering mental 
skills,(128) cultural mindsets,(18), relationships (49)and positive adaptive behaviours(107) 
whereas two are systems focused, drawing on planning to change structures.(22;52) 
3.5.3 Insights from healthcare-focused organisational resilience research 
In order to inform the research within this thesis, I identified three features of organisational 
resilience in healthcare which are evident across these studies.  The first is the paradoxical 
nature of resilience, where the organisational response to an unexpected event or disruption 
invariably involves efforts by hospital managers to tighten control over the situation, reduce 
variability and standardise practice.  However the process of standardising practice can 
reduce the individual or team workarounds or shortcuts, what Reason describes as the 
heroic improvisations,(128) that can preempt or prevent further disruptions or adverse 
events occurring.(49)  Aguirre supports this perspective, arguing that routinisation of practice 
that has evolved from disruptions increases the reliability and resilience of hospitals.  Jeffs 
counters this argument by proposing that in a culture where shortcuts or workarounds are 
adopted regularly, a drift towards a new, less safe standard  is encouraged and practices 
with unacceptable tolerances are normalised.(50) 
The second feature relates to organisational learning.  Aguirre argues that the revised 
practices which are generated from different types of disruptions are then applied to a broad 
range of future, potentially unrelated situations or disruptions, so that the distinction between 
learning from different types of disruptions becomes blurred but informs the mindful practice 
of hospital staff.(52)   Subsequently, empirical studies in different contexts have identified 
similar findings, that learning from one incident might be applied to other unrelated 
scenarios, but act as a catalyst for change and improvement.(26) 
The third feature relates to the use of Weick’s work as a theoretical basis for five out of eight 
studies.  Weick’s work focuses on cognitive and behavioural explanations for organisational 
responses to unexpected events.(142;154)  Although Weick only refers to resilience more 
explicitly in his later works(55), the use of concepts such as sensemaking, mindfulness, 
behavioural commitment, bricolage and virtual role systems to underpin organisational 
resilience studies indicates the relevance of his work to this field.  Aguirre proposes that 
hospitals operate as social organisations within the institution of health care and differ in the 
extent to which they will demonstrate resilience or not in response to a particular disruption, 
partially based on their capacities, their mindfulness and their responsiveness to 
hazards.(52)   Reason suggests that these differentials will occur as a result of human 
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factors, based on the capabilities of hospital staff to pre-empt or recover near misses or 
adverse events successfully and recognise the conditions that might trigger them across the 
hospital.   
To summarise, the healthcare organisational resilience literature is sparse. Of the studies 
that exist, the use of sensemaking theory, empirical research and behavioural perspectives 
is evident across the studies.  Although two measurement tools exist, one focuses on 
individual resilience and the other is a checklist which has not been systematically tested. 
3.6 Shortfalls and future directions for organisational resilience 
research 
3.6.1 To identify gaps in the organisational resilience literature 
In this section, I examine the gaps and problems with the organisational resilience literature.  
The study of organisational resilience is significantly affected by multiple disciplines 
developing different perspectives in the field, built on varied ontological positions.  This 
situation generates problems; a diverse and disjointed field of research, conflicting 
terminologies, inadequate development of theoretical propositions and insufficient empirical 
testing of models and frameworks that exist.   A positive perspective on the diverse literature 
is that new ideas are generated by different disciplines, which can cross-fertilise other 
disciplines and has accounted for, in more recent years, the absorption of cognitive and 
behavioural thinking into structural and systems thinking and a broader organisational and 
institutional perspective on cognitive and behavioural perspectives.  Specific problems in the 
literature that have been identified are: 
 A  focus on individual organisational concepts (differentials), e.g. organisational 
learning, preparedness rather than the development of models; 
 A failure to consider in detail the interrelationship between concepts in a tangible and 
testable manner; 
 The inadequate conceptualisation and testing of the different contexts in which 
organisational resilience operates, limiting the development of generic frameworks 
and models; 
 Inadequate empirical testing of models and frameworks has occurred, although in the 
last decade the position has improved; and 
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 Insufficient understanding about what happens in an organisation at each stage of an 
unexpected event or how organisations respond to chronic stressors over time. 
To address these problems, the following gaps in the literature have been identified. 
 Measurement studies are needed to test resilience factors across a whole 
organisation;  
 Theoretical and empirical research is needed to explore the extent to which a 
relationship exists between organisational resilience and broader environmental and 
regulatory factors, owing to the inadequate theorising on operational systems and 
their environment. 
 Theoretical and empirical studies undertaken at organisational level are needed to 
develop and test the theoretical concepts outlined in this chapter.   
Vogus and Sutcliffe suggest that the paucity of empirical work exploring resilience in 
organisational theory leaves many avenues open for future research in resilience.(24) 
3.6.2 Key areas requiring further research 
Building on the previous section which identified many problems and gaps in the literature, 
empirical studies undertaken at organisational level are needed to test the theoretical 
concepts, models and frameworks outlined in this chapter.  Further theorising is required to 
develop currently underdeveloped research on organisational resilience generally and 
specifically in healthcare.  McDonald comments that “we do not seem to have a strong 
empirically based model of how organisations respond, effectively or otherwise, to serious 
challenges to their operational integrity, such as are posed by serious incidents.”(124)  The 
following areas are considered necessary to develop the field: 
 Empirical studies, particularly quantitative measurement-based studies, are needed 
to test organisational resilience concepts, models and frameworks within and across 
organisations, both in relation to individual events and  continuous stressors over 
time; 
 Multidisciplinary research is required that attempts to combine the contributions from 
different disciplines to create a more comprehensive and  cohesive picture of 
organisational resilience in practice; 
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 Owing to the inadequate conceptualisation of the interaction between organisations 
at meso-level, and the influence of external agencies/governments at macro-level, 
both theoretical and empirical research is needed to explore the extent to which 
organisational resilience is affected by broader macro-level influences; and 
 Research is needed to assess the degree to which resilient organisational responses 
differ according to the nature of the unexpected event or stressor and comparative 
studies are required to examine these responses across multiple organisations. 
In conclusion, there are significant gaps in the existing organisational literature which would 
benefit from robust and well constructed theoretical and empirical research, which builds on 
existing research and takes a multidisciplinary perspective to develop a more 
comprehensive and cohesive picture of organisational resilience. 
3.6.3 Implications for the research studies in this thesis 
To inform my research, I have identified three significant gaps in the organisational resilience 
literature and designed studies that address these gaps and contribute to the future agendas 
for organisational resilience research.  The gaps are detailed below: 
1. Insufficient theoretical and empirical basis to explain how organisational 
resilience operates in particular contexts and under particular conditions; 
2. The inadequate conceptualisation of resilient interactions within organisations 
and resilient functioning in the context of broader macro-level influences; and 
3. The need for greater multidisciplinary research that combines structural and 
behavioural factors in one framework to create a more comprehensive picture of 
organisational resilience in practice. 
I have designed three theoretical/empirical studies (Chapter 7&8 are interlinked), where 
each study addresses some or all of these gaps in the literature (listed in brackets), as 
detailed below: 
 Chapter 5: The presentation of a positive example of information communication 
technology (ICT)-enabled national surveillance strategy, applying a Foucauldian 
governmentality perspective to explore the resilient factors that contributed to a 
reduction in specific organisms.  This is a macro-level qualitative study, assessing 
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the cross-system interactions between the government, hospital organisations and 
local actors. (1, 2)  
 Chapter 6: The development of an organisational resilience framework built on 
existing sensemaking literature and utilising a sensemaking theoretical lens to 
assess organisational resilience during an unexpected infection event.   This is a 
micro and meso-level case study, set in one acute hospital organisation that uses an 
in-depth qualitative methodology. (1,2) 
 Chapter 7: The design and development of a multidisciplinary resilience 
questionnaire, to address a significant gap in the literature on robust measurement of 
organisational resilience.  This study builds on the qualitative content analysis 
undertaken in Chapter 6 which analyses an unexpected infection event in a hospital 
organisation. (1,3) 
 Chapter 8: The identification of organisational resilience constructs and associated 
variables relating to an unexpected event which informs the revision of the 
organisational resilience questionnaire.   The methodology involved the analysis of 
an organisational resilience survey of unexpected infection events using principal 
components analysis.(1,3) 
In conclusion, these chapters build on the findings from the overarching resilience review 
and the more specific healthcare-focused review and will contribute to key elements of the 
future research agenda on organisational resilience. 
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4 Chapter 4.  Reducing the impact of outbreaks in the acute 
health-care setting by organisational resilience interventions: a 
systematic review 
4.1 Introduction 
This is the second background chapter, and is a systematic review of the infection 
prevention and control strategies adopted by acute hospitals to reduce the impact of 
infection outbreaks.  This chapter builds on the resilient concepts identified in the literature 
review in Chapter 3 and acts as an evidence-base for the exploration of resilient factors in an 
infection context in Chapter 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
My literature review (Chapter 3) has highlighted a series of shortfalls in the organisational 
resilience literature: the diverse range of organisational resilience concepts; the paucity of 
healthcare-related studies; and a series of untested models for unexpected events.  To 
address these gaps and to achieve a robust look at the empirical literature, the next step is 
to undertake a systematic review to examine organisational resilience factors in the context 
of an unexpected infection event in the acute healthcare setting. 
This is the first time that the identification of organisational resilience factors within an 
unexpected event has been attempted in a systematic way.  As described in Chapter 2, 
infection prevention and control is a relevant and useful tracer issue for organisational 
resilience.  This systematic review will focus on one aspect of infection prevention and 
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control practice – the response to infection outbreaks.  Infection outbreaks serve as a 
‘unexpected event’ from an organisational resilience perspective and can constitute ‘an 
abrupt and brutal audit’(55)p3 of an organisation’s resilience or vulnerabilities.  For this 
reason, only infection outbreaks that have had a rapid and unexpected impact in an acute 
health-care setting will be considered within this review.    
4.1.1 Organisational resilience interventions 
The use of organisational resilience paradigms are recommended for the study of 
unexpected events in the fields of community-based(110;125;155-157) and governmental 
disaster management(158;159).  Recent studies in these fields recognise the limitations of 
traditional perspectives on disaster and crisis management which have focused on two 
trends; disasters as social events and the development of a set of techniques to manage 
risks and hazards.(125)    These studies propose that organisational development, with its 
understanding of organisational capacities and capabilities should be harnessed to disaster 
and crisis management to create an amalgamated theoretical and empirical perspective that 
recognises the key role of organisational resilience.(125) The lessons that can be learnt from 
this reinvigorated approach should be applied to organisational resilience research in 
healthcare.  The importance of understanding organisational development perspectives in 
addition to other influences on clinical practice needs to be incorporated further into 
healthcare research.  From the perspective of infection prevention and management(160), 
this might assist in explaining why a focus on clinical, microbiological and epidemiological 
practice alone might not halt the progression of outbreaks. 
The organisational resilience literature identifies a number of resilient concepts based on 
theoretical perspectives, individual empirical studies or reviews of the literature.  These 
concepts are identified in Chapter 3, but include strong leadership (136;161) 
communication,(1;155;162;163), improvisation,(55) innovation,(136;164-166) redundancy, 
change,(14;119), performance/safety trade-offs(50) and incorporating learning into future 
preparedness plans.(26)  Owing to the few empirical studies in healthcare, it is not clear from 
the current literature, how these resilient concepts equate to practical resilience interventions 
during an unexpected event.   A further issue is that empirical studies are often based on 
reviews of individual events, so it is difficult to generalise from these individual studies 
whether there is a pattern of resilient interventions that relate to unexpected events.  For this 
reason, this systematic review will aim to assess: 1) what resilient interventions exist in an 
infection outbreak context; and 2) if a pattern of resilient interventions exists across the 
selected studies, what this adds to the existing organisational resilience literature.   
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4.1.2 Outbreaks as unexpected events 
Hospital outbreaks significantly affect the routine practice of acute hospitals.  Acute hospitals 
dealing with an unexpected outbreak are suddenly faced with a rapid surge in infected 
patients, huge pressure on limited resources and the potential for nosocomial transmission 
amongst staff and other patients.  Acute hospitals are expected to implement effective 
interventions, drawing on any emergency preparedness arrangements in place to deliver an 
effective response.  The U.S. has formalised and standardised such preparedness and 
response approaches in the form of the Hospital Incident Command System (HICS)(167), a 
system for use in emergency and non-emergency situations.  In many other countries, these 
approaches are less standardised and acute hospitals may draw on national or international 
guidance but - ultimately - develop their own plans.  The robustness of these plans can 
influence whether the response to an unexpected event constitutes a crisis, or is managed 
as an escalation of routine practice. 
Recent years have witnessed the global impact of outbreaks on acute healthcare.  Of 
relevance to this review is the impact of outbreaks of varying degrees of severity.  At worst, 
viral pandemics, caused by the antigenic shift to new virus strains or subtypes, for example, 
swine-origin influenza A/H1N1 in 2009, and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 
2003 can have a significant impact on the management of acute healthcare.(77;168)   The 
World Health Organisation reported that as of March 2010, 213 countries worldwide had 
reported laboratory confirmed cases of swine-origin influenza which caused at least 16,813 
deaths.(169) By June 2003, a cumulative total of 8,403 probable SARS cases with 775 
deaths had been reported in 29 countries.(170)  At a national level, outbreaks of Norovirus 
have a significant seasonal impact in the community and cause further problems if 
nosocomial transmission occurs in the acute healthcare setting.  For example, in the UK, the 
Health Protection Agency (HPA) reported 1653 outbreaks in the NHS during the 2011-12 
Norovirus season, involving 1291 ward/bay closures.  Owing to the potentially significant 
impact on healthcare organisations, infection outbreaks provide an excellent context for 
studying organisational resilience. 
The infection literature in the last decade has typically examined infection outbreaks or 
transmission of infection within acute healthcare at a Unit or ward level in the acute setting 
without examining the broader organisational context, to understand the organisational 
factors that contribute to a successful outcome.(171)  The focus of reviews to date has been 
on clinical, microbiological and epidemiological outcomes, rather than assessing the effect of 
organisational interventions.(81)  Recent systematic reviews have considered the effect of 
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physical interventions to reduce or interrupt the spread of respiratory viruses across 
community and acute settings(172), assessed quasi-experimental study designs in the field 
of infection prevention and control (IPC) under expected conditions(173), and considered the 
impact of individual interventions in the management of organism-specific outbreaks(174). 
However, reviews of multifactorial organisational interventions that facilitate preparedness 
and effective responses to unexpected events are poorly represented in the literature to 
date. The historical emphasis on clinically focused quantitative systematic reviews has led to 
a self-fulfilling prophecy where organisational factors are rarely considered.  A further 
constraint is that organisational factors may not easily be assessed using quantitative 
measurements.  Cognitive and behavioural drivers relating to factors such as leadership, 
sensemaking and adaptation are usually researched using qualitative methodologies which 
may not meet the rigour of quality assessment used in systematic reviews.  For these 
reasons, systematically reviewing studies of infection outbreaks will contribute to healthcare 
policy and research on the contribution of organisational interventions to improve infection 
control practice and provide a much needed context for the development of organisational 
resilience theory. 
4.1.3 Definitions 
In this systematic review, I refer to the definition of organisational resilience adopted within 
this thesis, “the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning, prior to, during or 
following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain required operations under both 
expected and unexpected conditions.” (57)  As discussed in Chapter 2, the unexpected 
conditions presented by outbreaks and transmission of infection within acute care provide a 
valuable field of study for the development of understanding of organisational resilience.  As 
described in Chapter 3, although theoretical resilience frameworks exist, relating to the key 
stages of unexpected events, inadequate empirical exploration of the resilient factors that 
underpin the unexpected event has occurred to date. I define unexpected events in acute 
healthcare as an outbreak or transmission of infection within acute healthcare where the 
outbreak has had a significant and rapid impact, involving an urgent coordinated 
organisational response to address it.   Increasing incidence of infection, where there is a 
gradual increase in infections over a period of one year or more will be excluded. 
I define organisational-level interventions as those interventions that involve a coordinated 
corporate response, by clinicians and managers to reduce the extent of the outbreak.  The 
interventions may impact across the whole organisation, or be focused on certain 
wards/Units where the outbreak is occurring.  Interventions include changes in leadership, 
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capacity, capability, communication, environment, education, training, surveillance and 
equipment provision.  As organisational-level interventions rarely conform to randomised 
controlled trial methodologies, in this systematic review I adopted the approach and 
methodologies of a recent systematic review of behaviour change to optimise IPC and aimed 
to include all controlled and non-controlled intervention studies.(175)  The parameters of my 
systematic review are detailed in the Table 4.1 below, following the participants, 
interventions, comparisons, outcomes and study design (PICOS) format.(176) 
Table 4.1  Systematic Review Criteria (PICOS) 
Population Acute care hospitals in developed countries affected unexpectedly by 
infection outbreaks 
Intervention Interventions that involve a coordinated organisational response 
Comparator Acute care hospitals in routine care provision mode 
Outcome Effectiveness of interventions that involve a coordinated organisational 
response by measuring: 
Lower nosocomial infection transmission to staff and/or patients than 
reported in other studies of similar outbreaks 
Shorter duration of outbreak 
Fewer bed days lost per outbreak 
Study Design All controlled and non controlled study designs that contain data. 
4.1.4 Research Questions 
So, I am going to undertake a systematic review to answer the research question: Do 
organisational resilience interventions lead to a reduction in the impact of outbreaks in the 
acute health-care setting?  To achieve this, I will address the following aims: 
a) To assess the organisational resilience interventions that are used in an outbreak 
b) To identify patterns of resilience interventions across selected studies 
c) using a) and b) to reveal organisational resilience factors  
For the purposes of this research which aims to assess organisational resilience in the UK, I 
will adopt a resource-rich, developed world focus, to ensure that the healthcare and socio-
political context is sufficiently similar to draw consistent conclusions about the type and 
pattern of organisational resilience interventions.  I will focus the systematic review on acute 
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healthcare, as this is the focus of my research and provides a sufficiently boundaried and 
consistent context to assess resilience from an organisational perspective. 
4.2 Methods 
This systematic review was undertaken according to the PRISMA guidelines.(176)   
4.2.1 Search strategy 
I conducted a search of Medline (including in-process and other non-indexed citations), 
EMBASE, ASSIA, PsycINFO, Business Source Complete and HMIC as outlined in Table 
4.2.  The breadth of databases used was to ensure that clinical (infection prevention and 
control), organisational (organisational resilience) and crisis/disaster management literature 
was captured.  The search was limited to studies published in English between January 
1999 and October 2012 as this was the period when there was a rise in rates of hospital-
associated infections.  Search terms (keywords and MeSH terms) covered three facets; 
organisational resilience factors, nosocomial infections and unexpected events 
(disasters/crises).  The search strategy was tailored to each database and its indexing 
system.  The design of the overarching search strategy was reviewed by an experienced 
researcher with practical knowledge of systematic reviews, which resulted in minor 
amendments.   The full search strategy for four databases is included in Appendix A.  Terms 
were first identified through a bottom-up search of relevant infection prevention and control 
literature.  These themes were cross-referenced with a thematic top-down literature review 
of organisational resilience (described in Chapter 3) that identified six disciplines that 
contained relevant resilience terms; patient safety, human factors, emergency preparedness, 
resilient engineering, resilient behaviours and organisational behaviour. A matrix that 
mapped terms across the relevant disciplines was prepared to inform the development of the 
search strategy.  A sensitivity checking procedure (which involved reviewing and cross-
referencing the references of seminal papers) was employed to ensure that recognised, 
relevant papers were present in the retrieved search papers and the search terms were 
amended to include any that were absent.(177)  Reference lists of retrieved articles were 
hand searched for relevant papers and grey literature including unpublished literature and 
non-journal publications from governmental agencies were sought.  The final search strategy 
was run in October 2012. 
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Table 4.2  Description of databases used for search strategy 
 
Database 
 
Description 
 
Medline 
 
Contains titles and abstracts for life sciences and 
biomedical literature. 
 
EMBASE 
 
Contains citations, abstracts and indexing of biomedical 
and pharmacological literature, some of which are not 
offered in Medline. 
 
Applied Social Sciences 
Index and Abstracts (ASSIA) 
 
Contains indexing and abstracts of health and social 
science literature covering health, social services, 
psychology, sociology, economics, politics, race relations 
and education. 
 
Business Source Complete 
 
Contains indexing and abstracts for business journals 
covering marketing, management, accounting, finance 
and economics. 
 
PsycINFO 
 
Contains indexing and abstracts for behavioural sciences 
and mental health covering psychology, medicine, law, 
social work, neuroscience, business, nursing, forensics 
and engineering. 
 
Health Management 
Information 
Consortium (HMIC) 
 
Contains records relating to health and social care 
management information covering health service policy, 
management and administration. 
4.2.2 Study inclusion and exclusion criteria 
For the title and abstract review the eligibility criteria included studies that were: 
 in an acute hospital setting; 
 involved an outbreak that affected the whole or a large part (>4 wards/Units) of an 
individual hospital; 
 responded to a single, hospital-associated, outbreak-related organism; 
 related to the organisational impact on a specific, individual hospital organisation and 
its coordinated organisational response; 
 unexpected events; 
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 English language papers; 
 and developed world studies focused on resource-rich countries. 
Exclusion criteria were: 
 settings other than acute hospitals; multi-centered hospitals (in different cities), 
regional hospitals or national hospitals, community, long stay, nursing home, 
residential, GP or walk-in centre ; 
 outbreaks in individual Units/wards or affecting ≤3 wards/Units; 
 multiple organisms or non-nosocomial transmission organisms; 
 Clinical, microbiological or epidemiological studies; 
 Infection transmission that showed increasing incidence over time; 
 and developing countries, using the parameters outlined in a recent study of use of 
behaviour change to optimise infection prevention and control.(175) 
Quality criteria were drawn from a previous relevant published systematic review that 
incorporated evaluation of both controlled and non-controlled robust studies, drawing on 
recognised guidelines; the critical appraisal skills programme (CASP) tool, Cochrane risk of 
bias tool and the effective practice and organisation of care (EPOC) model.(175)  The data 
extraction form used by this review was adopted, with minor modifications based on a further 
recent, as yet unpublished systematic review: systematic review and evidence-based 
guidance on organisation of hospital infection control programmes (SIGHT).2 
4.2.3 Data extraction 
The data extraction process occurred in two stages.  The first stage involved the screening 
of titles and abstracts using a standardised data extraction form against the inclusion/ 
exclusion criteria.  The first reviewer (EM) applied the criteria to all titles and abstracts and a 
second, blinded reviewer independently assessed a random subset of 310 papers, which 
                                                 
2Website:http://www1.imperial.ac.uk/medicine/research/researchthemes/infection/idi/policyorganisationbeh
aviour/sight/ 
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was 10% of the total papers.  The level of agreement between reviewers was tested, 
resulting in a Kappa coefficient score of 0.620 (p<0.001) which demonstrated substantial 
(.61-.80) level of agreement using Landis and Koch’s strength of agreement standards.(178)  
Discrepancies were resolved through discussion, resulting in non-agreed abstracts 
progressing to the next stage of the review.  The second stage involved screening the 
remaining 83 articles in full, against the inclusion/exclusion criteria and the quality criteria.  
The first reviewer (EM) recorded data from the included studies on a standardised data 
extraction form.  The second reviewer independently assessed the subset of 20 (24%) of the 
83 articles that were assessed in full against the quality criteria and any areas of contention 
were discussed and resolved. 6 articles were retained for data analysis and synthesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3310 articles identified 
318 duplicates excluded 
2992 articles retrieved to assess titles and abstracts 
2909 articles excluded 
   
83 articles assessed in full 
77 articles excluded: 
 
61 failed inclusion/exclusion 
2 duplicates 
9 review papers (no data) 
5 inadequate data/methods 
6 articles retained for data analysis and synthesis: 
2 H1N1  
1Norovirus 
2 VRE 
1 SARS 
  
 
Figure 4.1  Study Selection Process 
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4.2.4 Data Synthesis 
Inductive thematic analysis was used to extract data from all studies that met my inclusion/ 
exclusion criteria and met my quality assessment standards.  This approach relies on 
continual iterative comparison between the data and theory until the patterns became 
evident and ‘theoretical saturation’ is reached in that no new themes emerge.(179) This 
qualitative analysis approach was based on a similar approach in a previous systematic 
review, which applied a qualitative ‘grounded theory’ approach over a quantitative data 
extraction form, owing to methodological and content inconsistencies of the studies.(177)  
Organisational resilience-related theory was used as the basis for generating themes and 
understanding patterns in the data.   
4.3 Results 
3310 abstracts and titles were reviewed in the first stage, 83 articles were assessed in full.  6 
(7.2%) of these 83 met the quality criteria and were included as described in Figure 4.1.   
The final 6 articles were not subject to meta-analyses as the studies encompassed wide-
ranging study designs and organisational factors.  All six of the included studies assessed 
interventions – see Table 4.3.  These interventions were all multi-modal organisational 
responses to four different outbreak organisms; H1N1, Norovirus, VRE and SARS.  All 
studies were either non-controlled designs (before and after or interrupted time series 
analyses) or quasi-experimental designs (combining clinical, epidemiological and/or financial 
analyses).  All studies used a retrospective design, collating data either during or after the 
outbreak.  Studies were based in tertiary acute centres (4) or acute university teaching 
hospitals (2).   There were 4 European studies (France (2), England and Belgium) and 2 
Asia-Pacific studies (Australia, Hong Kong). 
4.3.1 Clinical and organisational response to unexpected events 
Cheng and colleagues(180) implemented an infection control bundle that involved a 
coordinated organisational response to the outbreak and assessed its effect on the 
prevention of nosocomial transmission of swine-origin influenza A/H1N1 in a large 1500 bed 
tertiary teaching hospital.  The bundle contained many elements of resilient organisational 
practice – see Table 4.3. 
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Cherifi and colleagues(181) investigated the effect of hospital preparedness and the overall 
management of influenza A/H1N1 on nosocomial transmission and costs of managing the 
outbreak in a tertiary teaching hospital.   A range of resilient measures are described, 
including the establishment of a multidisciplinary pandemic task force for strategic decision 
making and infection control management.  A less successful staff vaccination programme, 
with low nurse take up and moderate physician take up is noted. A low rate of nosocomial 
transmission was reported, although it was not clear which measures within the bundle of 
measures were most effective. 
Yazdanpanah and colleagues(182) analysed the financial impact attributed to an outbreak of 
SARS at a university hospital, a designated SARS referral centre, describing the resilient 
measures taken to manage the SARS patients.   Instead of using nosocomial transmission 
as a marker of resilient practice, this study assessed the impact on the hospital’s medical 
service use.  The study found that despite significantly increased costs associated with 
SARS, no concomitant impact on hospital medical use was found using a time series 
analysis, although low numbers of SARS patients were involved and the infection measures 
were described less comprehensively than other studies. 
Two studies considered the effect of multi-modal infection strategies on VRE outbreaks, to 
prevent VRE endemicity in the hospital setting.  Lucet and colleagues(183) assessed 
retrospectively the impact of simultaneous infection control interventions on two measures; 
the number of VRE-positive carriers and the consumption of targeted antibiotics in a 950 bed 
tertiary teaching hospital.  A reduction in VRE-positive carriers was reported over a four-
week period and a decrease in the consumption of targeted antibiotics, following an 
aggressive and rapid campaign of resilient infection prevention interventions during this time.  
In contrast, Pearman(184) reported the adverse impact of instituting only standard infection 
control practices in the first two months of a VRE outbreak, resulting in significant VRE 
patient colonisation.  To prevent the VRE strain from becoming endemic, a package of 
enhanced resilient infection interventions described in Table 4.3 was instituted from the two-
month point onwards and the effect of this on both VRE infections and colonization is 
reported.  The significant cost of these enhanced interventions is reported.  To prevent 
further recurrences, the hospital implemented a programme of long-term resilient measures 
by implementing a VRE eradication programme. 
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Table 4.3  Intervention Studies 
 Study aim and organisational 
intervention features 
Design and 
Methods 
Infective 
organism, sample 
size and study 
duration 
Study outcomes 
Cheng et al, 
2010, (185) 
Hong Kong 
Assessed effect of IPC strategic  bundle 
of measures; open staff forum, 
education sessions, video 
demonstrations for PPE, early 
recognition of index cases, early relief 
of sick staff from work, observed HH 
practice, cough etiquette compliance, 
IPC compliance monitoring, compliance 
with PPE, contact tracing, screening of 
patients/staff with URTI symptoms, 
seven-day medical surveillance for 
asymptomatic exposed persons, 
hospital admission policies modified,  
implementation of isolation facilities and 
cohorting, increased workload of 
laboratory, IPC staff and frontline 
HCWs, rapid molecular diagnostic test 
with 24 hr turnaround, definitions for 
community-acquired/ nosocomial 
infection, standard and transmission-
based precautions, oseltamivir for post-
exposure prophylaxis. 
Quasi-experimental 
study based on 
epidemiological 
analysis of clinical 
symptoms of 
exposed persons 
using retrospective 
analysis 
Influenza virus 
A/H1N1 
836 exposed 
persons 
  
01/05/2009-
08/08/2009 
Incidence of nosocomial influenza A 
infection (0.25 per 10,000 patient days in 
2007, 0.14 in 2008, 0.05 in 2009 (first 6 
months)) 1 May – 8 Aug 2009: patients 
positive for S-OIV by RT-PCR (100/311, 
32%). 
Nosocomial transmission of S-OIV for 
staff and patients i.e. secondary attack 
rate of exposed persons (4/836, 0.48%)  
Note: oseltamivir offered as post-
exposure prophylaxis. 
 
18 sessions of open staff forum held to 
prevent acquisition of S-OIV (3698/4976 
hospital staff, 74.3%) 
 
Significant risk factor of nosocomial 
infection: not wearing a surgical mask 
(4/4 vs 264/832, P=0.010) or vice versa 
(4/4 vs 300/832, P=0.017) 
Cherifi et al, 
2011,(181) 
Belgium 
Assessed hospital preparedness and 
response; multidisciplinary pandemic 
task force co-ordinated response, made 
strategic decisions and approved 
weekly action plans, daily data 
collection and reporting, one site 
containment, ED and ICU viral zone, 
dedicated wards, increased staff 
capacity, clinical pathways, isolation 
and cohorting, limited admission to 
restricted areas, prioritisation of cases 
for immediate care, restrictions on 
areas used for patient care, 
environmental disinfection, standard 
and additional precautions for ILI, IPC 
training and exercises for areas of 
need, e.g. use of masks, use of 
protective equipment. 
Quasi-experimental 
study based on 
clinical and cost 
analysis using 
retrospective 
analysis 
Influenza virus 
A/H1N1 
Cohort of 43  
hospitalised 
patients with 
confirmed influenza 
A 
(521 patients with 
ILI admitted to 
emergency ward) 
 
01/06/2009 – 
30/11/2009 
Nosocomial transmission of S-OIV i.e. 
secondary attack rate of inpatients with 
ILI (3/64, 5%) 
Nosocomial transmission of S-OIV to 
staff (1nurse) 
Case fatality rate (1/30, 3%) 
 
 
Note: Neuraminidase-inhibitors (INA) not 
offered as post-exposure prophylaxis 
Vaccination taken up by 10% nurses, 
60% physicians 
 
Total cost estimated at €75,691 
Illingworth et 
al, 2011, (186)  
UK 
Assessed implementation of new 
infection control strategy; restricting 
admissions and discharges of affected 
ward bays, installation of bay doors, 
division of nursing staff to work in to 
work solely in affected and or 
unaffected bays, use of theatre clothing 
(scrubs) on affected bays, restriction on 
ancillary staff entering affected bays, 
IPC nurses responsible for closing 
bays, enhanced cleaning regime, faster 
turnaround for Norovirus testing using 
rapid in-house molecular test, enlarged 
IPC team with daily visits to adult 
wards, IPC input to bed management 
meetings, out of hours ‘on call’ IPC 
nursing service provided, improved 
communication between community 
IPC team and hospital (daily email and 
daily bulletin to hospital admitting 
teams).  
Non-controlled 
before and after 
study comparing 
the effectiveness of 
two infection control 
strategies using 
retrospective data 
from two Norovirus 
seasons: 2007-08 
and 2009-10 
 
Norovirus 
2007-08 (50 
possible and 42 
confirmed hospital 
outbreaks) 2009-10 
(29 possible and 25 
confirmed hospital 
outbreaks) 
 
01/10/2006-
31/05/2010 
Significant decrease in: 
ratio of confirmed hospital to community 
outbreaks (r=0.317, P=0.025) 
no. of days of restricted admissions on 
hospital wards per outbreak (r=0.742, 
P=0.041) 
no. of hospital bed-days lost per 
outbreak (r=0.344, P<0.001) 
 
No significant change in: 
no. of patients affected per hospital 
outbreak (r=1.080, P=0.517) 
no. of hospital staff affected by outbreak 
(r=0.651, P=0.105) 
 
Cost of bed-days lost 2007-08 
(31/41confirmed outbreaks - £367,243) 
Cost of bed-days lost 2009-10 
(24 confirmed outbreaks - £108,962) 
 
Note: no change in predominating 
circulating genotype (GII-4) or major 
shift in variants present in P2 domain of 
virus capsid protein 
Lucet et al, 
2007, (187) 
France 
Assessed multimodal, co-ordinated 
intervention strategy; creation and 
twice-weekly meetings of 
multidisciplinary VRE control 
committee, index case detected early 
and control measures instituted in next 
few days, cohorting of VRE carriers in a 
Quasi-experimental 
study based on 
clinical analysis of 
the effect of multi-
modal interventions 
using retrospective 
analysis 
vanA VRE faecium 
resistant to 
vancomycin and 
teicoplanin 
39 VRE-positive 
patients (2 urinary 
tract infections, 36 
Decrease in: 
proportion of VRE-positive swabs; Week 
1(7/10, 70%), Week 2 (7/35, 20%), 
Week 3 (18/96,18.8%), Week 4 (5/305, 
1.6%) 
consumption of targeted antibiotics 
between third and fourth quarters of 
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dedicated ward, stringent adherence to 
contact and standard precautions, 
extensive screening of contact patients 
and high risk units, division of HCWs to 
work solely with VRE-positive or –
negative patients, restriction on patients 
entering cohorting area, environmental 
disinfection, sensitive technique for 
detecting VRE in stool samples, 
dedicated team to minimise selected 
antibiotic use, recommendations to 
clinicians on antibiotic use, information 
(information letter, Intranet home page, 
email updates, information meetings) 
for hospital staff, hospital staff 
education programme, electronic 
tracking of in-hospital transfer and 
readmission of VRE carriers and 
contact patients 
colonised) 
 
 
03/09/ 2005 – 
01/10/2005 
 
 
2006 (117DDDs-89 DDDs/1000 patient-
days, 24%) 
 
After week4, 1 VRE-positive contact 
patient identified through automatic alert 
system on readmission to hospital 
Pearman, 
2006, (188)  
Australia 
Assessed enhanced infection control 
practices; (after 2 months) creation of 
daily hospital VRE Executive Group 
(made strategic decisions, fund 
allocation, direction of staff), agreement 
for substantial additional funding, 
dedicated cost centre to record costs of 
outbreak, cohorting of VRE-positive and 
ward contact patients in dedicated 
wards, dedicated nursing staff for each 
cohort, increase in IPC staff, patient 
transfers required approval, equipment 
sharing between wards halted, ICU 
isolation rooms doubled, hospital-wide 
patient screening over one week, 
admission/discharge screening, 
developed rapid laboratory provisional 
identification technique, dedicated VRE 
ward-cleaning service, environmental 
cultures to check efficacy of cleaning 
post-discharge, electronic flagging of 
VRE carriers/ward contacts’ medical 
records, screening of ward contacts 
after hospital discharge, special 
discharge of elderly VRE carriers/ward 
contacts to residential facilities 
Quasi-experimental 
study based on 
clinical and cost 
analysis of 
enhanced infection 
control practices 
using retrospective 
analysis 
vanB VRE faecium 
resistant to 
vancomycin and 
susceptible to 
teicoplanin 
68 VRE-positive 
patients (4 infected, 
64 colonised) 
 
 
 
18/07/2001-12/2001 
VREF  acquisition rate: 
28/09/2001 – 31/10/2001 – 33% 
November 2001 – 2.6% 
December 2001 – 1.7% 
 
VREF carriage rate post-discharge (for 
ward contacts discharged before being 
screened 4 times (54/1977, 2.73%) 
 
Cost of enhanced infection control 
practices was AUD$ 2,700,000 
(£1,000,000) 
 
Note: results of pulsed-field gel 
electrophoresis showed that all outbreak 
isolates belonged to a single strain 
Yazdanpanah 
et al, 2006, 
(189) 
France 
Assessed the additional direct medical 
costs and missed opportunity costs 
attributable to SARS; designated 
isolation areas constructed and 
equipment set up for suspected SARS 
cases, 24 hour telephone line set up, 
dedicated nurse for SARS patients, 
division of nurses and cleaners 
between general ID sectors (new staff) 
and isolated SARS sector (existing 
staff),  additional working hours for 
physicians ,nurses and construction 
workers, criteria-based patient 
assessment, diagnostic testing to detect 
SARS, specific SARS accounting cost 
centre, provision of disposable 
protective equipment 
Non-controlled time 
series analysis 
using retrospective 
costs 
SARS 
3 patients with 
SARS (1 died), 307 
phone calls, 30 
outpatients, 10 
inpatient 
admissions 
 
Total cost of 
resources €356,030 
 
03/2003 – 07/2003 
Outbreak had no impact on hospital 
medical service use; no significant 
difference between observed and 
predicted use of hospital medical 
services before, during  and after the 
outbreaks of SARS using time series 
ARIMA analysis. 
Key: 
IPC –Infection Prevention and Control 
HH – Hand Hygiene 
S-OIV – Swine-Origin Influenza Virus 
ED – Emergency Department 
ICU – Intensive Care Unit 
ILI – Influenza Like Illness 
VRE – Vancomycin-resistant Enterococci 
DDD – Defined daily dose 
SARS – Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
RT-PCR – Reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction 
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Illingworth and colleagues investigated the effect of a new multi-modal infection control 
strategy on the management of Norovirus outbreaks in an acute teaching hospital, with 
significant decreases in the number of days of restricted admissions on hospital wards and 
the number of hospital bed-days lost per outbreak, although no significant change in the 
number of patients or staff affected per hospital outbreak.  The approach taken between 
Norovirus seasons altered from one that was managed as an emergency, with daily 
outbreak meetings, entire wards closed and restriction of movement of staff but no formal 
controls to one that was managed as routine practice, with increased numbers of IPC nurses 
undertaking daily ward visits, division of nursing staff between affected and unaffected areas 
and improved communications. 
In conclusion, whilst there is evidence of an organisational response in the form of resilient 
infection prevention interventions that have reduced the impact of the outbreak, some of the 
studies contain measures that lack statistical robustness.  Only one study reports P values 
for primary measures.(190)  Secondary measures, e.g. costs, antibiotic consumption, 
vaccination rates were reported in five out of six studies, two of which were statistically 
robust, reporting P values. 
4.3.2 Resilient practice 
I synthesized the evidence from the studies into emerging organisational resilience themes, 
to identify patterns of resilient interventions across studies, as shown in Table 4.4.   I 
identified common resilience themes (6 out of 6 studies), despite the variety of infective 
organisms reported across the studies and these are examined in more detail below: 
 Communication is critical in a crisis situation, to ensure that key messages about 
the event are heard and understood by staff, but also that those in senior positions 
respond to feedback from those at the front-line of the organisation.(154) In these 
studies, internal communications were used to update staff on the outbreak progress 
(through emails, daily bulletins or open forums), provide background knowledge and 
information (using the Intranet and information sheets) and to direct staff (using 
action plans, emails). Externally, communication was used to provide links with 
partner agencies, such as residential homes and community IPC teams and to 
provide further information to patients and physicians, e.g. use of dedicated 
telephone line. 
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 Improvisation, defined as a system’s unplanned but purposeful and speedy 
response to a complex, turbulent situation,(191) is evident in all studies that reported 
the division of HCWs between affected and unaffected areas and cohorting of 
affected patients in isolation areas/rooms.  Coping creatively with environmental 
problems within existing resources(192) is viewed as one component of 
improvisation and is evident in these examples.  Hospitals have rapidly redefined 
their environment to create infected and non-infected areas and allocated patients 
according to their infection status or exposure and staff to work in designated areas. 
 Innovation in the context of resilience refers to the organisation’s ability to develop 
new ways of working in response to unexpected events.(136)  In these studies, 
innovation is evident in the development of new means of rapid testing, to achieve 
faster identification of organisms where the challenge of an unexpected infection 
outbreak has led to the need to innovate and invest using new technology to achieve 
faster test results to support the diagnostic process.   
 Redundancy refers to the ability of an organisation to rapidly free up or create 
capacity and capability. Examples might include physical capacity and human 
resource capacity and capability.(140)   All studies reported the creation of additional 
HCW capacity, either through the use of additional HCW hours (from existing staff or 
temporary staff), the creation of ‘out of hours’ services that had previously not existed 
or the strategic placement of skilled staff in higher risk affected areas, whilst newer 
staff, with less experience of IPC guidelines, was placed in lower risk, general areas.  
One study reported the increase in physical capacity, through the doubling of 
numbers of ICU isolation rooms. 
Other commonly occurring resilience themes were organisational –level adaptation and 
change to the new conditions though enhanced infection control practices (5/6 studies), the 
importance of a leadership group through multidisciplinary task forces that co-ordinated and 
led the outbreak management (5/6 studies), heightened cognition through early recognition 
of index cases (4/6 studies) and awareness of the trade-offs between performance and 
safety (4/6 studies).  It was notable that minor interventions at clinical level such as 
environmental disinfection were effective because strong focused leadership was in place at 
organisational level.
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Table 4.4  Organisational resilience factors in an unexpected event 
Org Resilience 
Theme 
Infection 
Practice 
Cheng
(193)
 
(H1N1) 
Cherifi
(181)
 
(H1N1) 
Illingworth
(194) 
(Norovirus) 
Lucet
(195) 
(VRE) 
Pearman
(196)
 
(VRE) 
Yazdanpanah
(197)
 
(SARS) 
Cognition/ 
behaviour 
Early recognition 
of index cases 
 
 
 
    SARS 
surveillance 
system nationally, 
distribution of 
cases to local 
referral centres 
Observed 
practice 
 HH practice 
cough 
etiquette 
compliance 
 daily IPC visits    
Wearing 
personal 
protective 
equipment 
 surgical face 
mask 
 masks, 
protective 
equipment 
theatre scrubs   disposable 
protective 
equipment 
Organisation 
Learning 
Education 
sessions 
  ‘just-in-time’ 
education 
     
Training  IPC sessions 
for staff 
video 
demonstrations 
on PPE 
 IPC unit 
provided 
training based 
on need 
 information 
meetings 
  
Leadership Leadership 
group 
multi-
disciplinary 
development of 
strategic IPC 
bundle 
multi-
disciplinary 
task force 
daily outbreak 
meetings pre-
intervention 
VRE 
control 
committee 
daily VRE 
executive 
control 
committee 
 
Communication Internal 
communication 
 
 open staff 
forum 
 
weekly 
action plans 
daily bulletin to 
hospital 
admitting teams 
information 
letter, email 
updates, 
Intranet 
home page,  
direction of 
staff 
 
External 
communication 
  daily email 
between 
community IPC 
and hospital 
 patient 
transfers 
required 
approval 
24 hour 
telephone line set 
up 
Improvisation Limited 
admission to 
restricted areas 
hospital 
admission 
policies 
modified 
 (patient, 
staff and 
visitors) 
 (students & 
ancillary staff) 
 (patients)   
Division of 
HCWs to work in 
affected/ 
unaffected areas 
      
Isolation and 
cohorting 
isolation 
facilities and 
cohorting 
ED and ICU 
viral zone 
dedicated 
wards/private 
rooms 
affected bays dedicated 
ward 
dedicated 
wards 
dedicated 
isolation areas 
Ward/bay 
restrictions 
/closures 
 restrictions 
on rooms, 
routes, 
buildings 
IPC nurse 
control of 
closures 
   
Innovation Development of 
rapid testing for 
faster 
identification of 
organism 
rapid 
molecular 
diagnostic test 
with 24 hr 
turnaround 
home-made 
RT-PCR for 
detection of 
influenza A 
rapid in-house 
molecular test 
for Norovirus 
sensitive 
technique 
for detecting 
VRE in stool 
samples 
rapid 
laboratory 
provisional 
identification 
technique 
diagnostic 
testing to detect 
SARS 
Clinical 
pathways 
definitions for 
community-
acquired/ 
nosocomial 
infection 
definitions 
for ILI and 
influenza 
related 
mortality 
 antibiotic 
use 
recommend
ations to 
clinicians 
 criteria-based 
patient 
assessment 
Adaptation Use of additional 
precautions 
standard and 
transmission-
based 
precautions 
oseltamivir 
for post-
exposure 
prophylaxis 
standard 
and additional 
precautions 
for ILI 
 adherence 
to contact 
and 
standard 
precautions 
enhanced 
IPC practices 
equipment 
sharing 
between 
wards halted 
dedicated 
equipment for 
suspected SARS 
cases 
Control contact   Rapid,  Delay in  
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measures 
instituted rapidly 
tracing and 
seven-day 
medical 
surveillance for 
exposed 
persons 
aggressive 
control 
measures 
rapid 
instigation of 
organisational 
measures 
Monitoring 
 
 
Data tracking IPC 
compliance 
monitoring 
incidence of 
nosocomial 
influenza A 
infection 
daily data 
collection  
and reporting 
to task force 
 electronic 
tracking of 
VRE 
transfers/ 
readmission 
electronic 
flagging of 
VRE 
carriers/ward 
contacts’ 
medical 
records 
 
Screening of 
patients 
screening of 
patients/staff 
with URTI 
symptoms 
  contact 
patients and 
high risk 
units 
Ward 
contacts 
post-
discharge 
hospital-wide 
patient 
screening over 
one week 
admission/ 
discharge 
screening 
 
Additional 
costs/Funding 
widespread 
provision of 
alcohol-based 
hand rub 
   significant 
fund allocation 
dedicated 
cost centre 
SARS cost 
centre 
investment 
documented 
Redundancy Increased staff 
capacity 
 increased 
workload of 
laboratory, IPC 
staff and 
frontline HCWs 
additional 
HCW in ED 
IPC team 
expanded 
Out of hours ‘on 
call’ IPC nursing 
service 
dedicated 
team to 
minimise 
antibiotic 
use 
increase in 
IPC staff 
ICU isolation 
rooms doubled 
dedicated nurse 
for SARS patients 
additional hours 
for physicians, 
nurses, 
construction 
workers 
Trade offs Performance/ 
safety trade off 
early relief of 
sick staff from 
work 
7-day sick 
leave for 
infected staff 
prioritisation 
of cases for 
immediate 
care 
  special 
discharge of 
elderly VRE 
carriers/ward 
contacts to 
residential 
facilities 
HCW’s assigned 
only to SARS 
patients 
SARS patient 
care less efficient 
than other care 
due to  IPC 
measures 
Organisational 
structures 
Change to 
existing meeting 
structures 
  IPC input to 
bed mngt 
meetings 
   
Change to 
existing physical 
structures 
 One site 
containment 
 
installation of 
bay doors 
  construction of 
structures to meet 
SARS isolation 
standards 
Organisational 
change 
Environmental 
cleaning 
Ad hoc 
environment 
disinfection 
when 
confirmed S-
OIV 
Environmen
tal 
disinfection 
Enhanced 
cleaning regime 
Environme
ntal 
disinfection 
dedicated 
VRE ward-
cleaning 
service 
environment
al cultures to 
test efficacy of 
post-discharge 
cleaning 
 
Key: 
IPC –Infection Prevention and Control 
HH – Hand Hygiene 
S-OIV – Swine-Origin Influenza Virus 
ED – Emergency Department 
ICU – Intensive Care Unit 
PPE – Personal Protection Equipment 
 
ILI – Influenza Like Illness 
HCW – Health Care Worker 
VRE – Vancomycin-resistant Enterococci 
DDD – Defined daily dose 
SARS – Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
URTI – Upper Respiratory Tract Infection 
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4.4 Discussion 
In this systematic review, I set out to answer the research question: Do organisational 
resilience interventions lead to a reduction in the impact of outbreaks in the acute health-
care setting?  To achieve this, I proposed to address the following aims: 
a) To assess the organisational resilience interventions that are used in an outbreak 
b) To identify patterns of resilience interventions across selected studies 
c) using a) and b) to reveal organisational resilience factors  
I found that evidence does exist across these intervention studies to support a reduction in 
the impact of outbreaks in the acute health care setting as a result of organisational 
resilience interventions.  The impact of these interventions was assessed using primary 
measures of nosocomial transmission, patient acquisition rate or as a proxy measure, 
hospital medical service use.  However, the evidence is not statistically robust in the majority 
of studies. Frequently reported infection control practices were identified within the multi-
modal organisational interventions reported in the studies, such as the early identification of 
index cases, the role of isolation and cohorting, the division of staff between affected and 
non-affected areas which provide useful indicators for practitioners involved in managing 
infection outbreaks.  These practices were mapped to cross-cutting resilience themes; 
communication, improvisation, innovation and redundancy most frequently occurring, 
followed by themes of adaptation, change, leadership, heightened cognition and 
performance/safety trade-offs.   
The findings of my systematic review suggest that organisational learning from one outbreak 
can be applied to inform preparedness for future outbreaks and other crisis responses.  Two 
studies had adopted this approach.  Illingworth and colleagues(198) had reviewed the crisis 
management of previous outbreaks and instituted more robust routine arrangements to 
integrate outbreak management into everyday practice.  These included changes to the 
physical environment by adding ward bay doors, instituting barrier precautions between bays 
and increasing the volume and visibility of the infection team on wards and units.  
Pearman(199) had applied learning from a ‘disaster’ VRE outbreak scenario to implement a 
VRE control programme that included targeted active surveillance cultures of patients on 
high risk hospital units, eradication of single-strain outbreaks in hospitals by enhanced 
infection control practices and contact isolation of known carriers and unscreened ward 
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contacts of outbreaks.  Both studies had adopted a longer-term approach to assess the 
effectiveness of these practices over several years.   
The studies included in my systematic review suggest that a rapid institutional response to 
an outbreak is critical to effective management of the outbreak.  Resilience factors that 
support a rapid response include: sensemaking (64), the ability to make sense of unusual or 
unexpected cues by early detection of index cases through surveillance; improvisation and 
adaptation through aggressive implementation of organisation-wide enhanced control 
measures and strong, focused multidisciplinary leadership through the creation of a task 
force or control committee that meets frequently and gives clear direction.  When these 
resilient factors were not implemented immediately, as in the VRE outbreaks of 
Pearman(200) compared with Lucet(201) the outbreak duration was longer (five months 
versus four weeks) and the financial impact was greater.   
The studies also suggested that a strong, coordinated approach to managing capacity 
through bed and pathway management during the outbreak was essential.  Resilient factors 
included either having or being able to create redundancy rapidly through increased physical 
and human capacity and altered physical structures to accommodate increased capacity.  
Bed and pathway management was critical to ensure isolation policies were maintained 
strictly and was achieved through division of infected and non-infected patients and 
healthcare workers into infected and non-infected areas of the hospital. 
None of the studies explicitly used organisational resilience terminology, although all studies 
described interventions that related to resilient practice and were implemented at 
organisational-level, suggesting that the concept of organisational resilience has yet to be 
embedded in health care research.  The development of generic organisational resilience 
themes from these wide-ranging studies of unexpected infection events is evidence of 
organisational-level learning that may be relevant to policy makers and health care leaders.  
The application of organisational resilience concepts to future work might inform generic 
learning derived from cross-cutting themes in the study of unexpected events, rather than 
focusing on organism or organisation-specific learning.    
4.4.1 Limitations of the Review 
Limitations of the review are that one of the inclusion criteria was studies published in 
English, although the impact of this is likely to be small;(202) I did this for pragmatic reasons, 
as there was no budget for translators.   In addition, only studies from the resource-rich 
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developed world are included in this review to ensure that the healthcare and socio-political 
context is sufficiently similar to draw consistent conclusions about the type and pattern of 
organisational resilience interventions.  In this review, only intervention studies met the 
quality criteria and these reflected a reliance on weak quasi-experimental designs based on 
retrospective data.  The studies demonstrated the problems with attempting to analyse an 
unexpected infection event with minimal pre-event research preparation. This is potentially a 
fundamental issue for researchers owing to the reactive nature of unexpected events.  This 
issue creates a number of difficulties for researchers working in these acute setting/outbreak 
contexts, such as obtaining prior ethics approval, identifying baseline data and access to 
participants in an outbreak scenario.  Resulting studies suffer from missing data, no baseline 
assessment, sample bias, use of simultaneous multiple interventions, temporal confounders 
and inadequate statistical analysis.(173)  No qualitative studies could be included, even 
when inclusion/exclusion criteria were met, as these studies failed to meet the quality 
criteria.  Qualitative articles were typically narrative accounts of outbreaks that had 
insufficiently defined methodologies and inadequate study designs, but included relevant 
organisational factors that reflected the resilient factors identified in this review.  
Organisational resilience factors or frameworks were not explicitly referred to in any of the 
studies despite using resilience-related search terms. Further methodological work is 
required in this area, to ensure that intervention and qualitative studies are well designed, 
rigorously executed and robustly analysed to ensure that statistical and thematic findings 
respectively can be considered.  
4.5 Conclusion 
 For the first time in the organisational resilience literature, my systematic review has 
identified organisational resilience factors in the context of an unexpected event in a 
systematic way.  I have identified a set of organisational resilience factors based on resilient 
interventions that contribute to a reduced impact of outbreaks in the acute sector.  This novel 
approach, which involved the identification of organisational factors from clinical research, 
has proved to be an effective method for the development of the concept of organisational 
resilience contextually. 
In terms of future research directions, two issues are apparent.  I chose to exclude studies 
from the developed world as my research is UK-based and the healthcare and socio-political 
context of the developing world may not be consistent with resource-rich countries.  In 
future, a systematic review is needed that includes resource-poor settings.  A further issue 
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was the lack of robust qualitative research, despite a number of relevant narrative accounts 
that had inadequate methodologies.   
To understand organisational resilience better in the healthcare context, further detailed and 
robust qualitative research is needed in an empirical context to examine organisational 
resilience in the context of an unexpected event, and in the context of continuous 
organisational stressors.   This thesis addresses these requirements in the next two 
empirical chapters, taking a macro-level perspective on the impact of continuous 
organisational stressors in Chapter 5 and a micro-level perspective on an unexpected 
infection event in Chapter 6. 
4.6 Comparison of theoretical and empirical resilience reviews 
My aim at the start of the theoretical and empirical reviews of the resilience literature was to 
contrast the concepts identified within the theoretical review (Chapter 3) with those concepts 
that were extracted from the empirical review of healthcare studies that described 
unexpected infection events (Chapter 4).  I found that a comparison of the concepts 
identified within each review showed considerable overlap, as outlined in Table 4.45. I 
identified some key issues which have relevance for the thesis: the conceptual focus of 
unexpected events; the explicit nature of trade-offs; the significance of redundancy; and, 
gaps in the empirical examples compared with the theoretical literature.  
The theoretical focus of unexpected events was partially reflected in the empirical studies.  
Models for unexpected events in the theoretical literature emphasise three key stages: 
anticipation/ preparedness, response to the event and recovery post-event.  The main focus 
of empirical studies was the response to the event, with issues such as use of redundant 
capacity, managing change, rapid adaptation, innovation and improvisation playing key 
roles.   Organisational learning, which in the theoretical literature is usally associated with 
post-event recovery and improvement, in the empirical studies took the form of training and 
education sessions as part of the response to the outbreak, ensuring that all staff were 
conversant with the infection control protocols required to manage the outbreak. There was 
little discussion of anticipation or preparedness or recovery post-event and hospitals had few 
strategies in place to deal with these types of unexpected events. 
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Table 4.5  Concepts identified within organisational resilience reviews 
Theoretical general review Empirical healthcare review 
Organisational Learning  
Organisational Change  
Organisational Development  
Organisational Structures  
Organisational Culture  
Cognition/behaviour  
Trust  
Leadership  
Communication  
Performance  
Preparedness  
Innovation  
Improvisation  
Adaptation  
Monitoring  
Crisis Management  
Redundancy  
Recovery  
Policy making  
Competitive advantage  
The concept of trade-offs, which was inherent within the theoretical literature, was more 
explicit within the empirical studies, particularly the trade-off between performance and 
safety.  The performance/safety dilemma related to the performance requirements to 
continue elective work and maintain staffing levels, juxtaposed against the clinical need to 
isolate and cohort patients.  Examples of trade-offs included how long staff should remain on 
sick leave for, which cases to prioritise for immediate care, the balance between admissions 
and discharges and the appropriate staff/patient ratio for infected patient care. 
Redundancy, the capacity to maintain spare resource, was evident in theoretical studies in a 
commercial context, but was not the subject of healthcare studies.  However, in empirical 
healthcare studies, redundancy was a critical issue across all studies.  Having the capacity 
to rapidly utilise spare capacity effectively, either through increasing staff workload, 
expanding bed capacity or the creation of dedicated teams was essential to a rapid and 
effective response to the outbreak.  Although the term ‘redundancy’ may be more familiar 
within the commercial sector, the rapid conversion of redundant capacity was an important 
feature of the successful management of an unexpected event.  
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Finally, theoretical concepts that relate to unexpected events that were not evident in 
empirical studies included the explicit discussion of crisis/disaster management, any link to 
performance, the preparedness for the outbreak and discussion of recovery strategies.  The 
lack of explicit reference to disaster management may be an issue of terminology.  Most 
hospitals have plans to manage major incidents, but may not explicitly apply these to the 
management of major outbreaks.  The lack of reference to organisational performance may 
relate to the fact that the empirical studies were authored by clinicians whose focus was on 
the clinical impact of the outbreak.  Half of the studies commented on the financial costs of 
the outbreak, in terms of additional infection control practices, bed-days lost and resource 
implications, but there were few references to the impact on operational performance.  
Preparedness and recovery were not key features of the empirical studies.  Most studies 
acknowledged that the outbreaks were unexpected and few anticipatory plans were in place.  
Similarly, recovery was implicitly mentioned but only one study explicitly discussed longer-
term strategies to prevent outbreaks recurring.(203)   
In summary, whilst there was considerable overlap of organisational resilience concepts 
between the theoretical and empirical reviews, there were key gaps in the theoretical 
development of the empirical studies from the perspective of an unexpected event.  Of 
particular significance was the absence of discussion of anticipation/preparedness 
approaches and post-event recovery.  
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5 Chapter 5.  Increasing hospital resilience to infections through 
the adoption of electronic infection surveillance programmes: 
disciplinary accountability or democratic transparency? 
5.1 Introduction 
The first of the theoretical/empirical chapters, this chapter studies organisational resilience 
across a healthcare system, assessing the effect of macro-level government interventions to 
reduce rising infection rates on hospital organisations at meso-level and local actors at 
micro-level. From a resilience perspective, this is a study of organisational resilience during 
routine, expected conditions, but in the presence of rising infection rates which act as a 
continuous stressor on the system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
The context for this chapter is the infection control health reform programme led by the UK 
government from 2004 – 2011 which developed in response to rising MRSA and C.difficile 
rates.  I focus on one set of government interventions within the overall reform programme; 
the use of electronic infection surveillance programmes which relied on the recruitment or 
adoption of web-based technologies.  I trace three elements of electronic surveillance 
programmes using the effective recruitment of ICT:  i) the adoption and development of an 
enhanced web-based surveillance mechanism to increase visibility of hospital performance 
on infection rates ii) the enrolment of large numbers of hospital staff in national and local 
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surveillance and iii) the increase in public visibility of infection rates through government 
transparency policy agendas. 
I apply Foucauldian governmentality theory as a conceptual framework to understand these 
changes.  I identify four Foucauldian themes:  i) the erosion of traditional line management 
by novel indirect control modes ii) the operation of electronic panoptical surveillance systems 
in health care iii) the role of the surveying centre and its capacity to intervene and iv) the 
engagement in self surveillance and subjectification of clinical managerial hybrids, and use 
these to analyse UK infection control reform using an embedded qualitative case study. 
I begin by discussing the theoretical links between organisational resilience and surveillance.   
I discuss the literature on information systems in health and examine the interrelationship 
with Foucauldian perspectives on organisational power, knowledge and control.   I examine 
these themes in relation to my empirical case, assessing the macro-level role of the national 
infection strategy and the national infection surveillance scheme and its implications for my 
embedded case study hospital at meso and micro-level.  I conclude by discussing how the 
study extends the existing knowledge on health care ICT surveillance systems with 
reference to these four Foucauldian themes and on the broader learning for the study of 
organisational resilience in healthcare. 
5.2 Theory 
5.2.1 Resilience and surveillance 
With reference to Hollnagel’s definition of organisational resilience below, I propose that this 
study assesses the intrinsic ability of the healthcare system to adjust its functioning following 
disturbances, in this case rising MRSA and C.difficile rates, so that it could sustain required 
healthcare operations under expected conditions: 
‘the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or following changes 
and disturbances, so that it can sustain required operations under both expected and 
unexpected conditions’(23) 
I argue that the macro-level national surveillance strategy adopted by the government 
constituted an ‘adjustment’ to the system’s functioning, as did the meso and micro-level 
enrolment of clinical leaders in self-organisation under surveillance.  I will explore the extent 
to which this adjustment can be construed as positive, on the basis that Sutcliffe and Vogus 
contend that if an organisation can maintain positive adjustment under challenging 
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conditions, one of which includes disruption of routines and ongoing stresses, then the 
organisation can emerge resiliently.(24)   
Acquiring resilient capacity through positive adjustment can involve the realignment of 
organisational routines and processes to enable the organisation to move forward.(204)  I 
examine the role of surveillance and self surveillance in the construction of new routines and 
a new governance order, which provides a counterpoise with the established hierarchical 
model.   
5.2.2 Foucauldian perspectives on ICTs in health care 
Recent theoretical developments in the analysis of information communication technologies 
(ICTs) in organizations have built on seminal early work(74;205) that explored and critiqued 
the informating consequences of technology on knowledge, power and control in 
organisations.  Michel Foucault’s key works(68-71;73;75;206;207) particularly his articulation 
of the disciplinary society, analogised using Bentham’s architectural Panopticon, have 
informed these analyses. 
In the last decade, the Foucauldian perspective has increasingly been applied to the health 
care sector, with empirically-based studies that employ a critical(76) and interpretive 
perspective on a variety of mechanisms for health sector reform, varying from ICT 
implementation to the operation of Evidence Based Medicine (EBM).  These studies often 
are contextualised as post-bureaucratic organizational forms or processes that are 
characterised by indirect ‘governance’ rather than through traditional line managerial 
control(208) and reflect a transition from direct, hierarchical and bureaucratic rules towards 
new indirectly governed ‘networked’ organisational forms.(209)   Post-bureaucratic 
organisations have been characterised by Foucauldian concepts of governing at a 
distance(210) and ‘disciplined selves.’(211) 
Drawing on the established work of Ferlie et al(208)  I situate this study as an empirical 
example of a highly effective ICT-enabled national surveillance strategy that increased the 
resilience of healthcare organisations to address hospital-acquired infections.   I explore the 
effect of surveillance on a key patient safety issue; increasing infection rates.  I present the 
national surveillance strategy as a positive case within this literature, involving the successful 
adoption by the government of novel and indirect control modes.  I argue that these indirect 
control modes had a largely positive effect on hospitals’ resilient capability through the active 
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and creative enrolment in self governing and self surveillance by clinical managerial hybrids, 
who experienced strong identity shifts.    
This strategy is not representative of the findings of previous studies of ICTs in health.  A 
number of studies identify tacit clinical resistance and failure of the system to deliver the 
proposed outcomes.(209;212-214)  These studies identify a range of resistant (non-resilient) 
responses following the introduction of a new system that is seen by local actors to 
represent and institute new norms through a new knowledge-base, expertise and discourse.  
These include ‘resistive compliance’ where local actors put off and displaced using the 
systems(212), attempts by local actors to imbue the system with locally articulated 
meanings,(209) local actors failing to use systems, creating their own alternative systems or 
using systems to legitimise their own professional power(214) and local actors challenging 
the logic within the system or utilising the same logic to engineer additional resources.(213)   
McGivern and Dopson  argue in their study of Genetics Knowledge Parks (GPKs) that the 
introduction of standardized quarterly performance reviews constituted a form of 
‘governmentality’ (Foucault, 1991) by controlling the ‘space of representation’ but despite 
initial compliance with the reporting system, failed to lead to jurisdiction over GPKs.(215)   
A smaller number of studies take a more positive stance, considering how Foucault’s later 
appreciative conceptualisation of self-surveillance, the technologies of self and 
subjectification(76) can be understood in relation to health care reforms.  Waring explores 
self-surveillance in response to ‘patient safety’ reforms.(216)  He argues, using Foucault’s  
governmentality perspective(68) that doctors engage in adaptive regulation, rejecting 
managerially dominated safety discourses for internalised professionally dominated self-
surveillance.  Ferlie et al review Foucault’s work on governmentality as applied to 
subjectification, technologies of self and clinical managerial hybrids in cancer networks, 
finding clinical managerial hybrids energetically engaging with and  influencing institutional 
change as governing agents and leaders .(208)   Iedema & Rhodes(217;218) build on 
Lyon’s (1993) proposition(205) that we should look beyond the constraints of the Panopticon 
to consider the place for care and trust in surveillance systems by exploring the successful 
role of clinicians in surveillance and the potentially positive effect on patient outcomes. 
This chapter explores the empirical case of infection control in the UK as an exemplar for 
improving organisational resilience through the articulation of four Foucauldian 
governmentality themes: the erosion of traditional line management or market control by 
novel indirect control modes; the electronic Panopticon; the surveying centre with a capacity 
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to intervene; and self-surveillance and active enrolment in self-governing by clinical 
managerial hybrids.  These themes are explored in the following section. 
5.2.3 Foucauldian governmentality themes 
5.2.3.1 Erosion of direct control by novel indirect control modes 
The first theme, the erosion of traditional line management or market control by the use of 
novel indirect control modes reflects a shift from direct to indirect technologies of steering.    I 
consider the extent to which conventional direct technologies of steering, either traditional 
line management exemplified by hierarchical and bureaucratic processes of command and 
control, New Public Management (NPM) style managerialism of performance management, 
targets and measurement (Ferlie et al 1996) or market control exemplified by processes of 
choice, competition and diversity were eroded or at least complemented by novel indirect 
control modes.  These novel control modes which I argue created resilient capability in 
hospitals comprised of: firstly, the adoption of national surveillance strategies utilising ICT; 
secondly the enrolment of more people in surveillance, governing, self-surveillance and self-
governing; and thirdly, the publication of public sector data to achieve openness and 
transparency.  These indirect modes operate through drawing of committed clinical 
managerial hybrids into self-governing roles and ‘loose/tight’ governance regimes that afford 
high performers ‘loose’ self-regulation and poor performers ‘tight’ intervention and supported 
improvement. 
5.2.3.2 Designing the electronic Panopticon 
The second theme of the electronic Panopticon derives from Foucault’s elaboration on the 
metaphor of the panopticon, originally conceived by Bentham(219) as an architectural 
surveillance device or ‘Inspection House’, to explain the concept of disciplinary power; 
“panopticism, is the discipline mechanism: a functional mechanism that must improve the 
exercise of power by making it lighter, more rapid, more effective, a design of subtle 
coercion for a society to come.” (73)p209  Using the infection reform programme as a case 
study, I explore the extent to which discipline, as a mode of power, operates through the 
web-based surveillance database which has substituted for the architecture of the 
panopticon and allows the state to undertake permanent, yet discontinuous assessment, 
classification and monitoring of infection rates in individual hospitals.   
Foucault draws on three panoptic principles that support the exercise of this power; the 
creation of a conscious and permanent state of visibility, the creation of an effect of 
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continuous surveillance, even when it is discontinuous in action, therefore unverifiable and 
the creation of a sense of anxiety in the observed that they assume responsibility for the 
constraints of power.(73)p201  Building on these principles, the web-based infection 
surveillance programme can be understood as an artefact, an information panopticon that 
serves as a mechanism for constructing a field of visibility for the state. (74)  Zuboff explores 
the psychology of visibility and examines the extent to which individuals adapt to the 
illumination that the information panopticon provides.(74)  Zuboff identifies examples where 
panoptic visibility created a horizontal visibility or ‘collectivism amongst peers’ in addition to 
vertical visibility that induced conformity to work standards in the observed. In addition, 
universal transparency of data removed ambiguity and altered authority relations, if 
conditions of egalitarian access to data and adequate intellectual skill to find meaning in the 
data were present.(74)  Lyon(220) and Zuboff(74) argue that the panopticon is a starting 
point in understanding electronic surveillance and that a post-Foucauldian perspective is 
required(221) to understand the levels of resistance and refusal, whether explicit or passive 
that is produced by the panopticon.  In this chapter I examine the panoptical gaze of the 
web-based surveillance programme and explore the extent to which it served as a 
mechanism for democratic accountability and democratic transparency and stimulated an 
adjustment in hospitals towards resilient functioning. 
5.2.3.3 Surveying centre with a capacity to intervene 
The third theme concerns the use of a panoptical surveillance tool as a control mode.  This 
use is acknowledged by Power(222) who argues that in a hierarchy of control, surveillance 
can be understood as a first order control whereas audit has become a second or third order 
control.  As such, in a spectrum of programmatic control, Power considers surveillance as a 
more coercive strategy at one end of the spectrum, in contrast to a negotiated and 
consensual regulatory outcome at the other.  The use of surveillance is assessed in 
analyses of the impact of ICT on power dynamics between individuals and organisations(74) 
or individuals and the state, (220;223) which have drawn on the concept of panoptic 
power(73) and its application to ICT, referring to the electronic eye (224) or information 
panopticon.(74)  In this chapter, I build on these analyses to examine the government’s 
commitment to surveillance as both a public health and indirect disciplinary control tool, 
albeit operating indirectly alongside other direct mechanisms.   
In addition to the capacity to intervene, I analyse the government’s capacity for democratic 
transparency.  In his description of the inspection house, Foucault refers not only to constant 
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inspections by appointed inspectors,’ but also by the public: any member of society will have 
the right to come and see with his own eyes how the schools, hospitals, factories, prisons 
function.  There is no risk, therefore, that the increase of power created by the panoptic 
machine may degenerate into tyranny; the disciplinary mechanism will be democratically 
controlled.’ (73)p207   
The duality of disciplinary power with democratic transparency is fundamental to Foucault’s 
vision, each element acting as a restraining influence on the other.  The Panopticon was 
designed to enable an observer to have maximum visibility of individuals within it, but 
equally, it was arranged to enable anyone to observe any of the observers.    This iterative 
nature of observation, which ensured that ‘the exercise of power may be supervised by 
society as a whole’ (73)p207 was designed to prevent the Panopticon becoming a tyrannical 
mechanism, with unconstrained and unethical use of power and control.  This chapter 
examines the tensions between these two elements, mediated by professional interests 
within the policy field of infection control. 
5.2.3.4 Self surveillance and active enrolment in self governing by clinical managerial 
hybrids 
The fourth theme relates to the response by individuals to the panoptical gaze.  Early 
Foucauldian conceptions of panoptical power and visibility were described as a means of 
self-subjection of an individual, a mechanism by which the individual “assumes responsibility 
for the constraints of power” and “inscribes in himself the power relation in which he 
simultaneously plays both roles: he becomes the principle of his own subjection.”(73)p202  
These conceptualisations have been integrated into empirical analyses of disciplinary 
practice.(225)   Subsequent interpretations have focused on Foucault’s later works (76;218) 
arguing that individuals are able to free themselves from the disciplinary power inherent in 
their existing situation and internalise external surveillance (the use of subjectification) 
through the development of ‘technologies of self’ which reflect their own desires and 
constitute a self-disciplined framework of their own making.   Starkey & McKinley contend 
that small and informed groups of individuals may join together ‘to create their own modes of 
thinking and behaviour within their own communities.’(76)p236  Ferlie et al develop this 
logic, in their empirical study of clinical managerial hybrids, proposing that these hybrids 
work together in small teams, align themselves with evidence-based technologies and 
promote patient centeredness.(208)  I will examine the application of subjectification and 
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technologies of self perspective to the operation of clinical managerial hybrids in the infection 
control setting, as an example of a system adjustment that leads to increased resilience. 
 
5.3 Methods  
In order to investigate this contemporary subject in depth and in its real-life context, a macro-
level study of the national infection health reform programme was linked to a single case 
study in a hospital organisation, serving as an embedded unit of analysis.(226)  The 
research employed an inductive and deductive theorising approach(227-229) to support the 
development of theory based on the rich qualitative data that resulted from central and local 
actors’ interpretations of the reform programme and surveillance approach. An initial wide 
ranging literature review assisted in identifying theories that related to health care change 
which were then compared with the emerging themes from the study data.  An iterative 
process was followed, alternating between theory and data to identify a theory that fitted 
most closely with the study data.  The characteristics of the reform programme were found to 
be most closely related to a Foucauldian conceptualisation of a state response to local 
hospital organisations, which were perceived as failing to act on hospital-acquired infections.   
Having explored Foucauldian governmentality as a theoretical perspective on the data, it 
became apparent that the infection control reform programme served as a ‘tracer issue’ for 
several Foucauldian themes. 
In the context of these theoretical debates, this study investigates the surveillance 
programme within the national infection control reform programme which was identified as 
an interesting object of study because it preoccupied the state from 2000-2011.    An 
embedded local hospital case study was selected which was perceived by central 
government as a role model hospital organisation and a leader in infection innovation. This 
large, acute teaching hospital Trust was selected for the study on the basis of the significant 
reductions in MRSA bacteraemias that it had achieved and the local innovation around 
infection that had informed the national infection health reform programme.  The Director of 
Infection Prevention and Control (DIPC) at the hospital was an infectious diseases clinical 
leader who was well connected through links with central government on expert committees 
and as an expert speaker.  
Data collection and analysis was carried out from 2008 to 2011 at two levels: at macro-level 
with national state and regulatory organisations that directed or influenced the infection 
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reform programme and at micro-level with staff from different disciplines and levels with the 
hospital organisation who were involved in the management and operation of infection 
prevention and control and in infection-related incidents and outbreaks.  The study data was 
collated from three sources; 1) in-depth semi-structured interviews at national level (18) and 
local level (22); 2) documentary and web-based analysis at both levels and 3) personal 
reflections on the unfolding scenario.  The interviewees were identified by two different 
sampling strategies.  At national level, criterion sampling was used to identify all the external 
regulatory and advisory agencies that influence infection prevention and control policy and 
implementation in healthcare Trusts. At local level, snowball sampling drew on informants’ 
knowledge to identify other informants who would be useful in the study based on their 
involvement in infection prevention and control.   
In order to recognise ‘the irredeemable presence of the researcher in the research’(230), the 
subject position of the researcher in the research is acknowledged, from the perspective of 
being a former health service manager, having worked in the local organisation in senior 
management roles, rather than as an observer of it.  This perspective provided useful 
insights into the way national reforms are interpreted and enacted in a local organisation.  
The data derived from the interviews and personal reflections was supplemented with data 
analysis of organisational reports and minutes of meetings, policy documentation, legislation, 
letters and infection control statistics from the DH and national agencies.  Thematic analysis 
was used to explore emerging themes arising from the data and an iterative process of data 
triangulation was used to ensure that the emerging themes were consistent with the 
documentary and web-based evidence and personal reflections. 
5.4 Empirical Case 
5.4.1 The infection health reform programme 
5.4.1.1 National infection strategy 
The infection health reform programme was initiated in 2004 to stem the significant increase 
in a specific group of infections; Meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus bacteraemias 
(hereafter referred to as MRSA) that had occurred over the previous ten years- see Figure 
5.1.  
The political scrutiny of the retrospective MRSA data and the expansion of negative popular 
media coverage(280) resulted in the Department of Health (DH) developing the infection 
reform programme and a departmental action plan which was implemented across both 
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semi-autonomous regulated hospitals (Foundation Trusts) and directly controlled hospitals 
(Trusts) with little regard to the DHs new policy direction of devolution and with a greater 
level of intervention and implementation that had occurred in the history of the DH.  These 
NPM approaches were complemented and subsequently eroded by novel and indirect 
control modes, employed by the DH to maintain its stated policy direction, in response to 
significant political and media pressure to improve the MRSA bacteraemia rates.(231)   
Figure 5.1 Voluntary and Mandatory MRSA Bacteraemia Reporting 1993-2008 
 
UK Health Protection Agency. Pearson et al. (2009) Impact of mandatory surveillance on the 
measurement of meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus bacteraemia in the English NHS: 
comparison of mandatory and voluntary surveillance reporting systems. 
http://www.hpa.org.uk/webc/HPAwebFile/HPAweb_C/1317132089460 (Accessed 27 May 2012) 
These infections are resistant to certain antibiotics, resulting in significant illness, potentially 
death in susceptible hospitalised patients.  The UK laboratory-based voluntary system 
showed a dramatic rise in MRSA between 1990 and 2001, with the prevalence of these 
infections being associated primarily with hospital-acquired infection.  The mandatory web-
based surveillance system was introduced in 2002 with the enhanced version of this system 
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being implemented in 2005 (providing real-time data entry and more detailed information on 
risks and incidence of infection), with a marked decrease in infections from 2006.  This 
reporting was complemented in 2005 by surveillance for C.difficile infections. 
Prior to the reform programme (1990-2004) at strategic level, the policy agenda for infection 
control was implemented through the traditional line management structures of the health 
system, from the Department of Health (DH) to Strategic Health Authorities to hospital units 
(Trusts). Changes in policy were communicated to Strategic Health Authorities and Trusts 
via policy directives, recommending changes in practice.  The increased volume of MRSAs 
reported through the voluntary system led the government to recognise the inadequacy of 
using the traditional direct control system and overlaid this with contemporary New Public 
Management (NPM) style controls; the introduction of national clinical targets (2005), 
performance management of Chief Executives and more detailed measurement of infections 
through the introduction of a mandatory retrospective surveillance system for MRSA in 2002. 
The DH resorted to three more novel and indirect control modes to attempt to achieve 
traction on the issue of rising MRSA and C.difficile infections: i) the design of a web-based 
Foucauldian surveillance mechanism to increase the field  of visibility of hospital 
performance on infection rates  which precipitated local self-surveillance activities ii) the 
enrolment of large numbers of hospital staff in national surveillance and governance utilising 
data from the web-based system  iii) the increase in public visibility of infection rates through 
government transparency policy agendas.  The next section traces these three elements of 
the reform programme through the national infection surveillance programme and the case 
study hospital Trust. 
5.4.1.2 National Infection Surveillance Programme 
I examine a key component of the infection health reform programme, the national infection 
surveillance programme and the associated enhanced surveillance database as an artefact, 
an indirect control mechanism to exert disciplinary accountability through surveillance by 
constructing a field of visibility around Trusts.  I will review the operationalisation of the 
surveillance programme and database, assessing its operation centrally and the local 
enactment within Trusts and individual clinicians through the lens of a case study 
organisation.   
The infection surveillance programme, prior to 2001, was operated as a voluntary 
surveillance scheme for hospitals and was subsumed by the Health Protection Agency, an 
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independent UK organisation established by the government in 2003.  Infection numbers 
were published annually based on voluntary hospital returns that fed into a national controls 
assurance framework which encouraged a self-inspecting and regulating capability and 
required a level of trust in hospitals self-reporting against the standard, a concept which the 
government found insufficient against the rising levels of infections. As a result, the 
surveillance programme became colonized by the DH for the purpose of controlling hospital 
infection levels in 2001, in response to continual rises in MRSA bacteraemia numbers since 
1990.  The DH introduced mandatory surveillance of Staphylococcus aureus bacteraemias 
based on quarterly organisational-level laboratory returns in 2002, a year in which there was 
a further increase in reported bacteraemias of over 7,000 per annum. 
As a result of minimal improvement in MRSA numbers by 2005, the DH resorted to a more 
coercive strategy with the introduction of the ‘web-based enhanced surveillance database.’  
This database was notable for the level of enhanced ‘real time’ surveillance detail required 
on every case, the capacity for Trusts to enter data directly using the web-based interface 
and the scope for monitoring individual hospitals.  The amount of detailed data was much 
greater than the previous retrospective data gathered through laboratory-based systems.  
Hospitals were mandated to enter ‘real time’ detailed patient-level data about individual 
infection cases (MRSA bacteraemias 2004 and subsequently cases of C.difficile 2007) which 
involved collecting patient details for each episode such as NHS number, hospital number, 
date of birth, and sex, as well as information concerning the patient's location, date of 
admission, consultant specialty, and care details at the time the blood sample was taken.   
This was commented on by a Director within an arm’s length agency: 
‘MRSA, the reduction target has been very, very, very tightly managed from the top down.  
At a time where the Department of Health is moving to a devolved administration, as far as 
the NHS is concerned, this is one.....this is one area which is being micromanaged, to the 
nth degree, to the single infection, MRSA recorded infection.  Which is quite an interesting 
behavioural experiment actually?’ [72] Director of Arm’s Length Agency 
The increasing level of detail required on every bacteraemia was matched by the increasing 
regularity of surveillance activities by the DH detailed in Table 5.1.  Directives from the 
centre to hospitals increased with reporting, data checking and publication periods becoming 
more frequent, as the government sought to maintain greater control over Trusts through the 
surveillance opportunities that the electronic database presented. 
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This level of surveillance of Trusts led some Trusts to adopt gaming behaviour in an attempt 
to reduce their numbers of MRSA.  As a result of protests from Trusts that their infection 
numbers were artificially increased by ‘community cases’ those patients who already had 
MRSA blood stream infections when entering the hospital, the DH reclassified MRSA 
infections into hospital and non-hospital (community) cases.  This reclassification led to a 
complex set of rules under an ‘appeals process’ that highlighted a sense of mutual visibility 
and associated vulnerability within Trusts.  A formal ‘non-trajectory’ appeals process was 
established and managed by the Health Protection Agency on behalf of the DH to determine 
against a complex set of criteria, which individual cases could be accepted or declined 
during the process. 
Table 5.1  Directives issued by the DH, detailing key changes in infection reporting, data 
checking and publication requirements 
Date Infection 
Name/Reference 
Number of Directive 
 
Reporting/Data Checking 
Frequency 
Publication 
11
th
 
February 
2000 
Infections 
HSC 2000/002 
 
Not noted Not noted 
April 2002 Mandatory MRSA bacteraemia surveillance by NHS acute Trusts, England 
9
th
 June 
2003 
MRSA PL/CMO/2003/4, 
PL/CNO/2003/4 
 
Monthly/Quarterly Annual 
March 2005 MRSA PL/CMO2005/4 Monthly/Quarterly Six-monthly 
 
April 2005 National Target to reduce MRSA bacteraemias by 50% in March 2008 
October 
2005 
Introduction of web-based enhanced surveillance database for MRSA 
21
st
 
December 
2005 
C.difficile  
PL CMO/2005/6 
PLCNO2005/5 
Not noted Annually (2004) 
30
th
 March 
2006 
MRSA PL/CMO/2006/2 
PL/CNO/2006/2 
Monthly/Monthly Six-monthly 
7
th
 
November 
2006 
C.difficile Gateway ref: 
7318 
Six monthly/six-monthly Annually (2005) 
7
th
 
December 
2006 
HCAI, C.difficile Gateway 
ref: 
7490 
Six monthly/six monthly Jan 2007 
Quarterly 
December 
2006 
National target to reduce C.difficile by 30% in 2010/11 
April 2007 Introduction of web-based enhanced surveillance database for C.difficile 
11
th
 April 
2007 
C.difficile  
PL CMO (2007)4 
PL CNO (2007)2 
Monthly/Quarterly Quarterly 
27
th
 
November 
2008 
C.difficile Gateway ref: 
10936 
Monthly/Monthly Quarterly 
April 2010 National MRSA objective for 2010-11 
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7
th
 June 
2010 
MRSA and C.difficile 
Gateway ref: 14373 
Weekly/Weekly Weekly 
6
th
 January 
2011 
MSSA  
Gateway ref: 15353 
 
Monthly/Monthly TBA 
20
th
 April 
2011 
E.coli  
Gateway ref: 15980 
 
Monthly/Monthly Monthly 
5.4.1.3 Hospital staff enrolment in infection surveillance 
In the creation of a field of visibility, the government used physical control initially, in the form 
of ‘improvement teams’ colloquially described in the media as ‘hit squads’:   
‘In parallel with that [performance management] we set up the improvement teams which 
were not performance management, although we worked closely, but they were advisory 
and supportive, and they were to go out into Trusts that were having problems, which ended 
up being most of the Trusts in the country, over the years. [73/4] DH Director  
 These teams comprised clinical staff, technical experts and managers recruited on a 
temporary or secondment basis from hospital Trusts across the UK and who were tasked 
with visiting hospitals to elucidate their performance and offer advice and support: 
‘The big change was the creation of a programme that actually went into active mode, the 
setting of the target and then going out in that period to actually do things and to draw 
people in from the NHS to help us to create the team, that we did, and that we have.’[73/4] 
DH Director 
 This level of peer scrutiny and surveillance, which extended the field of visibility for the 
centre and encouraged a culture of surveillance by clinician managers who  were in a 
position to peer-review each other’s data, was run in parallel with technical control, in the 
form of the web-based surveillance tool.   This tool extended the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the centre to undertake surveillance and reduced the resources required for surveillance, 
freeing up resources for more focused surveillance and intervention in hospitals that were 
identified as poor performers. 
A further cadre of hospital staff, an elite group of clinical managerial hybrids who were 
partially self-selecting through their enthusiastic commitment to the programme and their 
ability to have reduced infection rates in their own organisations were recruited by the DH to 
provide strategic leadership and direction on a range of initiatives.  These included the 
design of multiple clinical guidelines (known as ‘High Impact Interventions’) under a 
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programme called ‘Saving Lives’, developing guidance for hospital Trust Boards, contributing 
to the improvement teams, assisting in policy formulation and ensuring knowledge transfer 
through conferences and learning events.   
5.4.1.4 Web-based transparency agenda 
The surveillance opportunities of the database were extended beyond the original scope of 
the reform programme when in January 2010, the government began publication of the 
weekly reporting for MRSA and C.difficile on-line(232) within the policy initiative, ‘Opening up 
Government.’  This initiative is explained on the government’s website as promoting the 
government’s policy agenda of transparency as a transformative force to ‘encourage greater 
public participation in decision making.’(233)  Public sector data is published on a website 
using a user-centric web format that enables the general public to access raw data from a 
range of government departments and other agencies.  Infection data is available through 
links with the Health Protection Agency (hpa.org.uk) website, a government arm’s length 
agency.  The HPA, with a primarily scientific and technical staff, were cautionary in their 
advice to the public: 
‘It is important to note, however, that these data are not classified as Official Statistics and 
hence the data should be interpreted with caution.  Please refer to the guidance for further 
information.’ (234)  
The guidance referred to in this advice details a series of caveats and limitations to the data 
that appear to reflect tensions between the government policy agenda to create democratic 
transparency and the professional concerns of the scientific and technical community that 
the data might be misunderstood or misused.  
In summary, my preliminary analysis suggests that a Foucauldian perspective can be 
applied to the national case; with i) the active use of novel indirect control modes by the 
government to complement existing line management/NPM style approaches ii) the creation 
of a field of visibility using electronic panoptical surveillance systems in health care iii) the 
enrolment of staff in surveillance activities and iv) the engagement in self surveillance and 
subjectification of clinical managerial hybrids. 
5.4.2 Case study hospital Trust 
The hospital Trust is based in a large city with a diverse population and provides secondary 
health services to its local population and tertiary health services to a broader patient 
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population from across the UK.  Following a merger with another large acute teaching 
hospital Trust in 2007, the Trust was officially recognised as an academic health science 
centre in 2009, which cemented a partnership between the Trust and its partner academic 
institution with a mission to demonstrate excellence in research, patient care and education.   
Juxtaposed against this transition, the Trust failed in several attempts (2005, 2009) to 
become a Foundation Trust, (a hospital overseen by an independent regulator), owing to its 
poor financial position. 
5.4.2.1 Local infection prevention and control 
In infection terms, prior to 2004, the Trust maintained a small infection control team that 
comprised infection control nurses and infectious diseases doctors who were responsible for 
dealing with infection outbreaks, developing infection policy and educating staff in infection 
control practice.  Infection rates were high.  An infectious diseases doctor [63] recalled that 
the Trust had very high levels of bacteraemia-related blood stream infections in 1999. By 
2004, the Annual Risk report to the Board in July 2004 highlighted a ‘significant incidence of 
infections’ suggesting that efforts to address the infection problems had not gained traction 
within the hospital.  The publication of ‘Winning Ways’(36) by the government in December 
2003, a report that set out a clear direction for hospitals on the action required to reduce 
healthcare associated infection, mandated that hospital Trusts introduce a new Director role 
on Boards, the Director of Infection Prevention and Control (DIPC).  The Trust recruited to 
this role in 2004, with a female, relatively junior, infectious diseases doctor who recognised 
her appointment as ‘a brave decision’ by the Chief Executive who could have recruited more 
senior, male establishment microbiologists based in the laboratory.  The DIPC role was 
ward-based, acting as an advisor to clinical teams on infectious disease issues and 
managing infection problems relating to equipment, the environment, medication, outbreaks 
and incidents.  In addition, the role required managerial focus: to provide direction on 
infection prevention and control issues at the Trust Board; to address infection problems with 
medical and nursing colleagues; to determine policy and strategy for infection and to 
manage infection performance across the Trust.  The DIPC was originally a career clinician, 
but progressively developed into a clinical managerial hybrid role through the adoption and 
influencing of the national agenda. The DIPC was seen as effective and innovative, having 
developed good relationships with the hospital Board, having clinical credibility with a wide 
network of clinicians in the hospital and being driven by the value of improving patient 
outcomes.  Despite this, the DIPC continued to experience resistance from certain clinical 
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specialties or individual clinicians who challenged infection control policies and resisted 
change. 
Table 5.2  Empirical evidence of Foucauldian themes 
Foucauldian 
themes 
Evidence of themes in 
case study hospital 
Local actor’s interpretations 
Self 
surveillance 
Statistician recruited to 
develop detailed 
epidemiological data at unit 
and division level 
 
 
‘And when I started we also had a statistician start 
at around the same time, so it’s hard to compare 
prior to that, but it, I got the impression that people 
were asking for data and we just didn’t have it.  So 
that’s changed rapidly, we have more data that 
you know what to do with now, people are 
constantly asking for it, so I think that’s been a 
major change’ [75]. 
Infection surveillance built 
into hospital balanced 
scorecard and clinical 
incident reporting system 
‘shortly after I was made director and we 
introduced the system of integrating the 
monitoring of infection prevention and control into 
directorate scorecards and making clear lines of 
accountability which sat with directorates aligned 
with financial accountability and all other areas of 
corporate accountability, and that actually just 
changed everything.  And also gave a framework 
for feedback.’[63] 
Implemented new localised 
infection control 
surveillance system within 
the hospital (ICNet) 
‘I actually think as numbers have, in fact in a way 
it’s, we’re creating these sticks to be beaten with 
because actually it was interesting at the, I can 
speak from the [hospital] site, they were so used 
to getting data all the time that when they had to 
do a month without it whilst we standardised how 
we do everything cross site,[Trust merger in 2007] 
and in fact we had to take a big hit to stop, 
standardise everything, so that we could 
reintroduce it in a way that would involve all the 
trust.  But the people that were used to getting 
data all the time, all the time, were getting angry, 
upset, and yet this was something we had 
introduced.’ [63] 
Self governing Influential clinical 
managerial hybrids in the 
structure (clinical directors) 
recruited to increase self-
governing capability within 
their own clinical areas 
‘So as Clinical Programme Director I’m 
accountable for all of the outcomes essentially in 
the clinical programme group....so essentially I’m 
accountable for hospital acquired infection and 
infection control practices that happen in my 
clinical services, so the delivery of infection 
control.  The difference in terms of what it 
changed, the scope is bigger because there are 
now more clinical areas since three sites.’ [133] 
Clinical infection champions 
appointed in each unit to 
observe, influence and 
feedback on  infection 
control 
‘I think infection prevention and control has 
become more, in my words, there are still policies 
and procedures however I do believe it’s become 
more focused and more tangible in what you do.  
It’s more measurable, I think, if that’s the right 
word.’[143] 
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5.4.2.2 Design of infection surveillance systems 
A major change introduced by the DIPC was to set up a tranche of ICT based self-
surveillance and self-governing infection mechanisms within the hospital, in response to the 
national scrutiny of hospital infection rates and to influence other clinician’s behaviour using 
epidemiologically robust infection data.  These mechanisms are outlined in Table 5.2, 
detailing local actors’ interpretations of these mechanisms in action. 
Three ICT mechanisms; the creation of electronic epidemiological data, the colonisation of a 
managerial balanced scorecard with infection data and the implementation of a localised 
infection control surveillance system served to increase the field of visibility for infection in 
the hospital.   The apparatus for surveillance was intensified, in that specialist clinical areas, 
such as the intensive care unit (ICU) and renal unit which had operated semi-autonomously 
prior to these changes became the focus of attention:  [High levels of ICU Bloodstream 
Infections] ‘But a huge amount is around attitude, data feedback and really, really making it 
an area of focus.’[63]   The level of scrutiny was extended to clinical as well as throughput 
indicators which had previously been the primary focus.  A fundamental change in individual 
clinician behaviour as a result of these surveillance mechanisms was noted by the DIPC.  
Individual clinicians, who may have previously resisted the surveillance, were actively 
enrolling in enthusiastic self-surveillance, to the extent that when infection data was 
temporarily unavailable, the clinicians became angry and upset. 
5.4.2.3 Clinical Self-surveillance 
A linked change was evident, through the performance management apparatus, of senior 
clinical managerial hybrids, such as Clinical Directors, taking accountability for infection rates 
in their own clinical areas and becoming self-governing in relation to their group’s infection 
performance.  The DIPC was able to successfully devolve accountability for infection to 
these self-governing hybrids who responded competitively to deliver improved infection rates 
compared with their colleagues.  The establishment of a network of clinical infection 
champions at a consultant/nurse leader level assisted in enroling more people in governing 
and self-governing and enabled sustainable self-surveillance networks across the 
organisation, supported by the intensification and extension of infection control surveillance 
mechanisms and data.   Clinical directors and clinical champions gained kudos internally 
from supporting the overarching infection initiative, evident from an increase in applications 
to the pay award committee in the Trust that justified a ‘merit award’ on the grounds of their 
work in infection prevention and control. 
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In describing her development, the DIPC outlined an iterative process of development in the 
clinical managerial hybrid role across national and local boundaries over time.   Initially, as a 
member of a national advisory expert group: the Advisory Committee on Antimicrobial 
Resistance and Healthcare Associated Infection (ARHAI), a DH Advisor and a member of 
improvement teams, the DIPC became recognised for her value in her national hybrid role.  
This was consolidated locally through the credibility achieved by significant improvements in 
local infection rates (see Figure 5.2) as a result of the changes implemented in Table 5.2.  A 
further iteration occurred when the DIPC undertook retrospective sensemaking around the 
improvements and created the Hammersmith Organisational Model of Infection Prevention 
(HOMIP) locally.(235)  This model provided a platform for a further iterative stage, to speak 
about the model at conferences and other knowledge transfer events. Through this iterative 
process, her career and status developed nationally as a hybrid and led to enhanced 
multidisciplinary research interests which facilitated success with research grants and 
developed credibility through research publications.   
Figure 5.2  Trust MRSA Blood Stream Infection Cases and rolling 12 month totals against DH 
Target, by month to May 2007 
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5.5 Discussion 
5.5.1 Direct to indirect control modes 
This case represents a transition from direct to indirect technologies of steering, which I 
argue represents a positive ‘adjustment’ by the government from a resilience perspective.    
Three novel indirect technologies were in evidence: the design of a web-based Foucauldian 
surveillance mechanism to increase visibility of hospital performance on infection rates; the 
enrolment of large numbers of hospital staff in national surveillance; and local self-
surveillance activities and the increase in public visibility of infection rates through 
government transparency policy agendas.  I argue that initially (2002-4) the first two indirect 
control modes complemented direct NPM style management modes of target setting, 
performance management and measurement. However, the implementation of the enhanced 
‘real time’ surveillance tool in 2005 and the enrolment of more hospital staff in self-governing 
activities caused a shift in the extent of visibility.  This shift, combined with the increased 
frequency of the reporting and publishing of infection rates, resulted in the gradual erosion of 
direct control modes.  For example, after 2010, national targets were minimised and the 
focus moved to locally derived and specific targets.  These indirect modes operated through 
drawing committed clinical managerial hybrids into self-governing roles enabled the DH to 
operate ‘loose/tight’ governance regimes and enabled targeted intervention and supportive 
improvement for poorer performers.  From a macro perspective these positive adjustments 
to rising infection rates increased visibility at meso-level.  Organisational resilience increased 
as hospitals with low resilience to infections were the focus of ‘tight’ governance regimes, 
receiving targeted resources and support whereas hospitals with high resilience to infections 
benefitted from ‘loose’ governance regimes and were able to capitalize on the involvement of 
a cadre of self-surveilling  leaders who took accountability for delivering lower infection rates. 
5.5.2 The electronic panopticon 
Empirically, I have applied the electronic panopticon concept to analyse a novel and indirect 
control mode, a ‘real time’ mandatory web-based surveillance mechanism in the health care 
sector.  I argue that the success of this panoptic device as a control mechanism to create 
disciplinary accountability and to increase hospital resilience to infections was evidenced by 
the significant reduction in MRSA and C.difficile rates by 2008 within three years of the new 
systems implementation.  The new surveillance system, as an novel and indirect control 
mode, exhibited control features that exemplified the panopticon gaze(73): the reporting was 
mandatory for every hospital in England; both regulated (Foundation Trust) hospitals and 
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directly controlled (Trust) hospitals were required to enter data, in effect overriding the 
regulatory devolvement of power to Foundation hospitals; data was requested at individual 
patient-level and the intensification of gaze was reflected in changing information 
requirements from annual calls for data to become continuous data requirements with 
weekly publication (see Table 5.1) and provided a field of visibility on the stringent 
performance targets against which hospitals were monitored.  The  ‘constraints of power’ 
(73)p202 were conferred electronically on hospital Chief Executives who were responsible 
personally for ‘locking down’ their organisation’s data using a personal password once they 
had assured its accuracy, eventually on a monthly basis.   
In contrast, McGivern & Dopson suggest that DH standardised quarterly performance 
reviews failed to control the jurisdictional space in a biomedical network.(215) In accounting 
for the differences, the panoptic device: was embedded in an organisational hierarchy, rather 
than across a more loosely defined network which created a clear hierarchy of disciplinary 
accountability; created a field of visibility around the organisation’s performance and by 
default the Chief Executive’s performance against the targets; ensured the function of 
inspection and surveillance was ceaseless and unverifiable, as continuous data was 
scrutinised by unknown observers within the DH which increased apprehension amongst 
Trusts; and caused  adaptations in Trusts’ behaviour in response to the perpetual 
surveillance which normalised intensive infection reporting so that additional requirements to 
add further infections, MSSA and E.coli were not met with any resistance.  The combined 
effect of these changes was to cause a system adjustment which reduced MRSA and 
C.difficile rates significantly. Although superficially, this adjustment appears to have 
increased organisational resilience to infections, in reality the close scrutiny paid to these 
two organisms, distracted attention and resources away from hospitals developing a more 
holistic approach to infection prevention and control and addressing the potential threat of 
other hospital-acquired infective organisms.  
At local level, I see the electronic Panopticon being developed by career-oriented clinical 
managerial hybrids to engage in self-surveillance which had the effect of creating a sense of 
mutual visibility and collective responsibility and diminishing the oppression of 
surveillance(74)p346.  In the case study Trust, influential clinical managerial hybrids 
benefited from being able to use the surveillance devices to assert control with their peers 
within their own spheres of influence. I view these adjustments as positive, as resilient 
capability in the hospital was increased due to the creation of self-surveillance systems, 
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which had the active enrolment of influential clinical leaders and participation from their 
clinical peers. 
5.5.3 The surveying centre with a capacity to intervene 
The successful functioning of the electronic Panopticon, altered the relationship of the DH 
with hospital Trusts and the general public.  Prior to the introduction of the enhanced 
surveillance system the DH operated reactively to the rising rate of infections, under scrutiny 
from the general public through the media and the Public Accounts Committee.  It employed 
a physical means of surveillance to check on the performance of Trusts, the establishment of 
improvement teams, or ‘hit squads’ as they were colloquially known in the media.  These 
teams could only react to retrospectively published data on the mandatory surveillance 
system and visit Trusts directly to intervene in their infection control practice.  In addition, the 
hit squad methodology was hampered by its epistemic dependence which required a degree 
of negotiation and interaction with hospital Trusts to arrive at its conclusions.  The benefit of 
the enhanced web-based surveillance database with increasingly regular and detailed ‘real 
time’ information requirements was the epistemic independence that this provided, i.e. the 
knowledge base was independent of the inspected party(222) and therefore could transmit 
‘the presence of the omniscient observer and so induce compliance without the messy 
conflict-prone exertions of reciprocal relations.’(74)p323.  The system in effect facilitated 
Foucault’s ‘automatic functioning of power.’ (73)p201  This reduced the need for the DH to 
intervene in such a widespread way, as detailed intelligence was available to the centre 
which enabled targeted interventions in poorly performing Trusts, thus increasing resilient 
capacity at macro-level through a flexible approach to developing resilience to infections at 
meso-level. 
The relationship of the DH with the general public altered through the availability of ‘real 
time’ data and was used for the new ‘transparency’ policy agenda that was introduced by the 
new coalition government.  The conceptualisation of Bentham’s architectural Panopticon 
structure(219) as a design to achieve ‘universal transparency’ by means of glass walls fitted 
onto a skeletal iron structure(74)p320 is reflected in a discourse of transparency and patient 
empowerment, evident in later communications between the DH and hospitals to justify the 
mandated operation of the web-based tool.  The democratising potential of the panopticon 
device was used as a justification for the extension and intensification of its use in infection 
surveillance ‘so that information for patients continues to improve’ in a letter from the 
Secretary of State for Health in June 2010 (Gateway ref: 14373).  However, earlier letters 
justified the use of surveillance in relation to minimising the risk of infections for patients and 
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staff (PL/CMO/2003/4, PL/CNO/2003/4).  The disjuncture between earlier and later 
discourses, leads us to question whether this constitutes rhetoric or genuine articulation of 
DH policy intention and the extent to which it improves accountability to the public and 
increases visibility of hospital performance on infections.  More recently (2011-12) weekly 
infection data has been published on a new government transparency website (data.gov.uk) 
entitled, ‘Opening up government’ and is described as one feature of the new policy agenda 
for transparency to make healthcare better. However, the arms length and largely 
professionally staffed body which analyses the infection data, issued guidance on the use of 
the weekly statistics which reflects the professional unease with which the new transparency 
agenda is being viewed.  The guidance notes that weekly data is not defined as ‘Official 
Statistics’ according to the Code of Practice and therefore should be used with caution.  This 
suggests that while the government has latterly utilised the transparency agenda as a 
mechanism to increase resilience to infections by extending the panoptic gaze, the benefit to 
patients and the public is less from the accessibility and transparency of data at this stage 
and more from the reduction in MRSA and C.difficile rates that the surveillance mechanism 
has achieved. 
5.5.4 Self surveillance and self governing by clinical managerial hybrids 
In contrast to studies that apply early Foucauldian conceptions of panoptical power as a 
means of self subjection of an individual(225), the empirical evidence from this study is that 
individual clinicians, particularly those who assumed clinical managerial hybrid roles, were 
able to internalise external surveillance, the process of subjectification, through the 
development of a self-disciplined framework developed with other like-minded hybrids in the 
hospital.  
I observe that the psychology of horizontal and vertical visibility(74) created by peer and 
national availability of infection data respectively, motivated clinical managerial hybrids to 
operate strategically by creating further internal surveillance mechanisms that not only 
responded to the new centralised requirements for mandatory MRSA and C.difficile 
reporting, but in addition, introduced local surveillance tools that enabled self-surveillance.   
Clinical managerial hybrids were observed to develop their internal networks to encourage 
other influential clinical managerial hybrids within the organisation to participate in the self-
surveillance processes to create their own modes of thinking and behaviour(76) and to use 
them to enhance their scope of self-governance within the organisation.  A further 
development of technologies of self was the iterative process engaged in by the DIPC to 
develop her role, status and career as a clinical managerial hybrid through participation with 
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other clinical managerial hybrids in national committees, development of guidelines and the 
creation of new models of infection organisation.  I consider the creation of a cadre of self-
surveilling leaders who proactively developed new identities through the development of 
technologies of self created the most positive adjustment in comparison with other indirect 
control modes.  The adjustment was positive from a resilience perspective as it generated 
long-term resilient capability within the organisation through enrolment in self-organisation 
under surveillance, which led to the construction of novel meso-level surveillance systems 
and facilitated the construction of new routines and a new governance order. 
5.6 Conclusion 
My primary contribution to the organisational resilience literature is to identify, within the 
spectrum of existing Foucauldian theorising about ICTs in the health sector, a highly 
effective ICT-enabled strategy involving the successful government transition towards novel 
and indirect control modes.  These indirect control modes had a positive impact overall on 
hospitals’ resilience in reducing infection MRSA and C.difficile rates nationally.  However, I 
found that the indirect control modes did have unintended consequences, such as 
preventing a holistic approach to infection prevention and control in hospitals.   I considered 
that the most effective indirect mode from a resilience perspective was the active and 
creative enrolment in self-governing and self-surveillance by clinical managerial hybrids who 
experienced strong identity shifts.  This positive change which involved clinical hybrids in the 
construction of new routines and a new governance order was found to create a long-term 
resilient capability to reduce infection rates in hospitals.   This strategy is not representative 
of the findings of previous studies of ICTs in health where most empirical cases find that 
ICTs fail to deliver the predicted outcomes and tacit clinical resistance is observed. 
I contribute further by applying a social science approach, Foucauldian governmentality 
theory to a novel arena.  Whilst the work of Foucault(68) has been applied to 
healthcare,(208;216), the application of Foucauldian theory to the study of organizational 
resilience and to the specific case of infection prevention and control is novel.  I used a 
Foucauldian framework to explore the system adjustments that resulted from rising infection 
rates and found it useful to explain the government transition from direct to indirect control 
modes, in particular to provide a rationale for clinical involvement in the surveillance 
programme and to explain the significant reduction in MRSA and C.difficile rates after 2006.    
A further contribution is that I use an in-depth qualitative study with an embedded case study 
to study organisational resilience.  I developed this qualitative design to analyse resilience 
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from a system perspective, in order to assess the effect of each macro-level intervention at 
meso and micro-level in hospital organisations.  I used in-depth interviews at macro, meso 
and micro-level to explore the interactions and influences on hospital organisations that 
might encourage or discourage resilient practice. 
This study has several limitations.  The case study Trust was purposefully selected for 
analysis as a case which represented a transition towards positive and innovative infection 
control practice.     As a single embedded case study, whilst providing rich qualitative data 
from which to draw evidence, it is limited in terms of broader generalisability.  The DIPC in 
the case study was recognised for participation in infection improvements.  It would be useful 
in future studies to enroll additional clinical hybrids to understand the extent to which the 
DIPC’s approach was comparable to clinical hybrids in other hospital organisations. 
  I propose that further work would be valuable to explore the Foucauldian perspective in 
relation to the application of novel indirect modes of governing across health sector 
organisations, to understand better the operation of organisational resilience from a systems 
context.
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6 Chapter 6.  A Sensemaking Perspective: Organisational 
Resilience during an Unexpected Event 
6.1 Introduction 
The second of the theoretical/empirical chapters, in this chapter I develop an organisational 
resilience framework, using comparative studies from the literature and underpinning 
sensemaking theory, to assess levels of resilient and resistant practice.  An in-depth case 
study analysis of an organisation-wide unexpected event, a Norovirus outbreak is used to 
inform the development of this framework.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This research study adopts a sensemaking lens to understand the often contradictory and 
complex events that occurred during an unexpected infection outbreak in a large healthcare 
organisation.  Few studies have taken a multi-faceted approach to sensemaking throughout 
the course of an event or issue, to explore the interaction between different types of 
sensemaking at different points during an unexpected event.  This study addresses this gap 
by examining the chronological stages of an infection outbreak from a range of sensemaking 
perspectives to improve our understanding of organisational resilience in practice.  
This chapter contains two sections.  In the first section, I use two comparator studies from 
the literature to inform the development of an organisational resilience framework; the first is 
a seminal sensemaking case study focused in healthcare(18), Weick and Sutcliffe’s re-
analysis of the Bristol Royal Infirmary paediatric cardiac cases,  as the nearest healthcare 
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comparator to this study and the second is a seminal study focused in aviation, that 
assesses sensemaking on aircraft carriers. (192).  To inform this comparison, I assess the 
key literature on sensemaking during unexpected events and outline the interrelationship 
with organisational resilience. 
In the second section, the organisational resilience framework provides a basis for analysis 
of an unexpected and unprecedented organisation-wide infection crisis to assess how the 
study contributes to existing knowledge on levels of resilient and resistant practices within 
organisations. 
6.2 Section 1.  A Sensemaking Perspective on Organisational 
Resilience: A Conceptual Background 
6.2.1 An Organisational Resilience Framework 
I will draw on the work of a key contributor to the sensemaking literature over the last two 
decades, Karl Weick, to develop an organisational resilience framework for assessing the 
levels of resilient practice that an organisation exhibits.   Karl Weick has explored  
sensemaking theoretically and in a number of empirical contexts, often at the extreme ends 
of organisational functioning during expected and unexpected events (64;109;153;236) 
which makes his works particularly relevant as a comparator for this study.  He has 
examined cultural failure and collapse in firefighting(19) and healthcare(18) at one end of the 
spectrum and at the other end, assessed cultural high reliability on flight decks of aircraft 
carriers.(192)  The links between sensemaking and organisational resilience in his work are 
implicit and there is inadequate conceptualisation of how sensemaking contributes to the 
study of organisational resilience.  To address this issue, I will reference two of these 
polarised, yet seminal studies, one focused on healthcare, the other on flight decks, to 
develop an organisational resilience framework with explicit links to the sensemaking 
literature.  I will use this framework as a basis for understanding the case study examined in 
this chapter, an unexpected infection outbreak in a hospital Trust. 
The first study which explores resilience (implicitly) and sensemaking in healthcare from the 
perspective of cultural failure is Weick and Sutcliffe’s case study of the Bristol Royal 
Infirmary (BRI).   At BRI, a very high mortality rate for paediatric cardiac switch operations 
was ‘explained away’ by senior clinicians and managers as unusual case complexity.  In 
reality, there was clear evidence that Bristol had divergent performance from other UK 
centres, yet paediatric cardiac surgery continued with poor results for almost fourteen years 
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until it was stopped in 1995, leading to Public Inquiry which reported in 2001.  Key 
characteristics of sensemaking in relation to resilience from this study are outlined in Table 
6.1.  The cultural mindset that enabled what Weick and Sutcliffe call a ‘culture of entrapment’ 
to develop involved: optimistic cognition (misplaced optimism that improvement might occur 
despite continued poor results) and strong behavioural commitment (social rationalisation 
and legitimisation of poor results at micro and macro level in the organisation).  Ultimately, I 
consider the organisation was characterised by low resilience, as many examples of 
resistant behaviours are evident, including failure to learn and distrust. 
The second study, which considers effective sensemaking during flight operations on an 
aircraft carrier, is Weick and Robert’s case study of flight deck scenarios that they argue 
represent the ‘collective mind.’   This cultural mindset describes the heedfulness with which 
social cognition, interrelations and actions occur within a system.  Weick and Robert outline 
the characteristics of this high reliability, high resilience culture in which cognition is 
precautionary (reflecting attentiveness to potential problems) and conation is weak 
(reflecting a willingness to consider and enact alternative behaviours).  This culture is 
characterised as high resilience, with numerous examples of resilient behaviours, such as 
accelerated learning and swift trust being demonstrated. 
Table 6.1  A preliminary organisational resilience framework from a sensemaking perspective 
Level of 
organisational 
resilience 
Cultural  Mindset Cognition Conation 
(Behavioural 
commitment) 
Displayed 
behaviours 
Organisation 
performance 
Low Entrapment: 
Blind spots 
Justifications 
Rationalisation 
Optimistic Strong Concealment 
Distrust 
Failure to learn  
Dogmatic 
Organisational 
Collapse/Failure 
High Collective mind: 
Heedful 
interrelating 
 
Mindful attention 
 
Social interactions 
Precautionary  Weak Openness 
Swift Trust  
Accelerated 
Learning  
Sceptical 
Organisational 
Reliability/ 
Failure-free  
In Table 6.1 I have developed a preliminary organisational resilience framework that 
explicitly references key aspects of Weick’s sensemaking theory based on the two studies 
outlined above.  I have defined two polarised resilience positions, based on the literature.  
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The first is a scenario of low organisational resilience.  In this scenario, a cultural mindset 
exists either in part of or the whole organisation, which encourages staff to: develop blind 
spots to areas of unsafe practice; justify the status quo even when it is unsafe; and, socially 
rationalize and legitimise poor practice as acceptable practice.  The failure to acknowledge 
unsafe practice leads to optimistic cognition, as the cultural mindset encourages an 
expectation that the situation will improve.  Conation is strong, because staff develops a 
strong behavioural commitment to the course of action that has socially acceptability.  
Deviation from this mindset would require significant disruption to the established thinking 
and acknowledgement of failure and would probably necessitate external intervention or 
whistle-blowing, given the strength of commitment that is likely to be exhibited internally.  In 
this context, the displayed behaviours, as they would appear to someone outside the 
organisation, are those of concealment, distrust, dogmatism and failure to learn.  The likely 
outcome of this scenario is that organisational performance will deteriorate and ultimately 
lead to the collapse or failure of the organisation.  In the healthcare context, this might 
involve regulatory failings and the subsequent merger of the hospital with a higher 
performing organisation. 
The second scenario is of high organisational resilience.  In this scenario, a cultural mindset 
exists of collective accountability which is characterised by relationships based on heedful 
interrelating, mindful attention and social interactions.  Heedful interrelating refers to a form 
of interaction between individuals or groups that is attentive, careful and conscientious.  
Mindful attention describes a level of awareness in attending to situations that is thoughtful 
and focused on the impact on others.  Both these terms contribute towards the third term, 
social interactions.  Reliable and effective social interactions between individuals and groups 
rely on heedful interrelating and mindful attention.  When this occurs, the group is operating 
as a ‘collective mind.’  Cognition is precautionary in this situation, because staff considers 
the potential ramifications on other individuals and for the system.  Behavioural commitment 
is weak, as individuals are open to other courses of action rather than being fully committed 
to one, potentially faulty course of action.  The displayed behaviours are those of openness 
to new approaches, the rapid development of trust, accelerated learning and a skeptical 
outlook that challenges established ways of thinking.  From an organisational performance 
perspective, this mentality encourages reliability and progress towards a failure-free 
environment, where every effort is made to minimise errors.     I will use this conceptual 
framework as a basis for assessing the sensemaking interactions in the case study 
unexpected event. 
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6.2.2 Organisational resilience and sensemaking during an unexpected event 
6.2.2.1 The role of unexpected events 
Having developed an organisational resilience framework based on the sensemaking 
literature, I will examine the interaction between sensemaking and organisational resilience 
in the context of an unexpected event, which is the focus of this study.  I will review in more 
detail the features of sensemaking and sensegiving that either contribute to or detract from 
organisational resilience, when an unexpected event or series of disruptions to the 
organisation occurs. 
When an unexpected event occurs, a dynamic process is triggered for organisational 
members who attempt to make sense of the changing and unfolding situation.   Described as 
an intensification of sensemaking, individuals try to make meaning, justify what is happening 
based on this meaning and then reconstruct the past to ensure it is consistent with the 
present.(18)p80  There are three conditions where explicit efforts at sensemaking might be 
found; i) in the event of a crisis when a dramatic loss of sense would be experienced ; ii) 
when the loss of sense is more mundane but still problematic; and iii) in unfamiliar contexts 
where sense is elusive.(153)p414  In the event of these conditions or when an expected 
event fails to happen, a routine is interrupted.   
I suggest that the way an organisation handles an unexpected event is key to its level of 
resilience.  A resilient organisation would identify and act rapidly upon the event whereas a 
less resilient organisation may attempt to normalise or compartmentalise the event.(237)  
Practical examples of these conditions might include the sudden introduction of new 
organisational forms, such as merged, restructured or disintegrating organisations.(238-241)  
This can lead to a breakdown in a shared organisational sensemaking, i.e. a sense of 
common purpose and lead to de-identification with the organisation.  Balogun and Johnson 
suggest that this process can create sensemaking fault lines between organisational groups 
which requires resolution through negotiation.(238) p543   
6.2.2.1.1 The individual contribution 
In the situations described above, how the individual behaves is critical.  Sensemaking 
theories help to explain the cognitive and behavioural responses of individuals and teams to 
these situations.  Self-interest is more likely to be exhibited when an unexpected event 
occurs and sensemaking intensifies. If self-interest predominates over a commitment to 
organisational goals, then role systems break down, sensemaking fails and an organisation 
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will be less resilient.  If individuals are able to maintain resilient practices; bringing and 
valuing diverse analytical perspectives on a problem(118), demonstrating a willingness to 
question what is happening,(19) and engaging in greater respectful interaction to enrich the 
information exchange (148), then there will be increased ‘conceptual slack’(148) which is 
likely to increase an organisation’s competence.(118)  Sutcliffe and Vogus include ad-hoc 
problem solving networks, fluid decision structures and using rich media (e.g. meetings) to 
communicate as constituting important elements of the ‘conceptual slack’ that contributes to 
increased resilience.(118) 
6.2.2.1.2 Role systems 
Role systems are a key factor in crisis-based sensemaking.  Organisations will have a role 
system; a structure of roles that are interrelated by associated rules and expectations.  
During normal everyday events, it is unlikely that this role system will alter significantly but in 
the event of a crisis or disaster, there can be a tendency for the role system to collapse and 
routines to disintegrate. Sensemaking is critical in the type of cognitive reorientations (239-
241) that are implicit in revised role systems.   If an unexpected event causes some roles not 
to be filled, unfamiliar roles to be allocated or failures in leadership roles, then individuals’ 
sensemaking can become confused and disoriented as they are no longer able to make 
sense of their context according to their past experience.  There are several resilient 
solutions to this scenario.(19)  One solution is the use of improvisation, or what has been 
termed ‘bricolage’.(19) Weick argues that when under pressure, bricoleurs have the 
creativity to improvise with whatever resources are available and develop an improvised role 
system.  An alternative is the use of virtual role systems, where individuals conceive of the 
organisation in their imagination and mentally take on other roles, to address shortfalls in the 
real role system.    One-to-one interaction in place of the role system helps to generate 
ideas, interpret situations and provide social support. (19) An inverse relationship has been 
identified between roles systems and the degree of meaning.  Resilience is maintained 
through a direct and inverse relationship between the two, so where there is less meaning, 
for example in the event of a disaster, then more role structure is required. Weick notes that 
where role systems do not keep pace with fast-moving environments, then reliance on 
individual wisdom and respectful interaction between team members maintains resilient 
practice.(19) 
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6.2.2.2 Applying sensemaking theory to unexpected events  
Several gaps exist in the sensemaking literature which this study aims to address. A key 
issue in the sensemaking literature is that the majority of papers focus on one element of 
sensemaking, e.g. embedded, distributed, ecological and analyse the entire chronology of 
the event against this one element, rather than exploring the range of sensemaking 
elements that emerge at different stages of an unexpected event. This is illustrated in more 
detail in a taxonomy of sensemaking and sensegiving in Appendix B, which demonstrates 
the number of studies that are interpreted using one element of sensemaking. The true 
complexity of organisations may be underestimated by applying simplified sensemaking 
models to empirical studies.  A second, related issue is the number of static, rather than 
interactive sensemaking studies are in the literature, which fail to explore the dynamics of 
interactions between individuals and groups. Again, this is discussed and illustrated in more 
detail in Appendix B.  In this thesis, I aim to address both these issues in my study of 
organisational resilience, by remaining cognisant of the full range of sensemaking 
approaches in my case study and by exploring the complexity of individual and team 
dynamics during an unexpected event using interactive sensemaking approaches. 
A further issue that is more evident in the structural resilience literature, is that sensemaking 
is usually described as antecedent to the main response to an unexpected event in 
resilience frameworks.(20;22;138)  The contribution of sensemaking in this literature is to 
explain the micro-level local behavioural processes at the start of an unexpected event. 
These processes use the strong cognitive focus of sensemaking theory to explain 
individual’s responses and interactions when first encountering an unexpected event.  There 
is less focus on how sensemaking may unfold during an event, as the emphasis in the 
literature is usually on the structural and technical response to the crisis.  In contrast, I will 
use the sensemaking perspective to assist in understanding individuals’ and teams’ 
sensemaking throughout the often contradictory and complex unexpected events of an 
infection outbreak to contribute to an understanding of organisational resilience.  
6.2.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, I propose that adopting a sensemaking lens to study an unexpected event or 
crisis will assist in determining the extent to which an organisation operates resiliently or not. 
I have developed a preliminary organisational resilience framework that references 
sensemaking studies from the literature to analyse my in-depth case study.  However, there 
are a number of criticisms of the sensemaking perspective.  Sensemaking is used in the 
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literature to define polarised scenarios; either complete organisational failure (low resilience 
with resistant behaviours) or significant organisational reliability (high resilience with resilient 
behaviours).  There are few studies that consider a ‘middle-of-the-road’ organisation affected 
by an unexpected event through a sensemaking lens.  As the majority of organisations 
constitute the middle ground, there is a large gap in organisational learning about resilient 
practice which this research aims to address. 
Gaps in the sensemaking literature that this research will address include a focus on one 
element of sensemaking rather than exploring the types of sensemaking that emerge at 
different stages of an unexpected event and an emphasis on static sensemaking studies, 
rather than more complex interactive sensemaking studies.  A further issue in the structural 
literature is the lack of awareness of sensemaking approaches throughout an unexpected 
event. 
This research will use the sensemaking perspective to study sensemaking throughout the 
often contradictory and complex unexpected events of an infection outbreak, in a healthcare 
organisation that is neither in collapse, nor a state of high reliability, but demonstrates 
reliable and less reliable elements of practice. 
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6.3 Section 2.  Applying a Sensemaking Perspective to understand 
Organisational Resilience in practice: a Case Study 
6.3.1 Introduction 
In this section I apply the analysis of sensemaking in the context of organisational resilience, 
examined in Section 1 to a case study of an acute hospital Trust.  The Trust in question 
experienced a significant unexpected infection event in 2007, in the form of an organisation-
wide Norovirus outbreak. 
6.3.1.1 Research Context 
Fieldwork was conducted at the acute teaching hospital Trust in 2009.  The name of the 
Trust has been anonymised as part of the agreement for it undertaking this study and will 
hereafter be referred to as ‘City Trust.’  The Trust has a translational research reputation 
developed through links with an academic institution.  It provides a full range of clinical 
services, undertaking over 500,000 inpatient, day case and outpatient consultations a year, 
for patients from diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds with general and specialist clinical 
needs.  Prior to a merger in October 2007, services were provided across two main hospital 
sites, hereafter referred to as site A and site B.  During the autumn 2006 and spring 2007, 
the period of focus of this study, the Trust was planning for a merger with another city 
hospital Trust in October 2007, involving the preparation of plans for new organisational 
structures and systems.   
City Trust was an ideal site to study from an organisational resilience and infection 
perspective as the Trust had been identified nationally as demonstrating resilient practice in 
relation to infection prevention and control owing to reductions in two high profile infections 
that were monitored by the government: a significant reduction in MRSA and more gradual 
reduction in C.difficile was reported by the Trust between 2004 and 2009.  The history of this 
improvement was that the Trust had initially reported higher than average levels of MRSA 
BSIs and C.difficile when mandatory reporting was introduced in 2001 and January 2004 
respectively.  Owing to the high infection rates, in 2003-4, a newly appointed Director of 
Infection Prevention and Control sought to embed infection prevention in the systems, 
structure and behaviour of the organisation and increase the visibility of infections to all staff.  
The impact of this work was observed by the Department of Health, who incorporated many 
of the ideas and suggestions for change in their national implementation tools for 
MRSA.(242;243) 
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6.3.1.2 January 2007 Norovirus Outbreak Crisis 
Every winter at the Trust, Norovirus, or the colloquially named ‘winter vomiting bug’ would 
affect the capacity of the hospitals to operate effectively to some degree, usually causing the 
full or partial closure of one or two wards.  Norovirus is a community-acquired highly 
transmissible virus which affects between 600,000 to 1 million people in the UK every year.  
The virus is easily spread through contact with an infected person or contaminated surfaces 
as the virus can survive for several days on surfaces or objects touched by an infected 
person.(244)  When Norovirus affected the hospital, it could cause case-to-case spread and 
staff spread.  On 24th January 2007, a Norovirus outbreak commenced with four index cases 
(the first cases that indicated the existence of an outbreak) on two wards in site A, 
presenting with diarrhoea without the usual symptoms of vomiting.  Within four days, six 
wards were completely closed on site A as a result of the outbreak.  By the peak of the 
outbreak, twenty-one wards were closed across the two main hospital sites and one hundred 
and twenty-six patients were identified with diarrhoea in the timeframe.  One hundred and 
seventeen staff reported symptoms to occupational health.  Figure 6.1 shows the daily 
number of new cases (incidence) of Norovirus from the first recognised case on 24th January 
by site and Figure 6.2 shows the daily number of continuing cases (prevalence) of Norovirus. 
The Trust’s initial response was confused by two factors: firstly the uncharacteristic clinical 
presentation of the virus, as vomiting was uncommon and diarrhoea was the primary 
symptom, also a symptom of many other clinical conditions or treatments; and secondly, the 
multiple points of entry of the virus to the hospital, initially through site A and four days later, 
through site B.  Within five days of the first recognised case, and following a one-off meeting 
which established the outbreak as an extraordinary event, a daily coordinating meeting was 
established on site A, involving over 25 managers and clinicians from across the Trust and 
chaired by the interim Director of Clinical Services.  One week later, the new Chief 
Operations Officer started in post and by the end of that week had changed the format of the 
meeting to a smaller, clinician-led group and changed the approach to managing the incident 
to focus on clinical safety over bed capacity.  The virus affected the hospital site A until 12th 
February and then less markedly from 16th February to 24th February.  It affected hospital 
site B from 28th January to 12th February.  Learning from the outbreak informed future 
unexpected events, including continuing operations during the heavy snowfalls and strikes 
that occurred in later years. 
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Figure 6.1  Daily incidence of Norovirus cases from the first recognised case on 24th January 
to 12th February 2007 
 
 
Figure 6.2  Daily prevalence of Norovirus cases from the first recognised case on 28th January 
to 12th February 2007 
 
6.3.2 Methods 
6.3.2.1 Case Study Approach 
A case study approach was chosen in order that the preliminary organisational resilience 
framework could be examined in detail in one organisation.  Yin defines the scope of a case 
study as an empirical inquiry that ‘investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and 
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within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident.’(226) p18   The case study provides insight into the context of the 
phenomena being studied, in this case an infection outbreak.  An outbreak, or disruption to 
the organisation’s state provides an opportunity to understand the contexts when staff may 
choose to improvise, be creative, utilise bricolage, in addition to changing rules, policies and 
procedures when new behaviour may be needed.(62)  The case study method allows 
multiple sources of evidence to be triangulated and the prior development of theoretical 
propositions to guide data collection and analysis.(226)  As multiple sources of data from the 
hospital, e.g. interviews, documentation were required for triangulation of the evidence and 
theoretical propositions had already been developed from the resilience literature, the case 
study approach was considered most relevant. 
The research design, including semi-structured interview schedules (see Appendix C & D) 
and consent forms (see Appendix E) were developed and approved by Barnet, Enfield & 
Haringey Local Research Ethics Committee on 25th November 2008, reference number: 
08/H0723/8.   The data was collected from three overlapping sources: i) semi-structured 
interviews ii) documents iii) participant observation.  The data from these sources was 
combined and triangulated to maintain the integrity of the analysis(245) and compared to 
official reports on the outbreak and no significant differences were found. 
6.3.2.2 Semi-structured interviews 
A semi-structured interview schedule was developed (see Appendix C) using open-ended 
questions that reflected all the organisational resilience topics of interest, relating to a critical 
incident technique method(246) to identify an appropriate infection incident.  The aim was to 
recruit participants from pre-defined inclusion criteria, where participants: were involved in 
the management of infection incidents, reflected a cross-section of professional groups and 
were from different levels within the organisation.  Twenty-three participants were recruited 
in total to provide a sufficient sampling frame to cover the criteria.  Participants were 
identified initially by the review of archival documents from the Trust Infection Prevention 
Committee report on the outbreak.  The output from these initial participants was analysed to 
identify a suitable incident (described in more detail in a later section).  Further participants 
were recruited using a snowball sampling design where participants provide referrals to 
further interviewees, but only were selected if they fulfilled the criteria above.  Participants 
were approached by sending them an introductory letter, information sheet and consent 
form, approved by the Ethics Committee, requesting their participation in a one-hour semi-
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structured interview.   All the participants that were approached consented to participate in 
the research and a mutually convenient interview date and venue was arranged and the 
interview was recorded, with the participant’s consent.  Interviews lasted between 45 
minutes to 90 minutes, depending on the number of critical infection incidents recalled.  
Interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim following pre-defined rules. The 
interviews were transcribed by a transcribing company that had signed confidentiality 
agreements and the resulting transcripts were checked against the original interview tapes 
for accuracy. The interviews were anonymised at this stage by substituting the participant’s 
name for a unique case number on each transcript.  
6.3.2.3 Data Collection 
The literature on organisational resilience in relation to unexpected events (55;99;247) was 
used to structure the data collection.  The study was designed to examine one critical 
infection incident in depth, including routine practices, prior to and post the incident, to 
assess the degree to which participants’ responses demonstrated organisational resilience.  
To achieve this, the chosen approach used Critical Incident Technique (CIT), a research 
method that uses informants’ recollections of a critical incident.  In this study, participants 
were asked to recollect critical infection incidents.(246)  Semi-structured interview questions 
were derived from four key areas: i) descriptions of routine practice and behaviour prior to 
the incident ii) the cause, description and outcome of the critical incident, ii) participants’ 
feelings and perceptions of the situation iii) actions taken during the incident and iv) changes 
(if any) in their future practice and behaviour after the incident (Appendix C).   The first eight 
participants in the study were asked to recall critical infection incidents from the previous five 
years.  An analysis of these incidents against Westrum’s typology of resilience 
situations,(248) identified one critical infection incident that fulfilled all the criteria for the 
study, an organisation-wide Norovirus outbreak that commenced in January 2007.  The 
process by which this was achieved is documented in the following section. 
6.3.2.4 Identification of critical infection incident 
 The three criteria used to determine which infection incident to select are set out in Table 
6.2.  Firstly, as this study is testing organisational resilience, it was important that the whole 
organisation was impacted by the infection incident.  Secondly, the critical mass of 
interviewees (sources) who recalled critical infection incidents and the number of references 
to infection incidents made by interviewees that could be coded to the resilience factors 
(coded references) was determined.  The third criteria used the Westrum resilience 
128 
 
framework(248) that grades resilient situations, according to either i) a regular threat with a 
standard response and low potential to disrupt the system ii) an irregular threat which 
constitutes a one-off event, is of low probability but has the potential for a serious outcome 
and iii) unexampled events which are extremely unexpected but have a devastating 
outcome.    Each infection incident recalled by the first eight interviewees  was graded 
according to Westrum’s typology(248) to identify all those incidents which were irregular 
threats. Based on the criteria referred to in Table 6.2, the Norovirus incident that occurred in 
January 2007 met all the criteria, as shown in Table 6.3.  No other infection incident fitted all 
the criteria.  The highest number of references pertained to this incident (n=39), compared to 
the next most frequently occurring references which were to C.difficile outbreaks that 
occurred across the organisation on a seasonal basis (n=16).  Having selected the Norovirus 
incident from 2007 as the focus for the case study, 15 further sources were identified for 
invitation to an interview based on their involvement in this critical incident, which including 
the first 8 interviewees, comprised 23 sources in total. Of these 23, 19 sources referred 
specifically to the Norovirus outbreak in their interview in sufficient detail to include their 
account.  The interviews were closed when no new issues were emerging and data 
saturation was reached. 
Table 6.2  Criteria to determine which critical incident to select for analysis 
Criteria Explanation 
Organisation-wide To test an organisational resilience framework, the infection 
incident needed to impact on the whole organisation.  This 
was contrasted with infection incidents occurring in specific 
teams, which may have team-specific cultures, issues and 
environments 
Critical mass Interviewees refer most often to factors relating to that 
incident 
Level of threat (Westrum) Resilience tested with irregular threat  rather than regular 
threat as described by interviewees in study 
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Table 6.3  Critical Infection Incidents by study criteria for inclusion 
 
Infections 
 
Organisation 
or team based 
 
Irregular or regular threat 
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Acinetobacter 1998-9 Team Regular (Clusters) 6 
BSIs ITU - 2003-9 Team Regular (Clusters) 3 
C.difficile 2003-9  Organisation Regular (Clusters) 16 
C.difficile Care of Elderly 2008 Team Regular (2 Clusters) 10 
MRSA Orthopaedics 2004-5 Team Regular (Cluster) 3 
MRSA 2003-9 Team Regular (Clusters) 7 
MRSA Cardiothoracic 2003-9 Team Regular (Clusters) 6 
MRSA Neonates 2007-8 Team Irregular 19 
Norovirus 2003-9  Organisation Regular (Seasonal) 10 
Norovirus 2007 Organisation Irregular 39 
Norovirus Cardiothoracic 2008 Team Regular (Cluster) 2 
Klebsiella Renal 2009 Team Irregular 1 
6.3.2.5 Documents reviewed 
Retrospective data totaling over 15,000 pages was collected including Trust Board papers, 
the Trust Infection Prevention Committee papers, local Trust infection data from 2001 to 
2008, annual reports and business plans, Annual General Meeting papers, national Infection 
Prevention and Control reports, including the National Audit Office Reports of 2000,(34) 
2004(92) and 2009(93) and Department of Health Reports from 1998 to 2009. These 
documents assisted with providing a context for the outbreak, both nationally and locally and 
informed engagement with participants in discussions about specific issues and events. 
6.3.2.6 Participant Validation 
As the critical incident was retrospectively recalled, participant validation of the initial findings 
took the form of attending Centre for Infection Prevention and Management annual reviews, 
which included teams from microbiology, infection prevention and control, managers and 
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clinicians.  At an annual review in 2011, initial analyses of the data were presented to 
participants and feedback received in group discussions afterwards.   Participation in these 
reviews enabled informal interaction with a large multidisciplinary group and served as a 
means to check the consistency and validity of interview data.  Participant feedback was 
used to check back themes informally with participants on an individual basis. 
6.3.2.7 Data Analysis 
Data analysis involved two phases, firstly an initial data analysis using retrospective 
qualitative content analysis based on Weick and Sutcliffe’s mindful infrastructure as a 
behavioural framework(55).  This framework describes positive resilient behaviours, known 
as ‘mindful behaviours’ and negative resistant behaviours, known as ‘mindless behaviours’ 
which contribute to high and low performance respectively in the context of an unexpected 
event.  Secondly, the analysis was developed with in-depth qualitative thematic analysis 
arising from the detailed descriptions of sensemaking processes that were contained in each 
of the content categories.   
6.3.2.8 Qualitative Content Analysis 
Content analysis was chosen as the initial method in order to assess the existing theoretical 
frameworks.(249;250) Content analysis provides a mechanism of coding data from multiple 
sources to an a priori framework in a manner that facilitates counting of the data.  Qualitative 
content analysis was chosen as it is a mixed method that has developed from the traditional 
content analysis approach of frequency and classification analysis combined with the more 
recent approach of interpretive analysis of text to incorporate understanding of meanings, 
attitudes and behaviours.  This method was relevant as in addition to testing resilience 
frameworks against the empirical data, the aim was to understand the process of 
sensemaking in a healthcare infection context.  The choice of a deductive approach enabled 
theory testing and triangulation which was relevant to test the resilience frameworks in a 
complex healthcare setting.  The use of frequency counts enabled ordering and comparison 
of the various factors within each framework, but as a qualitative approach was taken, a 
statistical analysis would not have been appropriate. 
Interview data was analysed according to a pre-determined coding scheme which was 
developed from the Weick and Sutcliffe framework into a categorisation matrix.  The 
sampling unit of analysis was each interview transcript.  The recording/coding unit of 
analysis was individual sentences within each transcript.  These hold the information that is 
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processed during coding and forms the basis of frequency analysis.(249)  During the 
interviews, participants spoke regularly in long sentences with multiple phrases concluding in 
a key point, which made the use of sentences a viable option.  NVivo, a software package 
designed for the analysis and categorisation of text was used to facilitate the process of 
content analysis.  Sentences of text from each transcript were coded manually to the coding 
categories within the theoretical framework.  The content from the categories of resilient 
practice within the framework were then sub-categorised using interpretive coding 
techniques derived from an inductive evaluation of the data.  The resulting sub-categories 
were reviewed to identify the specific clinical or managerial practice that denoted resilience.  
This data was presented in tabular form to demonstrate the range of interventions used by 
staff within the organisation to manage resiliently. 
6.3.2.9 Inductive thematic analysis 
As a second phase of data analysis, an inductive thematic analysis of data was undertaken, 
by making use of the extensive interview narrative and the documentary evidence to 
construct a ‘thick’ description(251) of the chronology of the Norovirus outbreak. This second 
phase of data analysis had two elements; first and second order analyses.  First order 
analysis was undertaken to capture the organisational responses to the outbreak and the 
informants’ interpretations of these events. Second order analyses were conducted to 
discover themes and patterns in the rich narrative descriptions of the chronology of the 
outbreak.  The data was examined for schemata that concerned how the organisation and 
individuals responded, prior to, during and after the outbreak.(238)  The stages of this 
second order analysis were similar to those outlined by Gioia and Chittipeddi(239) as 
follows: the initial qualitative content analysis was used to identify explanations for 
individuals’ and groups’ behaviours and actions as the event unfolded, interview accounts 
were analysed to determine if they retained consistency or altered during the event, cross-
account analysis of interviews was undertaken to identify patterns of divergence or 
convergence and emerging thematic dimensions were extracted from the data.  Continual 
iterative comparison between data sources and theory occurred through these stages until 
the patterns became evident and ‘theoretical saturation’ was reached in that no new themes 
emerged.(252)  The schemata that emerged from this analysis related to: different schemata 
for different time periods, schemata for the process of managing the outbreak and schemata 
for the different sensemaking processes as the outbreak unfolded.  The schemata for 
different time periods are outlined in Table 6.4. 
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Table 6.4  Schemata for different time periods within the Norovirus Outbreak (January – 
February 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3.3 Results 
This section reports on the findings from the analysis of the Norovirus outbreak in 2007.  I 
examine the results from the analysis of the outbreak against Weick and Sutcliffe’s mindful 
infrastructure framework(55) as a contextual background to the main results.  The main 
results use the initial schemata based on phases of the outbreak which cover a period of 
approximately five weeks.  Each temporal schema expounds a descriptive first order 
analysis and thematic second order analyses as a format to explore cognition, behaviours 
and actions from a sensemaking perspective during the outbreak.  
 
2006 - Jan 2007 
 
Phase 1 
Routine 
Routine Practice 
Regular, low-level clusters 
of infection 
Preparation for merger 
 
 
 
 Phase 2 
Discovery  
Phase 3  
Imposed Control 
Phase 4 
Collective 
Responsibility 
 
Wed 24 January –  
Sunday 28 January 
 
 
Monday 29 January 
- Thursday 8 February 
 
 
Friday 9 February –  
Friday 16 February 
 
Saturday 17 February – 
Saturday 24 February 
 
 
Phase 5 
Rapid Recovery 
Unidentified infection 
Multiple points of entry 
Rapid spread of virus 
Pressure on hospital beds 
 
One-off meeting 
Control meeting 
Medical Director Referee 
Restructured teams 
 
 
New leader 
Smaller meeting 
Clinicians as experts 
Streamlined decisions 
 
 
 
Rapid recovery 
Systematic policies 
Surgical engagement 
Outbreak management 
 
 
Phase 6 
New Routine 
 
Sunday 25 Feb – 2008 
 
 
Learning into practice 
Revised routines 
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Table 6.5  Resilient and resistant practices during the management of an organisation-wide Norovirus outbreak 2007 
Framework from Weick, K and Sutcliffe, 
K. Managing the unexpected: resilient 
performance in an age of uncertainty. 
Jossey-Bass; 2007 
Resilient Practices Resistant Practices 
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Director 3 1 11 34 14 63 0 0 0 4 0 4 
Director - Clinical 2 5 2 16 6 31 2 6 1 0 3 12 
Clinical Director 4 5 25 45 11 90 1 3 5 10 0 19 
Consultant Medicine 2 1 8 25 15 51 9 3 11 12 4 39 
Consultant A&E 9 3 10 21 6 49 2 1 2 7 1 13 
Nurse Manager 2 0 11 20 4 37 0 1 2 1 0 4 
Nurse Manager 1 5 12 28 0 46 4 3 3 10 4 24 
Nurse Manager 4 1 11 22 6 44 4 4 9 1 2 20 
Senior IPC Nurse 21 6 8 15 4 54 0 3 5 13 11 32 
Senior IPC Nurse 23 0 25 22 4 74 3 3 4 7 5 22 
Clinical Manager 11 0 19 18 5 53 9 0 3 1 3 16 
Manager 1 3 16 26 7 53 2 1 2 4 5 14 
Nurse Manager 3 1 11 30 3 48 2 0 0 4 3 9 
Nurse Manager 4 3 14 17 4 42 0 0 2 0 3 5 
Manager - Beds 7 4 35 19 11 76 2 2 19 15 0 38 
Manager - Facilities 6 1 10 8 4 29 1 0 2 6 0 9 
Manager 6 3 19 30 10 68 0 4 13 19 7 43 
Manager 6 1 11 22 8 48 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Manager 0 3 8 10 0 21 2 0 3 3 0 8 
Total of each characteristic 115 46 266 428 122 977 44 34 87 117 51 333 
Resilient practices: red/amber=low resilience (0-5), yellow=moderate resilience (6-15), green =high resilience (≥16).  Resistant practices: green/yellow= low resistance (0-5), 
amber=moderate resistance (6-15), red = high resistance (≥16).  
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6.3.3.1 Frequency of resilient and resistant practices 
The initial results from the study were based on qualitative content analysis of interviews 
against the mindful organising framework taken from Weick and Sutcliffe’s work(55).  These 
results provide an interesting contextual backdrop to the richer qualitative first and second 
order analyses.  In general, the Trust’s modus operandi seemed to focus on its operational 
sensitivities (sensitive to operations and taking operations for granted) (n= 353) and its 
ability to operate resiliently (capability for resilience and treating recovery as routine) (n=545) 
out of a total number of references to resilient and resistant practices (n=1,310).  This 
suggests that it may have less developed practice and routines in relation to its capability to 
track small failures (n=159) with the notable exception of the Infection Prevention and 
Control senior nurses whose attentiveness to small failures constitutes 38% of the instances 
in this category, although this reflects the requirements of their job role.  The practice of 
denying small failures is only 28% of the total category, suggesting reasonably resilient 
practice, despite the lower number of instances.   Interestingly, although there were few 
instances of resisting oversimplification (n=46), equally simple diagnoses being accepted 
(n=34) was the lowest scoring category in resistant practices.  This may reflect the hospital 
Trust’s tendency to operate in silos, with relatively little interaction between each silo, 
resulting in simplified and routinised practices or suggest that individuals operate to an 
existing set of assumptions and rarely question them.  The instances of expertise being used 
effectively (n=122) is over double the instances of experts deferring to authority (n=51), 
reflecting mainly resilient practice around the use of clinical expertise and leadership. 
City Trust demonstrated a relatively low organisational capacity to anticipate unexpected 
events, but demonstrated a stronger capability to contain unexpected events, in particular, 
maintaining capabilities for resilience.  Conversely, low levels of failure to anticipate an 
unexpected event were reported, although there was a more mixed picture around three 
resistant practices: frontline operations were taken for granted, recovery is treated as routine 
and experts defer to authority.     These findings suggest that the Trust had fewer strategies 
in place to anticipate irregular, unexpected events, except by remaining sensitive to 
operations, the highest scoring category (n= 266) out of the anticipatory categories (n=427).  
The reliance on maintaining capabilities for resilience (n=428) as a means of managing 
unexpected events is clear, receiving over three times as many references as ‘monitoring or 
taking advantage of shifting locations of expertise.’  Of particular note on an individual basis, 
is the high score (n=45) for the Clinical Director’s maintaining capability for resilience.  This 
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person took on a significant leadership role in relation to the outbreak and this is reflected in 
the instances of resilient strategies that were used to manage the outbreak effectively. 
To summarise, the premise is that whilst every complex organisation might be expected to 
demonstrate resilient and resistant practices, resilient practices need to outweigh resistant 
practices for an organisation to demonstrate organisational resilience and the contrary is true 
if an organisation demonstrates organisational resistance which is characterised by 
defensive routines.   
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Table 6.6  Outbreak Schema Development 
Schema Subschema Examples Sensemaking 
Phase 1 
Routine practice 
(2006 - January 
2007) 
Tacit systems 
Ad hoc organising 
Operational focus 
Improvisation 
Data-driven 
performance 
Mini-republics 
Pockets of resistant practice 
 
Habitual routines and 
practices 
 
Phase 2 
Discovery  
(24 Jan- 28 Jan) 
Confusion 
Scanning 
Allocating attention 
Communication 
Multiple point of entry 
Anomaly identified  
Anomaly discussed with 
multiple stakeholders 
Emails, discussions at ward 
level 
 
Embedded 
sensemaking 
Rapid sensegiving 
Phase 3 
Imposed control 
(29 Jan – 8 Feb) 
Extraordinary event 
Imposed control 
Individual self-
interest 
 
Novel action 
Multiplicity of 
expertise 
Changed roles 
One-off high level meeting 
Control group – chaired by  
interim Director of Clinical 
Services  
Vascular, orthopaedic 
surgeons and ICU 
consultants 
Spatial reorganisation 
Hybrid roles, new roles 
Distributed 
sensemaking 
Distrust  
Role systems 
 
Phase 4 
Collective 
accountability 
(9 Feb – 16 Feb) 
Deference to 
expertise 
Flexibility 
New Director of Clinical 
Services – hands chair of 
control group to Medical 
Director 
Two sessions of group to 
agree single plan 
All hands to the pump 
Dunkirk spirit 
Collective efficacy 
Collective mind 
Conceptual slack 
Trust 
Phase 5 
Rapid Recovery 
(17 Feb – 24 Feb) 
Maintenance of 
activity targets 
Learning 
 
 
 
Post-outbreak report and 
management response 
Briefing 
Organisational Learning 
and Enactment 
 
Phase 6 
New routine 
(25 Feb – 2008) 
Explicit knowledge 
Systematic (reliable) 
process 
Structured 
organising 
Experience of 
unexpected 
Stool charting 
Co-ordinated central 
response for future 
incidents 
Experience for dealing with 
snow and flu 
Restructuring of habitual 
routines and practices 
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6.3.4 Findings from Thematic Analysis 
6.3.4.1 Inductive Analysis 
In the next section, for each of the phases (1-6) of the infection outbreak listed in Table 6.6, I 
describe the first-order findings and elaborate on the second-order thematic findings.  The 
first-order analysis explains the story of the outbreak from the interviewees’ perspective and 
provides examples of the subschema through representative quotes.  It shows how cognition 
and behaviours of those involved with the outbreak changed over time, represented by the 
phased schema.  The second-order analysis explores the theoretical implications of schema 
changes that are outlined in the first-order analysis and supports the development of an 
explanatory framework.(238)  
6.3.5 Phase 1 
6.3.5.1  First-Order Findings 
6.3.5.2 Organisational Schema prior to Outbreak 
Prior to the outbreak occurring in January 2007, the Trust was preparing for a merger with 
another city Trust that was due to take place in October 2007. Preparations included 
planning for new structures, systems, roles and responsibilities.  Operationally, there was a 
strong focus on meeting national performance targets, for example, a maximum four hour 
wait target for patients in Accident and Emergency and on achieving local targets, built into 
the Trust balanced scorecard.  The Trust response to external pressures, such as the 
Department of Health was perceived as reactive and time consuming: 
71 – Large number of requirements from the Department of Health or visits from the 
Healthcare Commission or we have a potential Department of Health visit that seems to 
exercise haphazardly the minds of those that we sometimes get direction from and that 
suddenly becomes the priority and the panic of the time. 
From an infection control perspective, practice was mixed.  The integration of infection 
control targets into the balanced scorecard, use of statistical data and strong leadership from 
the Director of Infection Prevention and Control had initiated a process of local accountability 
for infection practice.  Effective clinical management of small clusters of infections, such as 
MRSA or C.difficile prevented a wider impact on the hospital and there was acceptance that 
some Norovirus would be seen every year. 
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78 – There were the odd isolated outbreak of generally the C.difficile or Norovirus, but it was 
pretty much part and parcel of day-to-day management...when you had a small, localised 
outbreak you took the appropriate precautions in that area and carried on as normal.  I don’t 
recall having to cohort more than six patients in one area and close off a ward or it spreading 
any further than that, so not remembering probably means that there wasn’t any major 
significant issue. 
However, Trust infection policies had been updated but were inconsistently enforced as 
certain directorates in the hospitals were perceived to operate as mini-republics, being 
selective about which policies they would choose to implement.  These issues caused 
tensions between central teams, such as infection control and local directorate teams who 
acted on the basis of local and individual accountability and did not appreciate challenge to 
their operating values and principles.  The Director of Infection Prevention and Control 
explained this dilemma in relation to performance data: 
63 - You’re not stepping on toes in terms of their hierarchies.  You’re providing their 
data.....they knew that also when they did well that that was also reported upwards and 
included in my reports to governance and boards and things.  So that’s another ripple effect, 
knowing that their data not only is being held up to them as a mirror for their, but also that it’s 
going upwards and outwards. 
On a day-to-day basis, the infection control team responded reactively to issues as they 
arose.  The team was perceived to be disjointed, to members of their own team and more 
broadly to clinical areas throughout the Trust.  Infection practice in the Trust was audited by 
the infection team, but was somewhat haphazard and systematic use of standardised tools, 
for example stool charting was not in place.   
75 - Yeah we have loose definitions with what is diarrhoea, what classifies an outbreak, and 
also what’s the sort of descriptors of diarrhoea, at the time we didn’t have a standard 
terminology for what diarrhoea is, one nurse would say diarrhoea’s different to somebody 
else.... we had different documentation on each of the wards, there’s no standard 
From an outbreak management perspective, there was no pre-existing, documented 
structure for crisis management and the flu outbreak plan was in embryonic form.  The Trust 
policies were not geared up for the impact of a large magnitude outbreak on the service. 
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6.3.5.3 Second-Order Findings 
6.3.5.4 Habitual Routines and Extended Accountability 
Prior to the outbreak occurring, the directorates (clinical groupings) within the Trust were 
semi-autonomous, only being held to account centrally on their finances and aspects of 
clinical governance.  A well developed sense of individual accountability existed at clinician 
level to their patients, immediate colleagues and teams.  Habitual routines and practices had 
developed over time and discussion or challenge to these practices, particularly well-
embedded clinical routines was met with resistance.  For example, the involvement of a 
central team, such as the infection control team to try and resolve infection clusters within 
boundaried units, such as the intensive care unit, could be received very personally by the 
clinical leader as described by one of the infection control nurses: 
75 - But it was very, very hard work, not physically, but it was emotionally hard work trying to 
use all your persuasion skills and negotiation skills, and still maintain the relationship, and in 
the end the relationships just broke down, we, which was quite upsetting 
Central team involvement was perceived to be interfering and representing an exaggerated 
response to issues that could be resolved locally.  From a sensemaking perspective, there 
was resistance to tracking or admitting to failures owing to the potential for impact on the 
unit’s reputation and leadership.  There were many unspoken, existing routines based on a 
set of traditions and tacit systems which relied on the experience of those involved and were 
passed on through word-of-mouth training and improvisation.   
135 - We actually had forgotten to do an awful lot of things and if you think about all the 
people moving around with the different mergers and traditions you see at a bed based 
management [level], but we just forgot about how to do it and then that’s because that’s what 
was based on tacit systems actually without operational policies. 
Contextual factors had altered some existing routines, with the focus of the Trust on the 
forthcoming merger; habitual patterns of behaviour had been broken and haphazardly 
replaced, if at all.  The majority of minor infection outbreaks were managed successfully at a 
ward or unit level as part of day-to-day clinical management and were viewed as minor 
‘punctuations’ in habituated routines. 
Challenges to individual accountability had begun to occur with the introduction of central 
systems to hold directorates to account, including performance systems, such as the 
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balanced scorecard, central monitoring of infections and clinical governance mortality 
reviews.  There were many clinicians, teams and units within the Trust that participated 
actively in the extended accountability arrangements, but pockets of practice existed where 
these new routines were resisted fiercely. 
6.3.6 Phase 2 
6.3.6.1 First-Order Findings  
6.3.6.2 Discovery of Outbreak 
The first (index) cases associated with the Norovirus outbreak occurred on Wednesday 24th 
January 2007 at a time of ‘winter pressures’ where additional seasonal patients put pressure 
on bed capacity.  Norovirus is a community-acquired virus, but once in the hospital, can be 
hospital-acquired.  Norovirus patients usually present with vomiting.  The discovery process 
for Norovirus occurred at multiple points in the hospital as patients with community-acquired 
Norovirus arrived at different entry points.  There were several routes of entry identified by: 
unexpected enormous pressure in Accident & Emergency (A&E) (the duty management 
team identified pressure and escalated the problem to the Service Manager, Emergency 
Medicine), bed and ward closures (the Inpatient Capacity Manager identified problem, liaised 
with the Infection Prevention and Control team and escalated to the interim Director of 
Clinical Services) and increased cases of diarrhoea on Medical Wards (the Clinical Director 
of Medicine and Lead Nurse for Medicine met to discuss what the problem was).  At each 
point, clinicians’ or clinical managers’ attention was allocated to the anomaly (253) as a 
result of proactive scanning of the environment.  However, at this stage, there was a lack of 
clarity about the underlying infection as the patients’ presentation fitted with a C.difficile 
prognosis from a clinician perspective as the patients were long stay patients on 
Medical/Care of the Elderly wards, with no vomiting and were presenting with infective 
diarrhoea of unknown cause.  The actual cause could not be confirmed until results were 
returned from the laboratories as described by an infection control nurse: 
75 - This was Norovirus but it didn’t present with vomiting, so we were kind of lulled into a 
false sense of security at the beginning by thinking, this can’t possibly be Norovirus because 
it’s not vomiting.  But then we were getting positives, and viral spread is very quick and 
rapid, and so it was typical in that sense, but we were confused by it because it, we weren’t 
having the vomiting as well. 
141 
 
133 - It just didn’t seem right.  We were saying, are we sure this isn’t Noro, but because 
there’s no vomiting because it was an atypical outbreak it was no, no, no it’s C.diff but of 
course it became apparent over the course of, over the first weekend, I think, that it was 
Noro and not C.diff. 
An early meeting took place on Thursday 25th January in the third floor offices of Site 
between the Clinical Director for Medicine and their colleagues to discuss the early cases.  
Agreement was reached to treat the problem as an outbreak and during the first four days of 
the outbreak, the consultants in the directorate of Medicine took action to isolate infected 
patients in bays of wards or on whole wards.  Communication with the multidisciplinary 
teams in the directorate to explain the situation occurred within 24 to 36 hours of the initial 
cases being identified.  Despite these efforts, the virus spread rapidly resulting in the closure 
of six wards by the 28th January at which point early indications from the laboratories over 
the weekend period suggested that the infective agent was Norovirus instead of C.difficile.  
6.3.6.3 Second-Order Findings 
6.3.6.4 Embedded Sensemaking and Rapid Sensegiving 
Clinically embedded sensemaking was evident in the early stages of the outbreak, triggered 
by the extraordinary circumstances and unexpected nature of the Norovirus outbreak.  
Clinicians and clinical managers identified that there was a problem at an early stage, 
utilising their embeddedness in clinical areas to notice anomalies in their local environments, 
bracket the anomalies based on their prior knowledge and experiences, engage in 
sensemaking conversations with colleagues to elicit additional cognitive and environmental 
perspectives and escalate the problem within the organisation. More problematically, initial 
sensemaking was confused by two simultaneous and contradictory cognitive cues; patients 
exhibiting no vomiting and diarrhoea.  This caused the sense makers to be overwhelmed by 
the scope of possible meanings that resulted from vague, equivocal cues, causing problems 
of confusion and ambiguity.(64)  
The infective agent was incorrectly labelled as C.difficile as this seemed the more likely 
infection, given the presenting symptoms.  However, this caused a period of confusion as 
the resulting rapid spread and community contagion did not fit with C.difficile, as described 
by the admitting medical consultant and the inpatient capacity manager who took active 
roles in managing the outbreak: 
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128 - it became very rapidly apparent that we had a group of patients in whom we thought 
actually had C.diff and it very rapidly transpired that they were C.diff negative, but that there 
was another infective agent going on here and we started seeing that coming in from the 
community....I think that was the first realisation that we had an issue, when we were in a 
situation where we were looking at having to close parts of the Acute Admissions Unit, 
because of what was clearly an infectious diarrhoea but of unknown aetiology. 
78 - this particular outbreak started with people having diarrhoea, so we didn’t pick it up as 
Norovirus very early on and we thought initially that we had an outbreak of C. diff and so we 
were sending off lots of specimens and not getting C. diff toxin positive, so we didn’t know 
what it was. 
Weick comments that only occasionally are salient, novel, unusual and unexpected cues 
pursued(64)p86 but in this situation, a small group of clinician leaders including the Infection 
Control consultant, the Clinical Director of Medicine and the admitting Medical Consultant 
persisted in trying to understand and make sense of what they noticed.  By the end of the 
weekend period (27-28th January) they had determined that Norovirus was the likely cause 
of the diarrhoea, by which time, six wards were affected.  The alertness of this group of 
senior clinicians reflects Schon’s emphasis on the role and interactions of experienced and 
senior practitioners.  He argues that such practitioners use expert sensemaking when 
encountering an unexpected event by engaging in ‘a reflective conversation with the 
situation’ (254)(1983:77). The ‘conversation’ involves framing the situation using a repertoire 
of past meanings and tacit knowledge, whilst remaining open to unique elements. This 
process makes that tacit knowledge more explicit and the basis of future action.(254) 
Embedded sensemaking was evident in the Clinical Director of Medicine’s approach to the 
outbreak as, in the space of four days, the Clinical Director drew on their identity and 
personal experience of being a front-line clinician and leader to construct a plausible story of 
what was happening in sufficient detail to start to brief others, to;(255) notice and bracket 
cues through their ability to recognise discriminatory detail, make sense of confusing cues, 
impose labels on interdependent events and act rapidly on that information.  Communication 
occurred through clinically embedded local sensegiving rather than through the central 
communication team. 
Rapid sensegiving was evident early in the outbreak, but focused in particular areas of the 
Trust where leaders were engaged fully in sensemaking.  For example, in the Medicine 
directorate, an observable change from automatic thinking to active thinking and action was 
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evident in the rapidity with which meaning making was converted to action as described by 
the admitting Medical Consultant: 
128 - I think it varied between individual groups, so for the clinical medicine teams it actually 
happened pretty quickly.  I think [the Clinical Director]l was getting emails and updates out 
probably within the first 24 to 36 hours saying, there’s a problem, we need to start creating 
some beds 
In these areas at ward and unit level, there was active and rapid sensegiving in the form of 
debate, clarification and enactment which involved detailed communications with other 
teams, co-ordination of operational plans and rapid education of staff which is described in 
one account from a ward manager: 
 130 - So there was a lot of coordination between the two of us as managers, a lot of talking 
to the nurses, a lot of educating the nurses, because I find that the sort of chaos and 
mayhem of something like this is often resolved when people understand what’s going on. 
In this time period, a rapid degree of sensegiving was less evident in other areas within the 
Trust, particularly in areas where clinical leaders had not been involved in the sensemaking 
activities, for example in certain surgical areas, as described by a senior nurse: 
137- I remember going to talk to the orthopaedic surgeons, who were utterly clueless, this 
was about five days into it and they had Noro on one of their wards and were utterly clueless 
about why they shouldn’t be going onto one ward and then tracking onto another, a stream 
of about 20 of them. 
In the surgical areas, surgeons continued with their habitual routines and practices, 
attempting to admit their patients to theatre, until the point at which they were prevented 
from doing so by physical obstacles such as closed wards and reassigned theatres, which 
created tensions between the surgeons and the physicians and infection control team whose 
focus was on trying to control the outbreak.  This became a major issue in the next stage of 
the outbreak, where more formal structures and systems were introduced to contain the 
outbreak. 
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6.3.7 Phase 3 
6.3.7.1 First-Order Findings 
6.3.7.2 Imposed Control 
This phase of the outbreak commenced on Monday 29th January and lasted until Thursday 
8th February.  Following a one-off meeting led by the interim Director of Clinical Services 
(IDC) with key participants from infection control, medicine and inpatient capacity, 
agreement was reached that the outbreak ‘needed to be managed in an extraordinary way.’ 
(66)  Control was imposed through the introduction of twice-daily command and control style 
disaster recovery meeting which constituted a large group (over 25 people) of internal 
multidisciplinary stakeholders.  This approach was borne out of the IDC’s previous 
responsibilities for emergency planning and ‘embryonic’ flu planning.   The meeting took 
several hours each morning, involving a detailed census of as near to real-time ward activity 
as possible. To achieve this, all the clinical areas within the Trust reported back available 
beds, infected cases and theatre capacity to enable the attendees to monitor the number of 
infected cases and agree how to proceed with managing the outbreak.  The focus on bed 
capacity and operational management was felt by some clinicians to detract from the clinical 
focus of infection control management, creating a managerial clinical divide as described by 
an infection control nurse based on Site B: 
71 -because it is complex deciding, it’s not just as easy as saying a patient does have 
diarrhoea or doesn’t have diarrhoea and this is infectious and this is not, it’s actually a far 
more complex clinical decision making than that sort of model allows. 
A fundamental tension that arose between clinical teams during this period was the 
competing priorities of those clinicians wanting to retain ‘elective capacity’ (the capacity to 
bring in planned patients) and those wanting to focus on ending the outbreak.  The clinicians 
attempting to retain their elective capacity were perceived by the outbreak team as 
individually self-interested, parochial and operating against the interests of the Trust.   As the 
organisational capacity for throughput of patients was rapidly compromised, some clinical 
teams, e.g. the intensive care team were accused by other clinical teams of following 
inappropriate clinical pathways and others, e.g. vascular surgeons were criticised for trying 
to circumvent outbreak policies to maintain their patient throughput and bed capacity.   Other 
surgeons, e.g. the Ear, Nose & Throat team worked with the outbreak team by operating 
flexibly to maintain their elective capacity through weekend working.  The Medical Director 
took on the role of ‘referee’ to resolve tensions between the clinical teams by making sense 
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of the priorities of different groups and persuading them to adopt an alternative clinical 
strategy, which involved them assessing potentially infected patients to free up the Infection 
Control team’s capacity. 
Within this timeframe, an innovative, spatial re-conceptualisation of the entire hospital was 
constructed with specific infected and non-infected areas, teams, processes and admitting 
arrangements.  These separate areas, colloquially known to the majority of respondents as 
‘clean’ and ‘dirty’ areas were delineated throughout the patient’s pathway, to enable two 
flows of patients to follow one pathway or the other through A&E, the admitting wards, 
medical wards, surgical wards, intensive care areas and theatres.  This system required 
cognitive reorientation for all the teams working within it, as they were required to adopt an 
improvised role system, becoming members of either an infected or non-infected team.  This 
process was coordinated with the Occupational Health department who identified individuals 
that had recovered from Norovirus to join infected teams and vice versa.   This innovative 
spatial re-design was based on the prior experiences of the small group of front-line 
clinicians who took leadership responsibility for the outbreak.  These clinical leaders drew 
from key elements of their prior experiences to conceive the hospital re-orientation which 
included; corralling patients, opening and closing services, maintaining separate admissions 
streams, ensuring staff worked in one admission stream or the other and day-to-day 
education of staff on how to manage infection and prevent transmission.  A key feature was 
that the re-design was dynamic, so if a non-infected area became infected, then that would 
be closed off and a new non-infective area would be identified, as described by the Clinical 
Director: 
133 - So it started off with the limited number of wards, isolating the patients, but got to the 
position where we weren’t on top of the outbreak so we started to cohort infected, non 
infected patients, cohort staff for those groups, and on a several times a day basis it became 
necessary to lock off one bit of the pathway and divert patients somewhere else.  So if an 
area that you were treating as a venue for new, non infected admissions started to have 
patients or staff with diarrhoea then you closed that one off to acute admissions and diverted 
the acute admissions somewhere else. 
In addition, the re-designed hospital balanced central ward closure with local patient 
cohorting decisions, ensuring that local accountability could be retained alongside central 
control.  The re-design resulted in an improvement in overall capability within the hospital 
and assisted in containing Norovirus in identified areas so that full infection control 
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precautions could be implemented and the area could be deep cleaned when the Norovirus 
was eradicated.  
These changes in the hospital required rapid alterations in roles and a high degree of 
flexibility which was exhibited by staff at all levels within the organisation.  Wildavsky(256) 
p70 suggests that a capacity ‘to investigate, to learn, and to act without knowing in advance 
what one will be called to act upon’ is crucial in achieving resilient practice in unknown 
situations.  Respondents described a range of adaptations to their roles including new roles, 
different jobs, alternative areas, changed or additional shifts, out of hours, working nights 
and undertaking extra hours for no extra pay, as described by the inpatient capacity 
manager: 
78 - it became very, very complex to manage it effectively, and actually everybody changed 
their roles for a period of three or four weeks in order to focus on managing the outbreak 
rather than their normal daily business. 
In addition, some respondents described hybrid roles, where they continued in their existing 
role but took on specific additional roles for the outbreak, which may have been much more 
junior in function but ensured that processes continued effectively.  The Clinical Director 
described continuing in their existing role whilst taking on a medical staffing type of role to 
ensure that there were adequate numbers of additional junior medical staff to fulfil the 
demands of the re-designed hospital: 
133 - And what this meant in practice was over the course of the three weeks or so I ended 
up basically sourcing residents for about two weeks in the director of services’ office at [Site 
A, City Hospital] 
6.3.7.3 Second-Order Findings 
6.3.7.4 Distributed Sensemaking 
Patterns of distributed sensemaking were evident in this phase.  The transition from 
discovery to imposed control resulted in a pluralistic picture with evidence of resilient and 
resistant practices.  One element of the distributed sensemaking was the use of a command 
and control group meeting which became the structure through which identities and 
strategies materialised.(257)  By bringing multiple stakeholders to one consensual meeting, 
the opportunity to access varied cues to make sense of what was happening was possible.  
Weick suggests that the use of meetings and direct contact to create rich personal data from 
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which sensemaking can emerge is more important than impersonal data such as emails, or 
electronic reports.(64)   Despite the attempts to impose control through the command and 
control structure, the semi-autonomous clinical directorate groupings reflected a loosely 
connected organisation where clinical teams had a partial image of the priorities and issues 
in the hospitals.  Although certain areas; Medicine and Cancer Services participated in the 
continued process of sensemaking through the central command and control meetings, in 
other clinical and corporate teams within the organisation attended the meeting but had not 
realised the significance of the outbreak and continued to follow existing routines.  One 
critical role, the bed manager, had continued to follow existing bed management routines for 
managing an infection: 
126 – ‘There were a number of areas that I think had diarrhoea, and we’d gone through our 
usual closing bays, trying to isolate patients in side rooms in order to manage a slightly 
higher number of diarrhoea cases than we usually saw.  And then we got some results back 
saying that we’d got Norovirus, and then got lots more results back saying we’ve got 
Norovirus, and realised quite, and realised at that point that we had a significant problem, 
and it was spreading across the trust’  
As this example illustrates, rather than adopting extraordinary strategies for dealing with the 
outbreak, in certain areas, habitual routines continued as a result of individuals reacting to, 
rather than anticipating cues.  The reactive nature of these responses suggests inadequate 
participation in the collective sensemaking processes and an absence of sensegiving to this 
team.  Tillement et al suggest that professional rivalries and asymmetric relations between 
occupational groups can be heightened during unexpected events and reduce organisational 
resilience.(135)   This was evident with certain surgical teams who had formed their own 
perspectives on the event by choosing to follow existing habitual routines and not alter their 
behaviour to take account of the outbreak.  The individuals in these teams were perceived 
by the physicians to be focused on getting their patients into surgery regardless of the 
consequences for the whole organisation, although the surgeons’ frustration with the 
constrained capacity for their patients was recognised, as described by members of the 
outbreak team:    
128 – the other big headache was a lot of the specialist teams, especially the surgical 
specialist teams, they got very frustrated that they could not bring in tertiary referrals, they 
couldn’t bring in elective procedures and there was quite a lot of grief about that. 
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126 - that’s not to say that some people still didn’t try the eagle gamesmanship of getting 
their own patients in.  It still happens, and it’s really irritating, especially when you’ve got that 
sort of crisis going at the time. 
137- And in terms of surgeons, it was so variable.  I have to say, they were the most difficult 
kind of group to deal with really I think, in terms of understanding the impact. 
133 - There were some tensions because periodically a surgical team would take a case to 
theatre without having been given the all clear for an intensive care bed, which then created 
a problem managing. 
These surgeons appeared to have a narrower perception of their role with a focus on 
individual patient care and were less embedded in the broader sensemaking and 
sensegiving processes across the Trust. As a result, sensemaking was distributed 
throughout the organisation, with groups reaching equivalent, rather than shared meanings 
from the situation.   
An associated issue was one of trust.  The outbreak had resulted in temporary groups 
forming to manage the outbreak, requiring the rapid formation of new relationships with 
individuals and teams who, prior to the outbreak, had little day-to-day contact.  In this phase 
of the outbreak, there was evidence of distrust between clinical groups who expressed 
suspicion about the intentions behind the actions of other groups, as described by one of the 
medical consultants: 
128 - one was the high dependency and critical care axis, who were very keen to get 
patients off ITU to create beds and there were certainly occasions where I looked at people 
who’d come off ITU and said, well hold on a minute, this person has been sent down either 
inappropriately or the fact that they’ve got diarrhoea has been masked in order to achieve a 
discharge and we certainly, ended up having a second HDU closure because of a step down 
on a patient who’d been started on, I think Vancomycin, quote just in case they got some 
diarrhoea, unquote.  Now, they certainly had diarrhoea when they came down to us......so 
one is suspicious that, that there were some clinical pathways being followed that were not 
ideal for anybody. 
A further issue that accentuated distributed sensemaking was that an elicited cognitive 
taxonomy(257) was operating in which the physicians regarded the surgeons as self-
interested and parochial, and the surgeons regarded the physicians as overreacting to the 
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infection problems. The basis of this is that Norovirus is a medical rather than a surgical 
condition and the surgeons dealt with surgery and their junior doctors attempted to manage 
patient co-morbidities.  The surgeons felt that they were focused on their surgical priorities 
and the physicians considered themselves to be managing the infection issues to improve 
patient safety and public health. These taxonomies exacerbated the sense of different core 
identities between groups.  Some groups justified these positions during interviews, for 
example, a physician described why the physicians would exhibit greater embeddedness in 
infection management, citing more regular contact with and management of patients who 
may be sicker, more vulnerable and at greater risk of infections that are easily transmitted 
and a member of the surgical team justified their cognitive taxonomy whilst recognising the 
futility of it at the same time: 
128 - The other side of it is that within gastroenterology we provide a significant service for 
the sick end of patients with, usually with C-dif, colitis, so we’re involved with management of 
that group of patients.  And in a slightly broader sense from the endoscopy point of view, we 
do a lot of endoscopic procedures on patients with high risk infection transmission issues 
and there’s a lot of infection control and cross contamination awareness that has to be 
driven by that patient group. 
137 - [Norovirus 2006-7] But I think because it’s surgery, we’d never assume that any kind of 
infection outbreak would affect us, which is crazy really, when you consider all the planning 
we had done previously for bird flu but it did, and it is crazy. 
These taxonomies prevented heedful interrelating and created sensemaking fault lines(238) 
within the organisation that prevented the development of shared cognition and behaviours 
to respond effectively to the outbreak. 
The innovative and novel spatial re-design of the hospital and staff involved recombining 
cognitive and behavioural repertoires that already existed, for example,  experience of 
corralling patients, opening and closing services and maintaining separate admissions 
streams.  The improvisation or ‘bricolage’ required to bring together these existing response 
repertoires (109) to form a new hospital system and extending the range of the action 
repertoires, for example, making changes to patient flows, staff work areas and bed capacity 
served to overcome the challenges presented by the virus, leading to heightened feelings of 
efficacy which in turn encouraged sensemaking.(109)  From an individual and group 
perspective, this capability for reconfiguring resources using existing routines(118) and the 
use of bricolage to develop an improvised role system under pressure, defines resilient 
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practice.  Weick suggests that in a crisis situation, resilience is maintained when more role 
structure is created to compensate for less meaning in a situation.(19) 
6.3.8 Phase 4 
6.3.8.1 First-Order Findings 
6.3.8.2 Collective Accountability 
A new leader, the Director of Clinical Services (DCS) started work on 5th February to take 
over from the interim Director of Clinical Services.  The Chief Executive introduced the DCS 
to the Control group in the first few days in post, as described by the IDC: 
66 - And I was left to carry on managing it [the Control group] because clearly I’d already 
started.  I think it was the second week of February, and the chief executive came in with 
[the DCS), and they made some comments about the way the meeting was being run.  And 
looking back, I didn’t find that very helpful at the time, because it felt quite undermining.   
The implied criticism in this quote was reflected by other informants who felt that the meeting 
had become too big and chaotic and was at the wrong time of day (too early) to have 
gathered accurate information to inform timely decision making.  The Director of Infection 
Prevention and Control explained the concern that the focus was on bed capacity rather than 
individual clinical assessments: 
63 - I think the headless chicken type of approach and everything must be ready for the bed 
management meeting, no because actually they’ll have to wait, because assessments need 
to be made appropriately instead of multiple moves being made for the wrong reasons. 
The new DCS describes implementing rapid change that increased the collective 
accountability for the outbreak: 
127 - You move away from colleagues thinking that you all have respective accountabilities 
to play out and the scales will tip one way or the other and we’ll get it right or we won’t, to 
people recognising very quickly we’re all here for the same reason, we all have a common 
understanding of the big issue facing us and we all quite simply just want to get through it 
and work it out.  And get a sustainable solution as quickly as possible. 
The DCS rapidly identified the key priorities to resolve the outbreak within the first week of 
starting in post. 
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127 - And if I did anything when I arrived it was one, to get the, be clear about who was 
leading what we were trying to do and secondly to keep asking the question where have we 
come from?  Where are we now?  And how are we going to stop it?  I kept asking it until a 
plan emerged....I think that took about two sessions, so after the first session it was oh yes 
these are all of the things we’ve talked about before, I know you’ve asked the question these 
are things we should be doing in priority order rather than a montage of things that people 
could pick and choose from and by the second meeting people were really clear. 
One priority was to identify two critical clinicians, Director of Infection Prevention and Control 
and the Medical Director, who were essential to co-ordinate the outbreak by creating ‘the 
space for the right leaders to come together.’  A significant symbolic action was to hand the 
chair of the Control Group to the Medical Director which reflected the willingness to defer to 
specialist expertise.  A linked priority was to ensure that the key decision makers were 
involved which resulted in the large Control Group meeting being pared down to a small 
decision making group, which met on a daily basis and was nicknamed COBRA (in 
recognition of the government COBRA which stands for Cabinet Office briefing room A and 
describes the meeting location of a cross-department government emergency committee 
that meets about high priority issues).    The critical feature of COBRA was that it drew on 
flexible networks of clinician expertise and was driven by clinical decision making, with 
membership including the Director of Infection Prevention and Control, the Medical Director, 
the Director of Surgery, the Director of Medicine and the Lead Pathologist with other clinical 
specialists as required. The larger meeting format was retained on a bi-weekly basis as the 
DCS explained, ‘it stopped everyone talking about everybody else to be quite honest and ‘oh 
well we would do this but they said that we can’t.’  We just had it out in the room.’ (127) 
A second priority was to create a clear plan of action, focusing on patient safety which meant 
isolating patients.  The DCS describes the process of sensemaking he engendered by 
tapping into an organisational cognitive reservoir of ‘simple’ thinking that was embedded in 
the academically-focused nature of the Trust: 
127 - And I think there is a lot about the way that the predecessor Trust [prior to the merger 
in October 2007] worked with just that way of thinking amongst the leadership and the 
professors and the lead clinicians who actually keep it simple.  When did it happen?  Where 
has it happened?  How many cases?  What’s the gestation?  How long does it take to clear 
the whole thing out?  What’s effective?  What’s the evidence base?  And let’s just get on and 
do it then and make it happen.   
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The issue of certain surgical groups operating disparately was addressed by the DCS who 
described using the ‘simplistic’ argument of promoting safety over performance to persuade 
the surgeons to participate in the collective effort:  
127 - in a humble way you may have other people that if they don’t understand that simplicity 
[safety first] they may just keep piling in the elective work.  And it was almost a moment of 
revelation when new in to role I said, as Director of Clinical Services at the … of [City Trust]  
I said, well haven’t we got to stop adding to the problem, haven’t we at some stage got to 
stop admitting patients in to this group of hospitals?  And it was almost everyone went, my 
God, it’s the right thing to do by my God.  So that was important.  
Friday 16th February signalled a turning point where the outbreak affected the Trust less 
markedly on site A and had largely resolved on site B.  
6.3.8.3 Second-Order Findings 
6.3.8.4 Collective Mind 
There is evidence of the three elements of the conceptualisation of the collective mind at this 
stage of the outbreak: contributions; representation; and subordination.  Contributions are 
evident from key individuals in the system; the new leader, the critical clinician coordinators 
and specialist clinical contributors.  In particular, the early contributions of the new leader 
were perceived by participants as a defining point in the outbreak.  The DCS was perceived 
to have contributed by shifting the mindset, from one of managers focusing on hospital 
capacity and experts deferring to authority to one where managers took advantage of 
shifting locations of expertise and experts focused on patient safety. This was achieved by 
delegating leadership and engaging the clinical experts, one of the five features of mindful 
organising.(55)  It may be that decision making had become more tangible at this stage, as a 
result of previous discussions and that participants ascribed to the leader the greater 
simplification and clarity of decision making as a retrospective reframing process, to form a 
new identify as a collective team managing the outbreak together. 
The role of representation, or greater interconnectedness within the system was recognised 
by participants in this phase.  The leader’s role was critical in creating a shared value set, 
‘safety first, keep it simple, stop the rot and then get going’ and drawing on a shared 
cognitive reservoir (simple, evidence-based thinking) to create temporal interconnectedness 
with which to frame the proposed actions to engender organisation-wide support.  This 
evidence of heedful interrelating created greater capacity to make sense of the outbreak as it 
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unfolded.   The successful engagement of the disparate surgical groups through these 
approaches led to the surgeons appreciating the interrelatedness of their actions on others 
in the system (subordination).  The role of a key clinician coordinator as self-designated 
chairperson was critical in engaging different groups of surgeons, as he describes: 
134 - for example, the decision is unpopular to stop orthopaedic admissions or do something 
different, you then have to go and talk to the orthopaedic surgeons and tell them this is what 
it is and tough tits. 
As a result of these series of conversations, the surgeons halted all but the critically urgent 
elective work and focused on the outbreak which was an important element in the rapid 
resolution of the outbreak, as the DCS explained: 
127 - By comparison other hospitals around us were stuck in it.  And then we became the 
hospital group that supported the others because they kept piling the work in.  They kept 
adding to the problem.....And they just didn’t stop and clean out, clear out. 
The greater interrelation between these previously disparate groups in the system, 
contributed to a more comprehensive collective mind, which served to create greater shared 
understanding of the complexities of the outbreak and support a swifter conclusion to the 
outbreak.  
Collective efficacy was a contributing feature of the enhanced collective mind in this phase.  
The new shared understanding of the outbreak led to increasing shared confidence that all 
the teams involved would be able to organise and action the changes that were required to 
resolve the outbreak.  All the available emotional and behavioural resources were utilised in 
addressing the outbreak as described by two participants: 
143 - I remember sitting here but I remember thinking, we’ve got a team here that can 
manage this, do you know what I mean? 
136 - I do remember thinking that it was, when we’re tested it’s, people really step up, and 
they did communicate and they did thank staff and there wasn’t a sense of panic and, oh, 
God we’ve got to do this and we must reach the target, I didn’t feel that pressure, for a 
change, it was certainly, it was very much about, this is what, this is our focus, let’s not lose 
sight of that, but just tell us what you need and we’ll give it to you. 
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This efficacy supports the loosening of control to move decision making and problem solving 
to those who have the greatest expertise.  Additional factors that contributed to collective 
efficacy in this phase included having positive leadership with a clear vision, shared 
strategies based on a shared value set, expertise-driven decision making, multidisciplinary 
co-ordination (with disparate groups included) and a highly skilled, senior, competent group 
of clinicians and managers supporting the process. (258;259)  These factors encouraged 
positive adjustment from individuals to become more confident of their problem solving 
capabilities, encouraging a positive cyclical process that enabled the group to overcome the 
challenges they faced to conclude the outbreak.(118) 
A further element that contributed to organisation’s competence and increased the 
‘conceptual slack’(148)  in the Trust was the conceptual openness that was exhibited at this 
stage.  There was a willingness to ask questions to bring focus to the problem, bring diverse 
analytical perspectives to the table in the form of clinical experts and specialists and 
encourage respectful interaction between previously disparate clinical groups.  This 
openness contributed to the creation of conceptual slack and relational redundancy(131) that 
enabled more attention to be paid to organising the outbreak response and activated 
relational networks, in place of addressing relational problems that had existed previously. 
6.3.9 Phase 5 
6.3.9.1 First Order Findings  
6.3.9.2 Rapid Recovery 
The outbreak concluded on 24th February on site A, which was hit the hardest with Norovirus 
and on 12th February on site B.  Despite the outbreak, the Trust managed to meet all its 
performance targets at the end of the financial year in March 2007 although there was 
tension between the emergency and elective sides of the organisation about achieving 
recovery, as described by a Clinical Director: 
133 - In the recovery phase there was clearly the tension of the emergency axis of the 
hospital saying, ‘oh let’s just slow down on the elective stuff, we’re not comfortable with this 
yet’, and the elective side of the organisation saying, ‘look we’re losing hundreds and 
hundreds of cases a day, this does seem to be dying down, we’ve got to bite the bullet’.  And 
interestingly there were some similar discussions happened last year with the snow, so this 
kicking back into action is quite a delicate decision because different people have different 
agendas and it does need somebody probably to arbitrate at executive level, I think. 
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This reflection demonstrates a key issue, the tradeoff between safety and performance 
within the organisation which is a contributory factor to organisational resilience.  The social 
sensemaking process that underpinned the decision making around this trade off involved 
different individuals with different agendas attempting to communicate their interpretation of 
prior events to influence future action.   
With the aim of concluding the outbreak formally, a report was produced dated 20 March 
2012 which was reviewed by the Trust Infection Prevention and Control Committee.  The 
report contained a summary of learning points and recommendations which included an 
action plan to be activated if a transmissible infectious agent were to threaten the Trust in 
the future.  Recommendations included the formation of a high level, small lead team and 
reinforcement of the clinician’s role in patient assessment.  A formal management response 
to the recommendations dated 16 April 2007, in the form of an action plan, was presented at 
the Trust Executive meeting for consideration and approval and was considered by 
interviewees to have informed more formalised future planning. 
However, to achieve a rapid recovery, some of the discussion and learning around the 
incident appeared to be lost to front-line operational staff:  
71 - I remember that we were going to be told that they were going to write up a quick paper 
that they’ll send to us and we would have the chance to formally respond to that, but I don’t 
think that ever happened actually, I don’t remember it happening.....unfortunately I got the 
feeling, because they kept on saying they would share it with us, but that communication 
seemed to fall down as well, so it seemed to be about very few people being involved in 
lessons learnt and it seemed to be an incredibly, almost quite an abstract exercise. 
75 - I think there was from a corporate level a document that was meant to, because I think 
afterwards you did do your lessons learnt, and what could we have done differently?  And I 
think something was drafted, but I’m not sure where it ever got. 
More positively, relational networks that were created as a result of the outbreak for a 
functional purpose were maintained after the outbreak.  This suggests that these 
relationships were built on solid foundations of trust, as described by one nurse: 
75 - Again I think the whole Trust really did pull together, I found someone the other day in 
estates, and the reason that he is such a good colleague is because of this outbreak, at the 
time, it was only a minor point but estates had an A3 colour copier and an A3 laminator, and 
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we needed signs producing, and we just, they did it all for us, they helped us, they went 
round, the built boards to go outside each of the wards, and they were here till ten at night as 
well.  And I think everybody just seemed to pull together, and those relationships you built up 
then are obviously still there, and that’s really good. 
6.3.9.3 Second-Order Findings 
6.3.9.4 Organisational Learning and Enactment 
Organisational resilience is affected by an effective trade-off between safety and 
performance, as occurred at the end of the outbreak.  The sensemaking process that 
resulted in the ‘delicate decision’ (133) involved the development of alternative cognitive 
mindsets between different actors with different agendas, which were reflected in the 
different options presented by the Clinical Director.  The balance of these options rested in 
part on the articulation of the two main occupational groups; physicians and surgeons which 
were characterised by symbolic and identity issues.(135)  The surgical perspective was the 
loss of hundreds of cases per day which affected their commitment to individual patient care 
and reduced organisational performance and the physician perspective which was the 
discomfort from increasing elective work before the outbreak had been resolved fully.  The 
need for an executive arbitrator between these occupational groups reflected the strength of 
identity issues resulting from these trade-offs. 
Organisational learning can be understood as ‘the revision of response repertoires in ways 
that improve organisational performance.’ (26)p846 From an organisational learning 
perspective, this phase of the outbreak was characterised by two distinct types of 
organisational learning as described by Christianson et al; learning from an unexpected 
event (similar to the concept of deliberate learning(46)and learning through an unexpected 
event.(26)  
Learning from this outbreak occurred at a high level in the organisation with few front-line 
staff involved and poor communication of the lessons learnt.  The process was formulaic, 
involving a written report and a management written response in the form of an action plan. 
This type of deliberate learning attempts to codify the tacit knowledge that was learnt from 
the outbreak.  The risks implicit in this process are over-simplification of learning and over-
emphasis on processes that were relevant to success.  The codification occurred through 
formal reports and action plans which were perceived by front-line staff to be an abstract 
exercise as it failed to capture the learning through the outbreak which they felt to be more 
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important.  In contrast, front-line staff described their multiple areas of learning from the 
outbreak as experiential; they had learnt through the event as it unfolded and the lessons 
that they identified were lessons that they would put into practice after the event.  Examples 
of learning ‘through’ the outbreak were lessons that had been learnt from risks, problems 
and challenges that occurred throughout the outbreak.  These lessons were exhibited in the 
organisation in a practical way, as described in the following example which relates to 
clinicians reviewing and changing their ward layout to minimise the infection risk: 
127 - I think the other bit that lots of colleagues did, coming back to me now, is look at ward 
layout, look at space between beds and the fantastic thing was you didn’t have to say 
anything to people, just through the learning, people started to come through and say 
themselves, we’re taking a bed out there. 
From a sensemaking perspective, the collective efficacy that was evidenced at the later 
stages of the outbreak appeared to support quicker and more skilful organising that 
facilitated rapid recovery at the end of the outbreak.  A clinician describes this effect on the 
rapid routinisation of outbreak-related activities: 
128 - I think a lot of the sort of very rapidly put together policies at the time basically became 
written in stone.  There was, with relatively little review, I think it’s fair to say.  So they 
possibly are not the most ideal way of doing things, but that’s what happened. 
There was evidence of ‘enacted salience’ during this outbreak, a process which focuses on 
the specific and unique features of a rare event and provides opportunities for unique 
sensemaking and sensegiving.  In this case the scale, impact and organisational attention 
allocated to this outbreak made it unique and led to subsequent unexpected events 
appearing more routinised as reflected on in relation to subsequent events: 
133 - And we haven’t had anything quite so intensive subsequently.  For all the pandemic flu 
planning or last year’s norovirus or the snow, no there’s nothing that subsequently is, seems 
quite so much on the same scale. 
A linked issue is that described by Christianson et al, who explain that ‘when learning occurs 
through rare events, the nature and magnitude of the learning may not be apparent until 
subsequent rare events.’(26)p857  This was true of the Norovirus outbreak, where all the 
learning related to organising and managing an unexpected event, was subsequently 
codified into emergency planning documentation, including command and control guidance.  
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Participants noted that this contributed to the improved management of future incidents, 
such as heavy snowfall, pandemic flu planning and subsequent Norovirus outbreaks. 
Organisational learning continued into the next phase of the outbreak, but transitioned from 
the immediate learning that contributed to a rapid recovery, such as balancing safety and 
performance or minimising infection risks on wards to longer term and more reliable 
integration of learning into new organisational routines.   
6.3.10 Phase 6 
6.3.10.1 First Order Findings 
6.3.10.2 New Routines 
After the outbreak, learning from the outbreak influenced people’s cognition, behaviour and 
practice in ways that served to strengthen and improve existing organisational routines.  
These three types of learning will be described in more detail in this section.  Cognitive 
learning included the revision of cognitive cues to improve individuals’ ability to identify, 
assimilate and act on problems.  Behavioural learning resulted from crisis-induced pressure 
on individuals to try out new behavioural approaches and then incorporate these new 
behaviours into future practice.  Practice learning involved individuals or groups adapting or 
renewing existing practices in the light of learning from the outbreak. 
From a cognitive perspective, participants noted that paying increased attention to infection 
control as a result of the outbreak encouraged broader attention to all aspects of patient 
safety.  Increased organisational awareness was evident to potential patient safety risks, 
such as patient pathways through the hospital, consistency in clinical processes and areas 
of potential harm.  A further cognitive change was the use of lower trigger points for the 
creation of mini taskforces to deal with a particular incident or event.  These trigger points 
were cognitive markers of improved sensemaking and reflected more effective noticing, 
bracketing and acting on clinical or organisational anomalies.   This cognitive change was 
supported by improved information, as reported by one participant: 
137 - Our daily SITREP [situation report] now reflects where we’ve got areas that are closed 
or potential D&V. 
Greater cognitive awareness was evident in the recognition of needing to build slack into the 
system, to ensure adequate redundancy for rapid response to an unexpected event: 
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127 - Well that it’s knowing that you have to have surplus capacity to make sure that things 
aren’t queuing and stacking and probably to make sure that the place isn’t over heating so 
much that you’re starting to spread infection. 
In addition to cognitive learning, behavioural learning opportunities were identified from the 
outbreak.  A Director reflected that: 
134 - It was a very good learning point for me actually, how the hospital works or didn’t work 
and how you can get control of something relatively quickly if you involve a few crucial 
people and make some simple, clear decisions, that you only go and meet once a day and 
then only a few people are going to be there and they’ve got specific tasks and they’re given 
enough support. 
Similarly, several leaders reported on behavioural changes based on prior experience from 
the outbreak.  A key behavioural change was the use of segregation of infected and non-
infected patients and staff into the infected and non-infected areas, which had continued 
after the outbreak in one area of the hospital.  Participants were confident that this 
behavioural approach could be reinstated rapidly, should circumstances warrant this: 
66 – They [A&E] did a lot of clinical, they had interesting approaches in trying to segregate 
patients known to be uninfected, from those who might be.  So that was really good.  And I 
don’t know whether they do that on a daily basis, but I think they’d be able to do that at the 
drop of a hat now, because they did it back then. 
Practice changes also resulted from learning lessons from the outbreak.   A significant 
change was making previously vague routines much more rigorous and disciplined.  One 
example was bringing consistency to the Infection Prevention and Control approach which 
had been perceived as reactive prior to the outbreak.  This meant ensuring all the team, 
including any infection control nurse would take the same approach, based on a new 
formality about work routines. (75)  One frequently quoted practice change was the 
introduction of clear policies that provided organisational assurance.  The introduction of 
Bristol stool chart, as an objective measure of stool sample consistency across the hospital 
was a key example: 
71 - Now it’s standard practice that patients who are showing signs will be put on a Bristol 
stool chart, so you’ve got a far more objective tool, for example, to help make that decision. 
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A further example was ensuring much more rigorous practice on bed closures and isolation 
rooms: 
71 - it’s gained a much higher priority and we are, as I said before, far more rigorous about 
making sure that where we can patients go into isolation rooms, close the beds at a very 
early stage for a predetermined time 
Innovative developments were introduced to support these practice changes, for example, 
visual templates of ward layouts that had been created at the time of the outbreak continued 
to be used for individual ward outbreaks. (75) 
6.3.10.3 Second Order Findings 
6.3.10.4 Restructuring of habitual routines and practice 
An unexpected event is a ‘brutal audit’(55) of resilience as it disrupts organisational routines 
and exposes the strengths and weaknesses of the organisation.(26)  From a cognitive 
perspective, those affected can ‘see more clearly what was already underway, what they 
had been learning and the limits of their previous comprehension.’(26) p857 Issues of 
organisational identity, culture and capabilities are exposed and questioned.  The benefit of 
this process is that it can raise awareness of problems and potential, leading to insights and 
learning across the organisation about how routines might be improved.  If these insights are 
acted upon, then existing routines can be made more reliable and expertise that existed 
informally can be converted into routines to reduce misunderstandings.  This process has 
been described as ‘restructuring’ where old routines that were perceived to be inadequate 
are reorganised or updated, taking into account learning from the unexpected event.(26)   
Participants in the Norovirus outbreak described many examples of ‘restructuring.’  One set 
of improvements related to formalising many informal routines, such as the introduction of 
the Bristol stool chart, designation of infected and non-infected areas in certain units and 
greater rigour in ensuring bed closures and use of isolation rooms.  A further set of 
improvements related to how an unexpected event would be managed and organised, taking 
learning from this event into planning for future events.  Participants described the 
documentation of a command and control structure for future unexpected events, an 
emergency response committee formed with appropriate people, the development of an 
emergency planning team, improved centralised and real-time communication mechanisms, 
including use of the intranet and central emails, the introduction of policies for standardised 
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and structured responses to events and the development of redundancy through building 
slack into the system: 
71 - I think terms of communication are better, because now when we have diarrhoea we 
have these policies in place, where we’re more likely to be informed straightaway and we 
have more of a structured response, using things like Bristol stool charts to help inform that 
decision. 
Participants reflected that these approaches had assisted with more recent audits of 
resilience, such as coping with severe snowfall and pandemic flu planning.   
Underpinning these explicit actions was the experiential learning that had been gained and 
provided an organisational memory for how to manage such an event again.  One element 
of the experiential learning was based on improved organisational networks, the 
development of trust and relationships strengthened through a crisis situation.  Another 
element was based on increased alertness to patient safety risks and recognition of the need 
for prompt action should an anomaly arise.  These implicit functions reflected increased 
sensemaking (increased awareness and bracketing of anomalies) and improved sensegiving 
(more effective, coordinated responses and information provision) to prevent distributed 
sensemaking and were described by one participant as a ‘sleeping network’, a set of 
powerful informal structures and relationships that lay dormant until they were required for 
another unexpected event.  However, the network was potentially threatened by pivotal 
participants leaving the organisation for other jobs, creating a gap in the network and 
organisational memory that was irreplaceable. 
To summarise, a series of restructuring activities were identified by participants, some 
relating to explicit activities, such as the introduction of new policies, guidance and teams 
and others relating to implicit improvements, to sensemaking and sensegiving capabilities, 
such as improved relational networks and greater awareness of anomalies and how to act 
on them, based on experiential learning through events. 
6.3.11 Discussion 
In this research study, I adopted a sensemaking lens to understand the often contradictory 
and complex events that occurred during an unexpected infection outbreak in a large 
healthcare organisation.  I will assess this case study against the preliminary organisational 
resilience framework based on a sensemaking perspective (Table 6.1) that I originally 
proposed which reflected the polarised perspectives on sensemaking in the literature.  I will 
162 
 
reference the gaps in the sensemaking literature that I described to understand the different 
types of sensemaking throughout the unexpected event and to explore the dynamic 
interactions at micro and meso-level and conclude by reflecting on the implications for 
organisational resilience in practice. 
This research examined the sensemaking strategies adopted by the ‘middle of the road’ 
case study organisation reacting to an unexpected and high impact event.  Many 
organisations may fall into this category(260), yet there is little literature that describes the 
effect of an unexpected event on their performance.  This study attempts to fill this gap, 
providing a perspective on the multi-faceted and complex sensemaking and sensegiving 
strategies that are enacted throughout the event. 
6.3.11.1 Intermediate Resilience 
My main theoretical contribution is to identify a concept of ‘intermediate’ resilience which is 
positioned between the low and high levels of organisational resilience set out in Table 6.7.   
In Table 6.7, I define the sensemaking characteristics associated with the concept of 
intermediate resilience.   
Table 6.7  Organisational resilience framework from a sensemaking perspective 
Level of 
organisational 
resilience 
Cultural  Mindset Cognition 
Conation 
(Behavioural 
commitment) 
Displayed behaviours Organisation 
performance 
Low (resistant 
behaviours) 
Entrapment: 
Blind spots 
Justifications 
Rationalisation 
Optimistic Strong 
Concealment 
Distrust 
Failure to learn  
Dogmatic 
Collapse/ 
Failure 
Intermediate 
(resilient and 
resistant 
practices) 
Sub-cultures:  
Warring factions 
Temporary cultural 
cohesion  
Common purpose 
Pragmatic Varied 
Caution/Confidence 
Initial Distrust/ 
Developing Trust 
Experiential Learning 
Stoicism 
 
Improvement or 
Decline 
High (resilient 
behaviours) 
Collective mind: 
Heedful 
interrelating 
Mindful attention 
Social interaction 
 
Precautionary  Weak 
Openness 
Swift Trust  
Accelerated Learning  
Skeptical 
 
Reliable/ 
Failure-free  
163 
 
Depending on how an unexpected event unfolds, intermediate resilience will operate in one 
of two ways.  Either organisational resilience will prevail to resolve the event satisfactorily 
and organisational performance will improve or resistant practices will predominate and 
organisational performance will deteriorate, leading to organisational decline.  The cultural 
mindset that is evident in the intermediate resilience scenario is one of sub-cultures, where 
in the context of routine practice, the predominant attitudes, behaviours and beliefs would 
favour the sub-grouping over the whole organisation.  In the context of an unexpected event, 
the disruption to routines might either create further defensiveness within the sub-culture, 
with more entrenched resistant behaviours or a willingness to put aside territorial and 
professional divisions and create temporary cultural cohesion for the common good.  At 
organisational level, cognition is pragmatic, as the sub-cultures favour the approach that 
supports their interests and leads to the most effective resolution of the problem.  Conation 
is varied, as there is weak behavioural commitment demonstrated by those individuals or 
teams willing to adapt and flex to new approaches and practices required in response to the 
event, or strong behavioural commitment demonstrated by individuals who are unwilling to 
depart from existing routines and justifications, which support high autonomy and choice.(18)   
Conation is varied as displayed behaviours can alternate between caution and confidence 
and from initial distrust to developing trust.  Learning is often experiential, as poorly 
developed routines are tested, revised and restructured and cognition develops towards an 
improved state of alertness.  Ultimately the response tends to be stoic, based on recognition 
of the need to deal with an unexpected event with fortitude and resolutely address problems 
as they occur, until the event is resolved.   
More recent resilience literature proposes that commitment to resilience is a principle of high 
reliability organising.(55)  Through this framework, I suggest a more nuanced argument on 
the basis that resilient practices are common to all organisations, including those 
demonstrating intermediate levels of performance.  Even in failing organisations, there may 
be individuals, teams or departments that are engaged in resilient practice, despite a 
prevailing resistant organisational culture.  This commitment to resilience, through the 
adoption of workarounds and reduction of errors, may be all the greater in a lower reliability 
organisation because organisational systems are unreliable and teams are blasé about 
errors.  However, there is usually a finite level of coping resources, even with the most 
adaptable teams and flexible individuals, if the underlying organisational support 
mechanisms are not in place to maintain overall resilient practice.(128;261)  In the context of 
an unexpected event, there may be sufficient commitment to resilience at individual or team 
level, even in an organisation that demonstrates lower meso-level resilience, to encourage 
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overall micro-level commitment to resilience for the duration of the event.  An unexpected 
event can act as a catalyst for a reassessment of the appropriateness of existing behaviours 
and practices, with the potential for a rapid, if temporary cultural shift towards more resilient, 
collective behaviours. 
This framework contributes to organisational resilience and sensemaking literatures by 
providing a mechanism for assessing the spectrum of organisational resilience function.  The 
majority of the literature focuses on high reliability, high resilience or failing, low resilience 
organisations.   Although healthcare organisations exist that are judged to be systemic 
failures, the most recent example being Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, reviewed 
through a Public Inquiry(262), the majority of healthcare organisations fall between the 
polarised ends of the spectrum that the sensemaking and resilience literature focuses on.  
By developing a framework that reflects these polarised ends of the spectrum, I am able to 
define the nature of sensemaking and resilience in this middle ground. 
6.3.11.2 Evidence for intermediate resilience in the case study 
In my case study, I found that intermediate resilience described a scenario of resilient and 
resistant practices co-existing during an unexpected event which is described in Figure 6.3.  
Organisational performance in this scenario was understood to be the throughput of patients 
in the hospital (linked to various national targets such as time in the Accident and 
Emergency department) in a safe environment.   
In Figure 6.3, I present a visual representation of intermediate resilience enacted through the 
case study organisation, highlighting the links with organisational performance.  I propose 
that intermediate resilience is a dynamic concept, as levels of resilience fluctuate throughout 
the organisation’s response to the unexpected event, as is evident on this diagram.   
In Phase 1, the pre-outbreak phase of routine practice, there is a mixed picture of resilience.  
I noted slight performance improvement against national and local targets, but micro-cultures 
predominating, with a reliance on habitual routines and tacit systems.  In Phase 2, although 
embedded sensemaking and rapid sensegiving was evident amongst a small group of 
physicians in the early stages of the outbreak, the majority of staff continued in habitual 
routines which may have caused viral spread and exacerbated the outbreak. 
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Figure 6.3 Diagram showing intermediate resilience enacted in case study hospital 
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This performance deterioration continued into Phase 3, where distributed sensemaking (with 
resistant behaviours) was evident. The introduction of a new leader who deferred to 
expertise resulting in the altered behaviours of some surgical groups (Phase 4) was required 
to shift the cultural mindset towards a common purpose.  This resulted in resilient behaviours 
predominating over resistant behaviours and whilst organisational performance, as defined 
by throughput of patients, had not recovered at this stage, strenuous efforts were made to 
free wards of Norovirus so that during Phase 5, the recovery phase, elective patients could 
be admitted again.  The outcome for organisational performance (Phase 6), in addition to 
managing to meet organisational targets for elective work by the end of the financial year, 
was performance improvement in across the organisation, leading to improved practice, 
behaviours and cognition resulting from organisational learning from the outbreak. 
6.3.11.3 Sensemaking and Sensegiving:  Dynamic Progression  
From a sensemaking perspective, a key finding from this research is that sensemaking and 
sensegiving strategies have a dynamic progression through an unexpected event which 
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impacts on the level of organisational resilience exhibited.  Sensemaking and sensegiving 
are dynamic processes within and between individuals and these contribute to a range of 
adaptive responses at organisational level.  Within the case study organisation, the following 
dynamic progression was noted prior to, during and post the outbreak: habitual routines, 
embedded sensemaking and rapid sensegiving, distributed sensemaking, collective 
sensemaking, organisational learning and enactment and restructured routines.  The 
sensemaking literature has focused on static sensemaking, see Appendix B, but this 
research suggests that sensemaking is interactive and progressive, in response to 
unexpected events.  Another feature of sensemaking was the crucial turning point during this 
progression, which signalled a change from distributed sensemaking to collective 
sensemaking and ensured the rapid resolution of the outbreak.  This occurred as a result of 
the commencement of a new leader who deferred to clinical expertise and persuaded certain 
surgical groups to stop all but critical elective surgery and focus on the outbreak, in contrast 
to the approach of other local hospitals who continued elective admissions, resulting in 
longer duration outbreaks.  Reaching this tipping point was a critical element in achieving 
positive adaptive responses over negative adaptive responses.  This was in contrast to the 
BRI study where despite whistle blowing and concerns raised by staff, the questionable 
clinical work continued, endangering patient safety.(18)  The turning point was driven by 
surgical constituencies deciding that the focus on their own patients had to be subsumed to 
the collective responsibility for patient safety across the whole organisation.   The emergent 
crisis leadership, development of swift trust and the ability to overcome silo mentality that 
characterised this tipping point were critical to reaching a resilient outcome, rather than a 
tragic outcome as in the BRI study.  This research suggests that during unexpected events, 
there needs to be awareness of the interrelationships between key constituencies in 
complex healthcare organisations and the influences on the delicate balance between 
resilient and resistant behaviours, in order to achieve a resilient outcome. 
6.3.12 Conclusion.  My contribution to the study of organisational resilience: the case 
of infection prevention and control 
In conclusion, my primary contribution is to have developed the literature in a modest way by 
adding an intermediate resilience category.   This category addresses a gap in the resilience 
and sensemaking literature which focuses on polarised positions of high resilience, high 
reliability organisations and low resilience, failing organisations.  I found in my case study 
analysis that intermediate resilience comprised a range of resilient and resistant behaviours 
and practices that could have led to an improvement or decline in performance. I drew on my 
empirical study to develop the category using sensemaking characteristics to define the 
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elements of culture, cognition, conation and pragmatic and experiential displayed 
behaviours.  To develop this category further and to understand more about the turning 
points that encourage a transition towards a resilient approach from a resistant approach, 
further research in other healthcare settings would be valuable. 
A further contribution is my use of an in-depth qualitative case study which enabled an 
intensive study of a specific case.  Whilst in-depth case studies exist in this 
field(18;19;26;192;263), the majority use secondary data sources which limit the exploration 
of cognition and behaviour which is essential for the development of sensemaking theory.  I 
used primary data sources, in the form of in-depth interviews and utilised two different 
qualitative techniques; qualitative content analysis and thematic analysis to ensure a robust 
and thorough micro-analysis of cognition and behaviour that was essential to inform the 
meso-level theoretical development of the study.   
A further contribution is the application of a social science approach to the novel arena of 
infection prevention and control.  I used sensemaking theory to develop my understanding of 
organisational resilience and found it helpful in explaining what I saw.  I found that using the 
sensemaking approaches (Appendix B) to study resilience throughout an unexpected event, 
facilitated the identification of resilient and resistant practices in the organisation and the 
micro-level behaviours that constituted these practices.  I was able to identify a dynamic 
progression of sensemaking which involved different types of sensemaking occurring at 
different points in the course of an unexpected event.  These dynamic changes reflected 
shifts towards resistant or resilient behaviours.  This contribution responds to a gap in the 
literature for complex, interactive sensemaking, as the focus to date has either been on 
static sensemaking or the adoption of one type of sensemaking to understand a particular 
event as described in Appendix B.   
If someone was commissioning research, a sensemaking theory, case-based approach 
should be included.  Using sensemaking theory to understand organisational resilience 
provided a much greater degree of insight at micro and meso-level than is evident in many of 
the empirical studies of resilience that use alternative techniques.(56;57) 
Finally, from a practitioner perspective, I have mapped the stages of an unexpected event 
and identified practical strategies that were used to manage an unexpected infection event 
that enabled a transition from resistant to resilient behaviours.  In particular, I have 
highlighted the need for awareness of the interrelationships between key constituencies in 
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complex healthcare organisations during unexpected events and an appreciation of the 
factors that influence the delicate balance between resilient and resistant behaviours. 
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7  Chapter 7.  Design and Development of Organisational 
Resilience Questionnaire  
7.1 Introduction 
The final two theoretical and empirical chapters, Chapters 7 & 8 are linked chapters.  
Chapter 7 describes the design and development of an organisational resilience 
questionnaire and Chapter 8 derives a revised organisational resilience questionnaire from 
the survey analysis based on the use of the measure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The previous chapters have examined the importance of organisational resilience and the 
need to study organisational resilience factors in acute healthcare.  The resilience case 
study in Chapter 6 shed light on the stages of an unexpected event and examined in detail, 
the organisational resilience dimensions that were associated with each of these stages of 
an unexpected event.  In addition, it laid the foundation for the development of a measure of 
organisational resilience.  As discussed in Chapter 3, many organisational resilience 
dimensions are cited in the literature and reflect a variety of cognitive, behavioural and 
systemic approaches.  However, simply exploring these dimensions in qualitative empirical 
studies may not provide generalisability of findings to all healthcare institutions or adequate 
assessment of each dimension in that context.   
The reason for developing the questionnaire was that there were very few tools in the 
literature to measure organisational resilience.  Resilience tools that do exist(55;147) focus 
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on the impact of continuous stressors rather than unexpected events. The nature of this 
research is exploratory as no measures of organisational resilience in the context of an 
unexpected event exist, so prior hypotheses have not been developed or tested. This 
chapter addresses these shortfalls through the design and development of an organisational 
resilience questionnaire.  The following chapter, Chapter 8, examines the conduct of the 
survey, presents the analysis of data and applies the findings to a revised organisational 
resilience questionnaire.  The stages of work for the design and development of the 
questionnaire to test organisational resilience in the management of an unexpected hospital 
infection event are described in the table below: 
Table 7.1  Stages of Design and Development for questionnaire 
Stage 1 
 
Amalgamating two resilience frameworks from qualitative 
case study 
Stage 2 
 
Inductive identification of chronological themes from the 
frameworks 
Stage 3 Questionnaire design using chronological themes and 
resilient frameworks  
Stage 4 
 
Pilot testing questionnaire 
 
7.2 Stage 1: Amalgamating two resilience frameworks 
I analysed the interviews from the case study review of a Norovirus outbreak outlined in 
Chapter 6 using in-depth qualitative content analysis against two separate frameworks.  The 
first framework is Weick and Sutcliffe’s framework for resilient performance (reported in 
Chapter 6), which has a cognitive/behavioural focus which emphasises sensemaking – see 
Table 7.2.  This framework contains two sets of criteria; the factors that support resilient 
practice and those factors that reflect resistant practices.  The second framework was 
developed from the resilient engineering literature, specifically identifying socio-technical 
factors associated with the erosion of resilience(99) and factors associated with the 
development of resilience(247) – see Table 7.3.  This framework places greater emphasis 
on organisational differentials, such as leadership and communication and trade-offs, such 
as that between performance and safety.   
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Both frameworks contain overlapping elements, but reflect the different foci of organisational 
theory (Weick and Sutcliffe) and resilient engineering (Woods, Hale and Heijer).  For 
example, flexibility is used in both frameworks, but for Weick and Sutcliffe, flexibility relates 
to local actors willingness to assume virtual roles and engage in bricolage whereas for Hale 
and Heijer, flexibility relates to the adaptive capacity of systems and the propensity for 
human work to adopt workarounds or shortcuts.   The second framework will be discussed in 
more detail as it is not the subject of preceding chapters. 
The second framework (Woods, Hale and Heijer) derives from two lists of factors from the 
resilient engineering literature which were chosen as they outlined opposing approaches that 
either eroded or promoted resilient functioning.   The first set of factors (Woods) relate to an 
erosion of resilience and were derived from an analysis of the NASA investigation report that 
identified the organisational factors that led to a series of space mission mishaps;  
 changing environment 
 increasing performance demands 
 reduced resources 
 new organisational structures 
 heightened public and political awareness 
 breakdowns in inter-group communications 
 cutting costs. 
Woods’ factors underpinned a fundamental sacrificing decision between performance and 
safety considerations as NASA was under pressure from stakeholders to reduce costs and 
schedules and improve production outputs. (99)  The report found that these factors resulted 
in a brittle system that demonstrated increased vulnerabilities and safety conflicts.  These 
factors created an organisation that was less resilient and more likely to fail. 
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Table 7.2  Resilient and resistant practices during the management of an organisation-wide Norovirus outbreak 2007 
Framework from Weick, K and Sutcliffe, 
K. Managing the unexpected: resilient 
performance in an age of uncertainty. 
Jossey-Bass; 2007 
Resilient Practices Resistant Practices 
Capacity to anticipate 
unexpected events 
Capacity to contain 
unexpected events 
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Director 3 1 11 34 14 63 0 0 0 4 0 4 
Director - Clinical 2 5 2 16 6 31 2 6 1 0 3 12 
Clinical Director 4 5 25 45 11 90 1 3 5 10 0 19 
Consultant Medicine 2 1 8 25 15 51 9 3 11 12 4 39 
Consultant A&E 9 3 10 21 6 49 2 1 2 7 1 13 
Nurse Manager 2 0 11 20 4 37 0 1 2 1 0 4 
Nurse Manager 1 5 12 28 0 46 4 3 3 10 4 24 
Nurse Manager 4 1 11 22 6 44 4 4 9 1 2 20 
Senior IPC Nurse 21 6 8 15 4 54 0 3 5 13 11 32 
Senior IPC Nurse 23 0 25 22 4 74 3 3 4 7 5 22 
Clinical Manager 11 0 19 18 5 53 9 0 3 1 3 16 
Manager 1 3 16 26 7 53 2 1 2 4 5 14 
Nurse Manager 3 1 11 30 3 48 2 0 0 4 3 9 
Nurse Manager 4 3 14 17 4 42 0 0 2 0 3 5 
Manager - Beds 7 4 35 19 11 76 2 2 19 15 0 38 
Manager - Facilities 6 1 10 8 4 29 1 0 2 6 0 9 
Manager 6 3 19 30 10 68 0 4 13 19 7 43 
Manager 6 1 11 22 8 48 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Manager 0 3 8 10 0 21 2 0 3 3 0 8 
TOTAL 115 46 266 428 122 977 44 34 87 117 51 333 
Resilient practices: red/amber=low resilience (0-5), yellow=moderate resilience (6-15), green =high resilience (≥16).  Resistant practices: green/yellow= low resistance (0-5), 
amber=moderate resistance (6-15), red = high resistance (≥16).
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Table 7.3  Development and Erosion of Resilience during the management of an organisation-wide Norovirus outbreak 2007 
 
Development of Resilience (Hale & Heijer) Erosion of Resilience (Woods)   
Framework from (Eds) 
Hollnagel, E., Woods, D.D., 
Leveson, L. Resilience 
Engineering.  Concepts and 
Precepts. Ashgate 
Publishing 2006. 
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Director 14 7 10 4 6 15 56 2 0 0 1 3 1 1 8 
Director - Clinical 1 5 2 2 5 14 29 0 0 0 2 10 1 4 17 
Clinical Director 6 15 13 7 7 29 77 4 3 0 7 6 10 0 30 
Consultant Medicine 1 6 13 5 9 12 46 0 3 6 16 9 0 7 41 
Consultant A&E 6 5 12 2 7 8 40 1 0 3 7 2 0 0 13 
Nurse Manager 3 8 7 4 8 4 34 0 0 0 4 9 1 3 17 
Nurse Manager 4 9 16 2 11 21 63 1 0 5 10 2 0 0 18 
Nurse Manager 3 1 4 1 7 19 35 5 0 0 12 8 0 1 26 
Senior IPC Nurse 6 0 3 7 1 12 29 6 0 0 7 1 5 3 22 
Senior IPC Nurse 14 3 5 2 7 15 46 1 0 1 3 1 1 0 7 
Clinical Manager 11 7 4 4 7 11 44 1 0 0 5 0 6 1 13 
Manager 10 9 3 4 13 15 54 0 2 1 0 8 0 3 14 
Nurse Manager 5 5 7 2 4 11 34 1 0 0 8 3 0 2 14 
Nurse Manager 5 9 2 4 1 23 44 0 0 0 2 0 3 1 6 
Manager - Beds 20 9 15 7 5 15 71 2 0 7 17 12 1 1 40 
Manager - Facilities 2 4 10 1 5 4 26 0 0 1 3 5 0 3 12 
Manager 0 6 8 5 4 22 45 0 1 5 19 16 14 3 58 
Manager 7 13 4 2 5 8 39 1 0 0 0 4 0 3 8 
Manager 4 1 3 0 4 7 19 6 0 0 5 3 0 0 14 
TOTAL 122 122 141 65 116 265 831 31 9 29 128 102 43 36 378 
(Resilient practices: red/amber=minimal development (0-5), yellow=moderate development (6-15), green =major development (≥16).  Resistant practices: green/yellow = minimal 
erosion (0-5), amber=moderate erosion (6-15), red = major erosion (≥16). 
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The second set of factors (Hale and Heijer) relate to the development of resilience in an 
organisation.  Organisational resilience is viewed as the ability to avert a disaster or major 
upset.(247)  Hale and Heijer suggest that by anticipating threats, an organisation should be 
able to recognise when it is close to an unsafe boundary and by coping with events using the 
characteristics detailed below, an organisation can adapt quickly to prevent what 
Rasmussen describes as a ‘drift to danger.’(264)  Characteristics that promote resilient 
function encompass: 
 Flexibility 
 Coping with unexpected and unplanned situations 
 Responding rapidly to events 
 Excellent communication 
 Mobilisation of resources to intervene at critical points 
 Ability to manage severe pressures and conflicts between safety and performance goals 
For this research, these two sets of factors were matched together to form a framework, for 
example, ‘breakdowns in inter-group communications’ was matched with ‘excellent 
communication’, ‘cutting costs’ and ‘reduced resources’ were matched to ‘mobilisation of 
resources to intervene at critical points.’  The resulting framework contained factors that 
eroded and developed resilience, against which the case study organisation could be 
assessed. 
The results of the qualitative content analysis using both frameworks (Table 7.2 and Table 
7.3) demonstrate that in the case study organisation there were examples of 
cognitive/behavioural and socio-technical characteristics in the same unexpected event.  In 
addition, there were examples of resistant and resilient practices as well as practices that 
eroded and developed resilience, with approximately two-thirds of practices falling into the 
positive categories in each framework.  To develop the resilient dimensions for the 
questionnaire, the most frequently occurring content categories from each framework were 
identified as resilience constructs to incorporate within the questionnaire. 
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7.3 Stage 2: Extracting chronological themes 
The qualitative statements that underpinned the content categories from the Weick and 
Sutcliffe and the Woods, Hale and Heijer frameworks were used to inductively map out a 
chronological sequence of events that assisted in defining stages of the outbreak and 
identifying the resilient dimensions (behavioural and systemic factors) that were linked to 
each stage.  These stages were reviewed with a psychologist to refine each stage of the 
infection outbreak and to confirm which dimensions constituted resilient practice within each 
stage.  This resulted in a five-stage format for the questionnaire which is described in more 
detail below.  The first stage (1) is routine practice pre-outbreak which can be described as 
the anticipatory or preparedness stage, stages 2,3 and 4 involve responding to the impact of 
an unexpected event and stage 5 involves recovering or readjusting to the impact of the 
event as illustrated in Figure 7.1. 
Figure 7.1  Five stages of management of an infection outbreak 
 
 
Stage 1 examined routine practice prior to the outbreak. As routine practice can reflect both 
the past experiences of the organisation and the existing performance of the 
organisation(78) it is essential to understand routine practice as a baseline for understanding 
the organisation’s response to the unexpected event.   Stages 2-4 reflect the sub-divisions 
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identified in the case study (Chapter 6) namely discovery, immediate management and 
ongoing management of the outbreak.  Stage 2 ‘discovery’ is conceived as a sensemaking 
stage, where rapid cognition, communication and action are critical in ensuring an effective 
response to the unexpected event.  Stage 3 ‘immediate management’ involves a set of 
system-focused actions to establish effective structures and systems to manage the 
response.  Stage 4 ‘ongoing management’ requires appropriate behaviours and systems to 
ensure sufficient organisational adaptation to the unexpected event.  Stage 5 deals with the 
aftermath of the outbreak, focusing specifically on organisational learning and parallels the 
recovery stage in the literature.  The use of these chronological stages in the questionnaire 
development was designed to assist respondents, as resilience dimensions reflected a 
logical sequence of likely stages within outbreak management. 
 
7.4 Stage 3: Designing Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was designed to reflect the chronological stages described in the previous 
section and to incorporate resilience-based statements into each stage; 
cognitive/behavioural statements from Weick and Sutcliffe’s behavioural framework(55) and 
system/structural statements from Woods(99),Hale and Heijer’s resilient engineering 
framework.(247)  This process ensured measures were reliable and valid as statements 
were related to models of organisational resilience and had face validity as statements 
reflected qualitative content from the case study.   The statements (items) for the survey 
were then designed through an iterative review process working between the literature and 
the full case study analysis (see Table 7.4) to ensure that the statements reflected both the 
practical empirical evidence of the case study and the resilience constructs within each 
theoretical framework.  This resulted in the development of a preliminary draft of the 
questionnaire over a period of four months.  A 5-point behavioural summary scale (Likert 
scale) that ranged from strongly disagree to strongly agree was employed.  Four reverse-
phrased items were included in three of the stages indicated as an ‘R’ in Table 7.4, to reduce 
response bias, as participants would be required to read the statements carefully when 
completing them. 
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Table 7.4  Questionnaire Design 
R = reverse-phrased items. Scores were inverted for the purpose of analysis. 
 
Stage of 
Unexpected 
Event 
Cognitive/ 
Behavioural 
Theory 
Statements (Items) Structural/ 
System 
Theory 
Statements (Items) 
Routine 
practice 
Situational 
awareness 
 
Imagined vs 
performed work 
Flexibility 
 Clinical teams were 
accountable for their 
infection performance 
 Infection policies were 
ignored in practice by 
clinical teams (R) 
 Ward staff were willing to 
implement new infection 
practices 
Dynamic 
stability (regular 
threat) 
Awareness/ 
Opacity 
 
Monitoring 
production 
pressures 
 Minor infection outbreaks 
were managed effectively 
 
 Monthly infection control 
data was provided to 
clinical areas 
 Performance targets for 
infection were used in 
clinical areas 
Discovery 
 
 
Sensemaking 
 
Sensegiving 
 
 
 
 
Operational 
communication 
Deference to 
expertise 
 
 The outbreak was 
identified within 48 hours 
 Staff understood the 
necessary measures to 
manage the outbreak 
within 36 hours of the 
outbreak being identified 
 The ward closure policy 
was clear to all staff 
 Clinical leaders were 
involved in decision 
making 
Inter-group 
communication/ 
responding 
rapidly 
Coping with the 
unexpected 
 The outbreak was 
escalated to Trust 
executive directors within 
48 hours  
 The significance of the 
outbreak was 
underestimated (R) 
Immediate 
Management 
 
 
Track failures 
 
Sensitivity to 
Operations 
Expert and 
informal 
networks 
 Information on cases was 
available daily 
 The isolation policy 
operated effectively 
  A clinical strategy for 
controlling the outbreak 
was implemented 
Flexible 
decision 
structures 
Mobilisation of 
resources 
 
 
 A clear structure was 
implemented to manage 
the outbreak 
 Bed capacity was created 
rapidly 
Ongoing 
Management 
 
 
Adaptation/ 
virtual roles 
Improvisation 
 
 
Leadership 
 
 
Rigour (case 
study) 
 
 Staff groups were willing 
to work flexibly 
 Innovative solutions were 
developed for unplanned 
problems 
 An effective leader took 
control of the outbreak 
 Outbreak-related policies 
were implemented 
rigorously 
Redundancy 
 
 
Trade offs 
(sacrificing 
decision) 
 
Inter-group 
communication 
 
Safety margins 
 
 Additional resources were 
made available when 
needed 
 The balance between 
patient safety and 
performance goals was 
achieved 
 Communication to clinical 
teams was haphazard 
during the outbreak (R) 
 The elective pathway was 
severely impacted by the 
outbreak 
Aftermath 
 
 
 
Organisational 
Learning 
 Learning from the 
outbreak informed future 
outbreak management 
Buffering 
capacity 
 
Reliability 
 The hospital Trust 
recovered rapidly 
 Policies resulting from the 
outbreak were 
implemented 
systematically 
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7.5 Stage 4: Piloting testing questionnaire 
Having designed a draft questionnaire, the next phase involved pilot testing the 
questionnaire.  A ‘talk through’ discussion of the content and phrasing of each statement on 
the questionnaire was carried out with infection experts including Directors of Infection 
Prevention and Control, infection control managers and senior infection control nurses.  
Individual items were amended to ensure consistent meaning for all respondents, to clarify 
poorly defined terms or phrases and to avoid asking multiple questions within one 
statement.(265)  The introductory wording at the top of the questionnaire was refined to 
ensure that participants recalled a major infection outbreak or incident that impacted on 
more than one ward or unit.  Participants were directed towards a Norovirus outbreak, major 
C.difficile or influenza outbreak as these would be likely to have an organisational-wide 
impact which was required to assess organisational resilience.  Pilot testing of the 
questionnaire occurred with individual doctors, nurses and managers and further refinement 
of the questionnaire was based on their feedback. 
7.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the questionnaire was developed through an inductive iterative process 
between two theoretical resilience frameworks from the organisational resilience literature 
and empirical evidence from a detailed case study of an unexpected event.  The 
questionnaire design was informed by chronological stages of an unexpected infection 
outbreak and associated resilience dimensions, which constituted each statement (item) on 
the questionnaire.  The draft questionnaire was refined through feedback from a 
psychologist and was ‘talked through’ and pilot tested with experienced infection control 
practitioners to ensure it had face validity. 
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8 Chapter 8.  Survey, analysis and findings of organisational 
resilience tool 
This study is the first test of the properties of the organisational resilience questionnaire 
(tool), the development and design of which was described in Chapter 7 and is found in 
Appendix F.  I will examine the factor structure of the questionnaire using principal 
components analysis (PCA) and the internal consistency of the structure using Cronbach’s 
Alpha and discuss the findings and their implications.  Table 8.1 sets out the stages that I will 
follow. 
Table 8.1.  Stages of survey implementation, analysis and findings 
Stage 1 
Survey Process 
 Survey sample 
 Survey implementation 
 Process of data analysis 
Stage 2 
Characteristics of 
Questionnaire Responses 
and Participants 
 Characteristics of questionnaire responses 
 Characteristics of respondents, acute hospital 
organisations, infection outbreaks 
Stage 3 
Results  
 Kendall’s tau-b correlation matrix 
 Principal Components Analysis (PCA) 
 Organisational Resilience Framework 
 Internal consistency of questionnaire 
Stage 4 
Discussion 
 Discussion of findings 
 Conclusion 
8.1 Survey Process 
I tested the organisational resilience questionnaire using a survey of infection prevention and 
control practitioners in the UK and Republic of Ireland who had been involved in an infection 
outbreak in an acute hospital organisation in the last three years.  I describe the survey 
sample, the implementation of the survey and the process of data collation and analysis. 
8.1.1 Survey Sample 
The sample population for the survey was acute hospital organisations in the UK and 
Republic of Ireland.  The total number of acute hospital organisations in England (164), 
Scotland (16), Northern Ireland (5), Wales (7) and the Republic of Ireland (6) was identified 
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from data on government websites; the Department of Health, England, NHS Health, 
Scotland, Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety, Northern Ireland3 and 
the Health Services Executive, Republic of Ireland.4  
The sample frame for the survey was acute hospital organisations that sent representatives 
to infection-focused national conferences that attracted a range of different professional 
groups, primarily nurses and doctors.  These conferences were the Infection Prevention 
Society (IPS) Conference was attended on 19th and 20th September 2011 in Bournemouth, 
the Federation of Infection Societies (FIS) Scientific Conference was attended on 17th 
November 2011 in Manchester and a Govtoday Reducing Healthcare Associated Infections 
(HCAI) conference on 14th March 2012. These conferences were attended by delegates 
from a number of different health sectors, including acute, community, mental health and 
independent providers.   
The sample of acute hospital organisations surveyed was 94 out of 198 (the total number of 
acute hospital organisations in the UK).  150 respondents completed the organisational 
resilience questionnaire in total, as there was more than one delegate per hospital in some 
cases in England, Scotland and Republic of Ireland.  This sample of convenience represents 
responses from 47% of hospital organisations in the UK and the Republic of Ireland.  This 
level of response rate is considered satisfactory when compared to the average response 
rate of 48.4% reported in academic journals in 1995 in a study undertaken by Baruch.(266) 
8.1.2 Survey implementation 
The survey was implemented using self-administered questionnaires that were handed out 
to conference delegates in the main exhibition hall of each conference.  Conference 
delegates were asked if they worked in an acute hospital environment and only respondents 
who confirmed acute hospital status and incorporated infection prevention and control in 
their job role were asked to complete a questionnaire. Respondents were offered a small 
incentive of a chocolate if they handed back a completed questionnaire.  In total, 150 
questionnaires were collected over the duration of four days at the conferences.  
                                                 
3 Northern Ireland Hospital Statistics: Inpatient and Daycase Activity Statistics 2011/12. 
Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety, Northern Ireland 
4 Health Services Executive: www.hse.ie/eng/services/Find_a_Service/hospitals/regionlist.html#n 
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8.1.3 Survey Analysis 
Data collation and analysis was undertaken using SPSS a statistical software package using 
standardised tests following the methodologies outlined by Field.(267)  Nominal and 
demographic data categories were screened for missing data fields and the data was tabled 
using frequency tables and graphed using histograms and checked for normal distribution.  
Where the distribution of demographic data categories was skewed, responses were 
analysed and regrouped where necessary, to create a lower number of categories for 
inferential analysis.  The data was then re-graphed to assess whether the data showed a 
nearer to normal distribution. Questionnaires were reviewed to identify data that could 
appropriately be added to missing fields, e.g. where a department could be coded using the 
specialty category description.   
8.2 Characteristics of Questionnaire Responses and Participants 
Having completed the survey, I describe the characteristics of: 
a) the responses given to the items on the organisational resilience questionnaire; and 
b) the respondents, the acute hospital organisations they work in and the infection 
outbreaks that they recall. 
8.2.1 Questionnaire Responses 
The responses to each of the 28 questions on the resilience questionnaire were assessed.  
Respondents were asked to grade their responses on a Likert scale from 1-5, where a score 
of 1 equated to ‘strongly disagree’ and a score of 5 equated to ‘strongly agree.’  Where 
questions were reverse-scored, these scores were inverted for the purpose of analysis.  
Appendix G shows the mean, median, mode, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis and 
range for each question. All items on the questionnaire were answered, showing the 
relevance of the items to the respondents.    There were very few missed data items, only 
one item with 3 missing data points, the remainder of items with two or less missing data 
points out of 150 respondents.  The mean scores indicate a negatively skewed distribution 
and the kurtosis scores indicate a leptokurtic distribution in the majority of variables. 
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8.2.2 Respondents 
Respondents were analysed from their demographic data; post title, profession, grade, 
department and specialty and membership of infection control team.  Table 8.2 shows the 
respondents grouped by post title and profession. 
Table 8.2  Respondents grouped by post title and profession 
Role/Professional Group (n=149) Nurse Doctor Other Health 
Professional 
Infection Prevention and Control Nurse 35 0 0 
Senior Infection Prevention and Control Nurse 8 0 0 
Lead Infection Prevention and Control 16 0 1 
Clinical Specialist Infection Prevention and Control 12 0 0 
DIPC/Assistant DIPC 12 5 0 
Microbiologist 0 27 0 
Infectious Diseases/Medical Microbiologist 0 11 0 
Allied Health Professional 0 0 3 
Nurse Manager/Practitioner 10 0 0 
Doctor/Senior Lecturer 1 8 0 
Total 94 51 4 
Of the total number of respondents reporting in this category (n=149), the greatest number 
of respondents (n=94) were nurses, of whom the largest number (n=35) were infection 
prevention and control nurses.  The second largest professional group was doctors (n=51) of 
whom over half (n= 27) were microbiologists and 11 were infectious diseases/medical 
microbiologists.   
From a specialty perspective, 54.7% described their specialty as infection prevention and 
control.  22% described their specialty as microbiology, and 8% as infectious 
diseases/medical microbiology.  The remainder (n=9) were respondents working outside 
infection prevention and control in specialties such as orthopaedics, medicine and renal 
medicine.  The majority of respondents (68.7%) stated that they were infection control team 
members with 14.7% of cases stating that they were not members.  16.7% did not state 
whether or not they were a member of the infection control team. In summary, the 
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predominant respondents were infection control nurses on agenda for change bands 6-9, 
who were members of the infection control team with differing levels of managerial and 
leadership responsibilities. 
8.2.3 Analysis of responses between professions 
The variance between means of the two largest professional groups in the sample; doctors 
and nurses was analysed using a non-parametric Mann-Whitney test, which compares the 
means of two independent groups to determine if the variance is significant. Nurses’ 
responses (Mdn=4.05), were significantly more positive than doctors (M=3.59), U=1037.00, 
p<.001, r=.47. 
8.2.4 Acute hospital organisations 
Hospital organisations were assessed by; name of hospital organisation, country, 
Foundation Trust or not and total number of wards.  On initial review, the 150 respondents 
represented 94 acute hospital organisations within the UK.  Respondents had indicated 
hospital organisation in a free text field, therefore a review of every hospital organisation was 
undertaken using hospital websites to determine which country the organisation was based 
in and if in England, whether it had foundation trust status or not.  87% of the sample was in 
England which is unsurprising given that the conferences were held in England.  However, 
although the actual numbers of acute hospital organisations was low from other countries 
(13%), the total number of acute hospital organisations in these countries is also low (17%), 
therefore the response rates were acceptable.  Of the English Trusts, 60% of cases were 
foundation trusts and 38% of cases were non foundation trusts with 2% from the 
independent sector. 
8.2.5 Infection Outbreaks 
Outbreaks were analysed on; organism, start date, duration and number of wards affected.  
Respondents were asked to recall the most recent major infection outbreak or incident 
(n=131) that had an impact on more than one ward or site.  In the guidance section on the 
questionnaire, respondents were asked to recall a major Norovirus outbreak in the last 3 
years (n=123), but if they could not, they were encourage to recall a major C.difficile problem 
(n=5) or influenza outbreak (n=1) during periods of increased incidence.  If there was no 
relevant example, they were asked to recall a minor outbreak as an example (n=2); MRSA 
and Carbapenemase were listed.  There were 19 missing data items in this category which 
equates to 12.6% of the total number of respondents.  The term ‘approximate’ was used for 
outbreak start month and outbreak duration, as respondents did not have the actual dates to 
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hand at the conference, but used their best estimate of when the outbreak started and how 
long it lasted.  The range of outbreak start months occurred between April 2009 and 
February 2012. 
8.3 Results 
I describe the results of the first test of the organisational resilience questionnaire, using 
Kendall’s tau-b correlation to examine relationships between variables and investigate effect 
sizes, and then undertake principal components analysis to explore any components in the 
data and associated variables.  
8.3.1 Correlations 
As the data was found to have a non-parametric distribution, it was appropriate to apply 
Kendall’s tau-b non-parametric correlation matrix to examine any relationships between the 
variables and to test whether the correlation coefficients are significant.  Kendall’s tau-b was 
chosen over Spearman’s correlation coefficient as the dataset was small with a large 
number of tied ranks.(267)  A two-tailed test was selected, as the research is exploratory 
and a relationship was expected, but the direction of the relationship was not predicted in 
advance.  A detailed correlation matrix (Appendix H) was prepared that examined 
relationships between the 28 organisational resilience variables, displaying the significance 
value of each correlation and the effect size on which it is based. I have adopted Cohen’s 
behaviourally-based thresholds for effect sizes where r=.10 (small effect), r=.30 (medium 
effect) and r=.50 (large effect).(268;269)  The correlation matrix revealed a large number of 
significant correlations between variables. 
Positive, significant (p< .01) and large effects for correlations existed between variables 
which related to clinical management and leadership and effective organisation of the 
outbreak.  A strong, positive relationship existed between involving clinical leaders in 
decision making and implementing: a clinical strategy for controlling the outbreak ( = .654), 
outbreak-related policies ( = .501), a clear structure ( =.511), daily information on cases 
(=.506) and an effective isolation policy (=.511).  A similar positive relationship was found 
between an effective leader taking control of the outbreak and implementing a clinical 
strategy for controlling the outbreak ( =.629).  Further evidence of positive relationships 
between clinical leadership and organisational variables was the positive, significant 
correlation between rigorous implementation of outbreak-related policies and both 
implementation of a clinical strategy for controlling the outbreak (=.587) and systematic 
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implementation of policies resulting from the outbreak.   There were large numbers of 
positive, significant and medium/small effect correlations between variables and far fewer 
examples of no significant relationship between variables.   The majority of variables had a 
specific impact within certain stages of the outbreak and not on other stages.  A few 
variables had a negligible relationship with other variables, particularly, the variable, ‘the 
elective pathway was severely impacted by the outbreak’ (inverted). 
 
8.4 Principal Components Analysis (PCA) 
In the next section the rationale for applying principal components analysis (PCA) to the data 
is discussed and the PCA analysis is examined.  PCA is used to establish which linear 
components exist within the data and how any particular variable might contribute to that 
component.(267)  As a type of exploratory factor analysis, PCA is usually applied to a list of 
variables to understand which variables cluster in a meaningful way.  The decision to use 
PCA, in place of factor analysis was based on the requirement for a larger sample size in 
factor analysis, i.e. > 300 participants to support a technique such as confirmatory factor 
analysis which provides a stable factor solution.(267)  PCA is also a psychometrically sound 
procedure.(267)  In this exploratory and preliminary research with a sample size of 150, 
which falls just within the minimum proposed limits of 5-10 participants per variable up to a 
total of 300(270), PCA was more appropriate as a technique.  In order to assess the efficacy 
of the organisational resilience questionnaire, PCA was applied to a revised list of 23 
questionnaire items, having excluded 5 items as a result of a reliability analysis, see 
Appendix I. 
As a further test of the adequacy of the sample size, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure 
of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of sphericity were checked.  The KMO score was 
.864 where values between .7-.8 are considered good, values between .8-.9 are considered 
great and values above .9 are superb.(267;271)  This positive indicator of adequate sample 
size was also reflected in the Bartlett’s test which indicated a significance of .000.  Bartlett’s 
test was highly significant (p<.001) and therefore factor analysis was appropriate.  As an 
additional check, MacCallum proposes that a sample size of 100-200 should be sufficient 
with communalities of .5 or above.(272)  All communalities were above .5 and the mean of 
the 23 communalities was 0.615. 
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 As the underlying factors or components were expected to correlate, i.e. they are all related 
to organisational resilience practice in an infection outbreak scenario, an oblique rotation 
was chosen over an orthogonal rotation, specifically direct oblimin, with a delta setting of 
zero which is appropriate for the sample size of this dataset.  With regards to factor 
extraction, an initial extraction was set at five factors, to reflect the five chronological stages 
(subscales) used in the preliminary questionnaire.  Kaiser’s criterion is to retain eigenvalues 
greater than one as components and as the resulting analysis indicated five components 
with eigenvalues greater than one, this also complied with Kaiser’s recommendation.(273)   
Kaiser’s criterion has been found to be accurate when the number of variables is less than 
30 (23 in this dataset so this criterion is met) and when the resulting communalities, after 
extraction are more than .7.  In this research, communalities varied from .5 to .8, and the 
mean communality was .615 so the components should be treated as exploratory.  The 
scree plot was not used to determine the number of factors as this relies on a sample size of 
200 or more to provide a reliable criterion for factor selection.(274)  As the significance of a 
factor loading depends on sample size(267), Stevens recommends that for a sample size of 
100, the loading should be greater than .512 and for a sample size of 200, should be greater 
than .367.(274)  For the purposes of this research, with a sample size of 150, we have 
assumed that the mean of these two values, .438 would be an acceptable minimum loading 
to assume significance.  In this dataset, based on the pattern matrix (see Table 8.3 below) 
all of the variable loadings were over .445 and can be considered acceptable significant 
values. 
8.4.1 PCA Findings 
For direct oblimin analysis, Field recommends reviewing both the pattern and structure 
matrices as the pattern matrix shows the unique contribution (loading) of a variable to a 
factor whereas the structure matrix shows the common variance and the relationship 
between factors.(267)  The pattern matrix (Table 8.3) was reviewed, to determine which 
variables constituted each component.  I examine each of the five components with their 
associated variables, in the context of the organisational resilience literature and with 
reference to the five subscales (chronological stages) within the organisational resilience 
questionnaire; routine practice, discovery of outbreak, immediate management, ongoing 
management and aftermath of outbreak.   I found that component three reflected routine 
practice and component two reflected discovery of outbreak, with minor variations.  
Component one, four and five constituted a new arrangement of variables compared with the 
stages of outbreak; immediate management, ongoing management and aftermath of 
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outbreak.   As a result, I derived a new understanding of all five components using the 
organisational resilience literature and examining the variables that constituted each 
component.  I explain my interpretation of each component in more detail below: 
8.4.1.1 Performance Capability (component 3) 
I consider that the three variables that load onto component 3 reflect the capability within the 
organisation to manage performance efficiently during routine practice; therefore I use the 
descriptor ‘performance capability’ to describe this component.  The three variables 
comprise of providing regular performance information to front-line areas, implementing 
appropriate performance targets in front-line areas and ensuring front-line staff are 
accountable for their performance. These variables loaded strongly onto component three, 
demonstrating values of 0.7 or higher with no cross-loadings onto other components.  I have 
listed component 3 first, as it comprises three out of the four variables in stage one (routine 
practice) of the questionnaire which is chronologically situated prior to an outbreak.  The 
fourth variable from stage one (routine practice), ‘minor infection outbreaks were managed 
effectively’ was placed in component five, so was interpreted as part of that component.  
8.4.1.2 Responsive Capacity (component 2) 
I considered that the variables associated with component 2 reflect the capability of the 
organisation to respond to the outbreak in an agile and aware manner.  This capability 
comprises a rapid response with the implementation of range of measures to manage the 
event effectively.  The variables associated with component 2 describe this measure; 
ensuring front-line staff understands the measures to manage the event quickly, correctly 
assessing the significance of the unexpected event, effectively communicating the event to 
senior leaders, involving experts in decision making and ensuring critical operational policies 
work effectively.  For this reason, the descriptor, ‘responsive capability’ seems appropriate. 
Of the six variables associated with component 2 in the pattern matrix, three of these loaded 
strongly onto component 2, demonstrating values of 0.7 or higher.  Based on the structure 
matrix (see Table 8.4), of the three variables within the component that load onto other 
components, two variables; ‘clinical leaders were involved in decision making’ and ‘the 
isolation policy operated effectively’ have a cross-loading where the minimum difference of 
0.200 between variables(275) was not met. 
I have listed component two second, as all the variables included in stage two (discovery) of 
the questionnaire were retained, with the exception of one variable, ‘the ward closure policy 
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was clear to all staff.’   Instead, the variable, ‘the isolation policy operated effectively’ was 
included, which was previously within stage three (immediate management) of the 
questionnaire. 
8.4.1.3 Adaptive Capacity (component one) 
Component one was made up of five variables (see pattern matrix -Table 8.3) which I 
consider represent the adaptive capacity of the organisation to respond to an unexpected 
event through its capacity to adapt to new situations.  The elements of organisational 
adaptation which the variables describe are: using learning to inform future practice, 
developing innovative solutions, moving to daily information availability and systematic 
implementation of new ways of working.  Based on the structure matrix (Table 8.4) three of 
these variables had multiple loadings, but if a minimum difference of 0.200 was 
imposed(275), only two of these variables, ‘innovative solutions were developed for 
unplanned problems’ and ‘outbreak policies were implemented rigorously’ had a cross-
loading (in each case the loading onto the component was >0.438 but there was a difference 
of <0.200 between variables).   
8.4.1.4 Redundant Capacity (component four) 
Component four is made up of three variables (see Table 8.3) which I consider reflect the 
redundant capacity of the organisation to respond to an unexpected event.  The elements of 
redundancy described by the variables are the willingness of staff groups to work flexibly, the 
availability of additional resources when required, and the rapid creation of bed capacity 
when required.  Based on the structure matrix (see Table 8.4) two variables load onto more 
than one component, one of which ‘bed capacity was created rapidly’ has a cross-loading 
where the minimum difference of 0.200 between variables was not met. 
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Table 8.3  Pattern matrix output from direct oblimin 5 factor PCA 
Pattern Matrix
a
 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 
Policies resulting from the 
outbreak were implemented 
systematically 
.739    
Learning from the outbreak 
informed future outbreak 
management 
.705    
Innovative solutions were 
developed for unplanned 
problems 
.598    
Information on cases was 
available daily 
.543    
Outbreak-related policies 
were implemented rigorously 
.490    
Staff understood the 
necessary measures to 
manage the outbreak within 
36 hours of the outbreak 
being identified 
 -.790   
The outbreak was identified 
within 48 hours 
 -.786   
The significance of the 
outbreak was underestimated 
 .708   
The outbreak was escalated 
to Trust executive directors 
within 48 hours 
 -.473   
Clinical leaders were involved 
in decision making 
 -.457   
The isolation policy operated 
effectively 
 -.445   
Performance targets for 
infection were used in clinical 
areas 
  .894  
Monthly infection control data 
was provided to clinical areas 
  .797  
Clinical teams were 
accountable for their infection 
performance 
  .690  
Staff groups were willing to 
work flexibly during the 
outbreak (e.g. working 
different roles) 
   -.826 
Additional resources were 
made available when needed 
   -.669 
Bed capacity was created 
rapidly 
   -.455 
Minor infection outbreaks 
were managed effectively 
    -.721 
The balance between patient 
safety and performance goals 
was achieved 
    -.642 
An effective leader took 
control of the outbreak 
    -.618 
A clear structure was 
implemented to manage the 
outbreak 
    -.572 
The ward closure policy was 
clear to all staff 
    -.482 
A clinical strategy for 
controlling the outbreak was 
implemented 
    -.480 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.      
a.
 Rotation converged in 15 iterations. 
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Table 8.4  Structure Matrix output from direct oblimin 5 factor PCA 
Structure Matrix 
 Component 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Policies resulting from the outbreak 
were implemented systematically 
.767     
Learning from the outbreak informed 
future outbreak management 
.733     
Innovative solutions were developed 
for unplanned problems 
.688   .533  
Outbreak-related policies were 
implemented rigorously 
.674   .441 -.557 
Information on cases was available 
daily 
.641 .401 .419   
Staff understood the necessary 
measures to manage the outbreak 
within 36 hours of the outbreak being 
identified 
 .834 .413   
The outbreak was identified within 48 
hours 
 .783    
The significance of the outbreak was 
underestimated (inverted) 
 .676    
The outbreak was escalated to Trust 
executive directors within 48 hours 
 .606    
Clinical leaders were involved in 
decision making 
.497 .597   -.490 
The isolation policy operated 
effectively 
 .550  .489  
Performance targets for infection 
were used in clinical areas 
  .899   
Monthly infection control data was 
provided to clinical areas 
  .830   
Clinical teams were accountable for 
their infection performance 
  .744   
Staff groups were willing to work 
flexibly during the outbreak (e.g. 
working different roles) 
   .829  
Additional resources were made 
available when needed 
.459   .752  
Bed capacity was created rapidly .523   .581  
Minor infection outbreaks were 
managed effectively 
  .434  -.743 
An effective leader took control of the 
outbreak 
.505    -.723 
A clear structure was implemented to 
manage the outbreak 
.407 .462 .454  -.716 
The balance between patient safety 
and performance goals was achieved 
.473   .411 -.712 
A clinical strategy for controlling the 
outbreak was implemented 
.580 .450   -.687 
The ward closure policy was clear to 
all staff 
 .404   -.607 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
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8.4.1.5 Management Capability (component five) 
Component five comprises six variables, which I consider represent management capability 
to handle an unexpected event.  These relate to resilience variables that reflect the 
organisation’s capability to comprehensively manage an outbreak through effective 
management of smaller events, strong leadership capability, clear structures, effective 
cultural trade-offs, strategic use of expert networks and operational communication.  Based 
on the structure matrix (see Table 8.4), all six variables had multiple loadings, but if a 
minimum difference of 0.200 was imposed(275), only one of these variables, ‘a clinical 
strategy for controlling the outbreak was implemented’ had a cross-loading (the loading was 
>0.438 with a difference of <0.200 between variables). 
A revised model of organisational resilience during an unexpected event was developed to 
reflect these exploratory components arising from the PCA, see Figure 8.1 below and a 
reliability analysis was run using Cronbach’s Alpha to check that the reliability of each 
subscale was an internally consistent reflection of the construct – see Table 8.5. 
 
Figure 8.1  Organisational resilience constructs relating to an unexpected event 
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Table 8.5  Reliability Statistics for Revised Component Descriptors 
Revised Descriptors for Unexpected Event 
Management Components 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha based 
on 
standardised 
items 
N of items 
Performance Capability 
 
.818 .817 3 
Responsive Capability 
 
.784 .799 6 
Redundant Capacity 
 
.696 .699 3 
Management Capability 
 
.823 .830 6 
Adaptive Capacity 
 
.795 .797 5 
The corrected item-total correlation score identifies items that fail to correlate with the overall 
score from the scale.  Field proposes that any item with a low correlation (less than .3) 
should be reviewed and potentially excluded as that item would reduce scale reliability.(267) 
The lowest corrected item-total correlation score was .42 so no item was found to reduce 
scale reliability significantly.  The reliability analysis was calculated on all variables, as they 
loaded onto the component subscales.  Cronbach’s Alpha was .7 or above in each case and 
therefore reflected good internal consistency of each subscale. 
8.4.2 Revised Organisational Resilience Questionnaire 
The organisational resilience questionnaire was revised on the basis of the PCA.  Five 
variables were removed that the reliability test prior to PCA identified as having a corrected 
item-total correlation score of less than .3.  The variables were reorganised to reflect the new 
PCA component descriptions and variables were rephrased where cross-loadings between 
variables were less than 0.200.  The revised questionnaire is shown in Table 8.6. 
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Table 8.6  Revised Organisational Resilience Questionnaire 
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8.5 Discussion 
This study addresses a shortfall of measurement studies in the organisational resilience 
literature.  The nearest comparator is a recent measurement study that used PCA to 
establish resilient factors relating to rail engineering planning.   This study was designed 
using resilient concepts from the resilience engineering literature, rather than empirically 
based data.  It aimed to assess the preparedness of the system to respond to both expected 
and unexpected conditions.  However, the outcome of the PCA showed no direct 
relationship to the four main resilience factors that were originally derived from the 
literature.(147). 
In contrast, I developed a more robust study, designing a unique empirical measurement tool 
for organisational resilience in the context of an unexpected event.  I achieved this by 
designing a questionnaire based on chronological stages of an outbreak from my empirical 
research which fitted broadly with theoretical frameworks from the literature.(20;22) I focused 
my questionnaire on unexpected conditions to test specifically one contextual aspect of 
organisational resilience. Using PCA (Table 8.3), I identified five components (two of which 
reflected the chronological stages of an outbreak) with strongly loaded associated variables.  
I reviewed these components and described them as; performance capability, responsive 
capability, redundant capacity, management capability and adaptive capacity.  Finally, I 
redesigned my organisational resilience questionnaire in line with the findings from the PCA.  
 The five components described above, relate closely to the organisational resilience 
literature.  The strong positive loadings (> .7) and the unique relationship of the three 
performance-oriented variables onto the component ‘performance capability’ suggest that 
this is a significantly independent component and is highly relevant as a precursor to an 
unexpected event.  This finding contributes to the literature on resilient performance, as 
these results confirm that having robust performance mechanisms in place in routine 
practice are an important facet of resilience during an unexpected event.   
All the variables, bar one, loaded strongly (>.45) onto the component that I described as the 
‘responsive capability’ of the organisation.  These variables represented the organisation’s 
ability to respond rapidly and effectively to an outbreak, using sensemaking(64;153;237;276) 
and sensegiving (239;277-280) strategies to: rapidly identify the outbreak, correctly estimate 
the significance of the outbreak, ensure that operational measures to manage the outbreak 
effectively were understood by staff, escalate communication to senior leaders and involve 
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relevant experts in decision making.  Few empirical studies have attempted to measure 
sensemaking and sensegiving strategies as they have been viewed as sufficiently complex 
to make measurement difficult.  In this study, I contributed to the literature by developing 
theoretically- derived sensemaking and sensegiving statements that reflected practical, 
measurable activities.   As two of the variables associated with this component cross-loaded 
onto other components (difference between variables <0.200) I refined two statements, to 
more closely reflect responsive capability. 
The component, redundant capacity, clearly relates to the literature on resilience and 
redundancy which suggests that a reasonable level of organisational redundancy is required, 
to ensure the organisation has the resources to respond in a rapid and flexible way to 
unexpected events.  Too great a level of redundant resources causes the organisation to 
become inefficient. (20)  The three elements of redundancy described in the variables were: 
‘staff willingness to work flexibly’, which in the case study related to staff working additional 
hours for no extra pay, taking on additional roles and working in different environments; 
‘additional resources were made available when needed’, which in the case study reflected 
the willingness of managers and directors to release additional resource into the 
organisation regardless of cost and ‘bed capacity was created rapidly’ which in the case 
study reflected an organisational focus on freeing up bed spaces by discharging patients and 
reorganising the hospital space.  The contribution to the literature that this component 
provides, whilst requiring some fine tuning, is that it measures the ability of the organisation 
to free up and use redundant or unused capacity, rather than just measuring the volume of 
redundant capacity that exists.  Many organisations may be able to identify redundant 
capacity, but it requires a resilient organisational culture to create the conditions that enable 
redundant capacity to be rapidly converted into a useful currency.   
The component, management capability, relates to many of the organisational concepts 
identified in the literature review (Chapter 3) that relate to resilience; leadership, structures, 
trade-offs, tracking and managing small failures, and having clear operational strategies and 
policies that are clear to front-line staff.  As with the previous component, redundant 
capacity, the contribution to the literature that this component provides, is that it is not 
sufficient to have management capability in place, e.g. a leader, a ward closure policy, but 
these have to be adequately implemented.  A leader has to be effective and take control of 
the unexpected event and the operational policy or strategy has to be implemented and 
made clear to all staff.  It is the active and effective use of management capability that 
ensures the organisation operates resiliently.  A further contribution to the literature is that 
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these variables have been found to load onto this component.  In the current literature 
(Chapter 3), there is a lack of clarity about the contribution of these concepts to either 
unexpected events or routine continuous stressors within an organisation.  Many studies 
identify potential relationships between two or more organisational concepts, but these are 
often hypothesised relationships which have not been tested empirically, or the study 
focuses on one organisational concept in depth, ignoring interrelationships.  This study 
identifies management-related organisational concepts that are shown to be significantly 
associated with a construct of management capability. 
The final component, adaptive capacity, reflects the resilience literature which relates to 
organisational adaptation.(4;22;136)  The contribution to the literature of this component is 
the identification and testing of measurable, adaptive practices in healthcare which can be 
associated with an overall construct of adaptive capacity.  The variables that grouped 
together to form this component related to: the capacity of the organisation to learn from the 
outbreak to inform future outbreak management, the development of innovative solutions to 
unplanned problems, rigorous and systematic implementation of policies and daily 
accessibility of information.  Each of these variables required the organisation to adapt to the 
unexpected event, by using strategies that went beyond those required in routine practice.   
The overall contribution of this questionnaire to the organisational resilience literature is in 
providing a unique, if exploratory, organisational resilience measurement tool that can be 
used by healthcare practitioners and academics to measure levels of organisational 
resilience pertaining to an unexpected event.  There are few examples of measurement in 
the literature(103;106;111;139;141) and none pertaining to organisational-level resilience 
during unexpected events.  This study also contributes to the organisational resilience 
healthcare literature by providing a healthcare-specific measure of organisational resilience, 
relating to a topic of high importance in healthcare; infection prevention and control.  The 
questionnaire has face validity for healthcare practitioners, as it is developed based on 
empirical data describing infection outbreaks.  It is a useful tool for all acute hospital 
organisations, to enable them to benchmark their organisational resilience in relation to 
infection outbreaks.  A further development of the questionnaire for healthcare would be to 
develop questions that are relevant to other healthcare sectors and to develop versions that 
relate to other non-infection types of unexpected events.  As a first step, testing the revised 
questionnaire using a broader random sample of practitioners would strengthen and confirm 
the findings. 
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The limitations of this questionnaire are that it was developed from a convenience sample, 
rather than a random sample and this should be addressed in future research using the 
revised questionnaire.   Although a benefit of using participants who had an organisational 
overview is that they were able to consider the management of an outbreak from an 
organisational perspective, the higher means for each statement may have resulted from 
infection control professionals scoring their own practice in managing the outbreak more 
highly than other organisational members might have done.  This would be worth exploring 
more fully in future research by incorporating participants from a broader range of 
professional groups.  A further issue was that the sample size of 150 was too low to 
undertake confirmatory factor analysis, and this could be addressed using a larger sample 
when testing the revised questionnaire. 
8.6 Conclusion 
As the previous discussion section has outlined, this study is a positive first exploration of an 
organisational resilience measure for unexpected events.  My primary contribution, in terms 
of advancing organisational resilience research, is the development of an organisational 
resilience questionnaire that pertains to an unexpected event. The nearest comparator in the 
resilience literature is a measure of resilience during expected conditions, focused on rail 
engineering(147) as the few examples of measurement studies in the literature are either 
business decision support tools(106;139;141) or untested theoretically derived measurement 
tools.(111) I identified five constructs of capacity and capability building during an 
unexpected event: performance capability, responsive capability, redundant capacity, 
management capability and adaptive capacity.  These constructs have been identified in 
theoretical frameworks, but without the detailed description of associated variables and have 
not been tested empirically.   Whilst this research is exploratory, these findings provide an 
empirical basis for developing future studies, which will address a significant gap in research 
to date.(24) 
From a methodological perspective, one limitation of this study was the use of a 
convenience sample, although this achieved a 47% response rate across UK and Republic 
of Ireland hospital organisations.  To ensure robustness, future sampling strategies may 
include the whole UK acute hospital population, rather than a sample group. A further 
limitation was the sample size of 150 that prevented the use of confirmatory factor analysis.  
Future work may include running the adjusted questionnaire with a larger (300+) sample that 
supports confirmatory factor analysis. 
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From a professional standpoint, an interesting finding is the significant difference in 
responses between nurses and doctors.  Although this will not have a statistically impact on 
this study, it would be interesting to follow up this study with a qualitative approach to 
understand why these differences exist and whether the difference reflects a professional-
level difference in attitude and outlook or issues relating specifically to an outbreak scenario. 
From a healthcare practitioner perspective, the study demonstrated how useful a large 
outbreak event is in testing organisational resilience.  Whilst acute hospital organisations are 
more aware of the need for preparedness and business continuity plans such as the Hospital 
Incident Command System in the US(281), these plans can often be mechanistic and 
structural in design and are silent on the cognitive and behavioural elements of managing an 
unexpected event resiliently.  The questionnaire in this study attempts to measure both 
cognitive-behavioural and socio-technical aspects of resilient practice.
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9 Discussion 
In this chapter I begin by demonstrating how each of the objectives of the thesis have been 
met, before summarizing the contribution that this thesis makes to the literature, identifying 
the potential directions for future research, assessing the implications for clinical practice 
and finally, discussing the implications for policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.1 Fulfilling the thesis objectives 
At the start of this thesis I aimed to examine organisational resilience in UK acute hospitals, 
using an exploratory case study and empirical analysis, based on the following objectives: 
 to investigate what is known about the concept, associated factors and application of 
organisational resilience to UK acute hospitals 
 to explore theoretically and empirically the two contexts for organisational resilience 
(expected conditions and unexpected events) and; 
 to design and test an organisational resilience tool to measure organisational 
resilience during an unexpected event. 
In the next section, I explain how each of these objectives has been met. 
9.1.1 To investigate what is known about the concept, associated factors and 
application of organisational resilience to UK acute hospitals 
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I undertook two reviews to investigate what is known about the concept, associated factors 
and application of organisational resilience to UK acute hospitals.  Firstly, I conducted a 
literature review to understand the conceptual and empirical development of organisational 
resilience and how it has been applied in the healthcare context (Chapter3).  The literature 
review addressed a gap in existing literature reviews of resilience and organisational 
resilience, which were either too broad(1;2), lacked methodological rigour(97) or had a 
practitioner focus.(98)   
I found that the organisational resilience literature was diverse and disjointed as a result of 
ontological differentiation between disciplines.  This had adversely affected the overall 
conceptual development of organisational resilience, although recent work had recognized 
the benefits of amalgamating approaches to create a multidisciplinary perspective on 
resilience.  The literature review highlighted the conceptual breadth of organisational 
resilience, but the majority of studies focused on individual concepts and the few models and 
frameworks that had been developed were not empirically tested. 
Secondly, I adopted a novel strategy of systematically reviewing infection prevention and 
control responses to infection outbreaks within acute hospitals to examine resilience factors 
(Chapter 4).  I found evidence to support a reduction in the impact of outbreaks in the acute 
health care setting as a result of organisational resilience interventions although only six 
intervention studies met the selection criteria and these lacked statistical robustness for 
primary measures.   
9.1.2 To explore theoretically and empirically the two contexts for organisational 
resilience (expected conditions and unexpected events)  
In this thesis, I have explored theoretically and empirically the two contexts for organisational 
resilience.  The main contribution of my first study (Chapter 5) was to apply a Foucauldian 
framework to a novel arena; infection prevention and control in hospitals.  I identified the 
creation of a cadre of self-surveilling leaders with new identities who contributed to 
organisational resilience through the construction of new routines and a new governance 
order.  A supporting modest theoretical contribution was, in contrast to much of the existing 
literature on the adoption of information communication technology (ICT) in healthcare, to 
exemplify a positive outcome in using ICT to construct a novel surveillance system in 
healthcare.  Empirically, I contributed by using qualitative embedded case study to study 
organisational resilience in the context of routine practice.  The primary contribution of my 
second study (Chapter 6) was to make a modest theoretical contribution by adding a 
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category of ‘intermediate’ resilience in contrast to the polarized categories in the literature of 
high and low resilience.  A further supporting theoretical contribution was to identify 
sensemaking as a dynamic and changing process throughout the unexpected event and to 
identify that different types of sensemaking were evident at different stages.    I contributed 
empirically to the literature by undertaking a detailed qualitative case study of an unexpected 
event analysed using social science frameworks.    
9.1.3 To design and test an organisational resilience tool to measure organisational 
resilience in the context of an unexpected event. 
My primary contribution, in terms of advancing organisational resilience research, is the 
production of an organisational resilience questionnaire that measures organisational 
resilience in relation to an unexpected event.   I identified five constructs of capacity and 
capability building during an unexpected event: performance capability, responsive 
capability, redundant capacity, management capability and adaptive capacity.  These 
constructs broadly reflect theoretically derived constructs from the literature which have not 
been tested empirically previously.  The variables associated with each of these constructs 
explain how organisational resilience functions in detail.  
9.2 Overall contribution to the study of organisational resilience; the 
case of infection prevention and control. 
The overall aim of my thesis was to examine organisational resilience in UK acute hospitals, 
focusing on infection prevention and control.  I assess my contribution to the organisational 
resilience literature in this section. 
9.2.1 The development of a measure of organisational resilience 
 A significant contribution to the organisational resilience literature is the development of an 
organisational resilience questionnaire to measure organisational resilience in the context of 
an unexpected infection event.  The literature on measuring organisational resilience is 
sparse, as identified in my organisational literature review in Chapter 3 with few examples of 
measurement studies in the literature.  Those that exist are either business decision support 
tools(106;139;141) or untested theoretically derived measurement tools.(111)  The 
development of a tool to measure organisational resilience is innovative for several reasons.  
Firstly it is built on the qualitative findings of a detailed empirical study of resilience therefore 
the questions derived from the study have face validity.  This contrasts to other resilience 
questionnaires which are built on theoretical constructs from the literature or have not been 
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tested.(111;147)  Secondly, the questionnaire reflects a multidisciplinary theoretical 
perspective, incorporating questions that build on a cognitive behavioural framework(55) and 
a systems/structural framework(83;247) compared to the uni-disciplinary approach evident in 
much of the literature. The only recent example in the literature of a measurement tool  is a 
study that focuses on expected conditions(147), whereas this tool is unique in its focus on an 
unexpected event.   
 A further contribution is the identification of an organisational resilience framework for an 
unexpected event that identifies five overarching constructs; performance capability, 
responsive capability, redundant capacity, management capability and adaptive capacity that 
are related to chronological stages of an unexpected event.  A key feature of this framework 
is that the constructs are generic and could be applied to unexpected events in other 
settings.  Although theoretical models and frameworks describing unexpected events exist in 
the literature(20;22;138), the majority have not been empirically tested or derived.   
9.2.2 Applied social science literature to a novel arena 
The theoretical utility of two social science perspectives; Weick and Foucault to the study of 
organisational resilience was to provide new insights that had not previously been seen.  
Both perspectives were practically useful as they provided an analytical framework to assess 
the empirical data and enabled an in-depth understanding of the study in question.  Weick’s 
sensemaking perspective, with its focus on cognition and behaviour, enabled analysis of the 
dynamics of individual and team interaction in a complex hospital setting.  Foucault’s 
governmentality theory, with its focus on power, knowledge and social control enabled 
analysis of new indirect modes of control juxtaposed with established hierarchical modes of 
control.   
I make a modest theoretical contribution of an ‘intermediate resilience’ category to the 
literature using sensemaking theory. The resilience literature is polarised, with research on 
high resilience/high reliability (26;192) or low resilience/failing (18;19) organisations.  Few 
examples of healthcare research exist which address organisational resilience in the majority 
of organisations.(111)  The intermediate resilience category has features of resilient practice 
and resistant practice and the overall outcome for the organisation is determined by the 
trade-off between the two, influenced by a series of factors, including the strength of 
leadership.  I developed an organisational resilience framework that incorporated these 
different levels of resilience with associated sensemaking characteristics of culture, cognition 
and behaviour.   
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I found that the level of resilient practice was linked to the type of sensemaking that was 
exhibited, so distributed sensemaking reflected more resistant practices, whereas collective 
sensemaking reflected more resilient practices.  This was in contrast to the literature where 
the majority of studies referred either to static sensemaking or assessed one type of 
sensemaking empirically. 
I applied Foucauldian theory to study organisational resilience across a healthcare system.  I 
identified a positive, ICT-enabled national surveillance strategy using novel and indirect 
control modes that significantly reduced MRSA and C.difficile rates nationally.  This strategy 
is not representative of the findings of previous studies of ICTs in health where most 
empirical cases find that ICTs fail to deliver the predicted outcomes and tacit clinical 
resistance is observed.(209;212-214)  In assessing the impact of these novel and indirect 
control modes on organisational resilience, I found that they had a largely positive impact 
overall on hospitals’ resilience in reducing infection.  However, unintended consequences 
were evident, resulting from the close scrutiny of specific organisms which distracted 
attention and resources away from hospitals developing a more holistic approach to infection 
prevention and control and addressing the potential threat of other hospital-acquired 
infective organisms.  I considered that the most effective indirect mode from a resilience 
perspective was the active and creative enrolment in self governing and self surveillance by 
clinical managerial hybrids who experienced strong identity shifts.  This positive adjustment 
which involved clinical hybrids in the construction of new routines and a new governance 
order was found to create a long-term resilient capability to reduce infection rates in 
hospitals.    
9.2.3 Adopting a mixed methods approach 
The mixed methods approach proved successful in spanning the ontologically diverse 
organisational resilience literatures and facilitated a multidisciplinary approach that 
incorporated social science and natural sciences methods and integrated the literature from 
several disciplines to develop new findings.  
I used different approaches throughout the thesis: 
I successfully developed and tested a quantitative measurement tool that derived from a 
social science approach using qualitative methods.   I applied behavioural (sensemaking) 
and structural (resilient engineering) analytical frameworks to an in-depth qualitative case 
and used thematic analysis to build the evidence base for a quantitative approach.  This 
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effective approach, involved the use of empirical studies in addition to theoretical 
conceptualising, which ensured that the variables reflected actual rather than hypothesised 
resilience practice and improved the face validity of the questionnaire.   
In a further study (Chapter 4), I successfully identified resilience factors in an unexpected 
infection event using a multi-methods approach to conducting a systematic review.  I used 
quantitative methods to undertake the quality assessment of papers, but applied social 
sciences thematic analysis to extract the resilience factors.  Using these techniques, I was 
able to assess both the statistical veracity of the papers and explore in more depth the 
underlying resilience themes. 
9.3 Methodological issues and limitations 
From a methodological perspective, a significant issue is that the organisational resilience 
literature is disjointed and ontological diverse and the healthcare-focused organisational 
resilience literature is poorly developed.  Building on existing research is problematic as few 
theoretical or empirical precedents exist and research themes are generally uni-disciplinary.  
To address these issues and achieve theoretical integration required a multidisciplinary 
perspective utilising a range of theoretical perspectives from different paradigms, with a 
mixed methods approach.  
The limitations of each study are explored below: 
In researching the systematic review (Chapter 4) I found a limited number of papers that 
were relevant to the review criteria, as the majority of papers adopted an epidemiological, 
clinical or microbiological focus, rather than an organisational perspective on infection 
outbreaks.  As a result, only six papers were systematically shortlisted which reflected the 
need for further research in this area. 
I was restrained in my questionnaire study (Chapter 7&8) from undertaking confirmatory 
factor analysis owing to smaller sample size than is required for this analysis.  My use of a 
convenience sample based on conference attendees provided a larger sample than I may 
have achieved through a random sample, but this was less representative of the overall 
healthcare population.  
In my empirical case study (Chapter 6) I was limited to some extent by the use of a critical 
incident that had occurred two years prior to the interview study.  Although this was identified 
by participants as a significant organisation-wide outbreak and therefore remained vivid in 
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their memories, some participants who were named in the snowball sampling design had left 
the organisation and could not be traced and others had changed roles and were less willing 
to participate.  In some circumstances the gap between interview and event affected the 
recall of specific events. 
I designed my multi-level empirical study (Chapter 5) using one embedded case study which 
provided an in-depth understanding of behaviours, but the study could have been 
strengthened by the use of comparative empirical studies which would have assisted in 
generalising the findings.   
9.4 Future research 
As Vogus and Sutcliffe argue, there are many avenues for future research within the field of 
organisational resilience.(24)  My research for this thesis has highlighted some key areas 
that would benefit from further studies.  The first area is the development of measures of 
organisational resilience.  Robust measures would contribute to a field which has few 
empirically derived and tested measures.  Further research is required to test my revised 
organisational resilience questionnaire on a randomised, large sample which would support 
confirmatory factor analysis.   The application of this measure to other unexpected events 
within healthcare and its broader application to other industries would be useful.  Future 
research on measures of organisational resilience in different contexts would be valuable, for 
example, under routine expected conditions impacted by change, stress or disturbances. 
The application of social science perspectives was found to be helpful in this thesis and 
provided novel insights.  The use of social science frameworks to analyse organisational 
resilience in other contexts, particularly the in-depth study of organisational resilience during 
expected conditions and from a system context would be valuable.  
Empirically, the field of infection prevention and control provided a rich seam of data for 
testing organisational resilience theories in a healthcare context. The contextual use of IPC 
for future research on resilience would be beneficial.   Future empirically-based research is 
required, to either confirm or contest existing theoretical frameworks and models and to 
develop new empirically derived models. 
Overall, there is scope to extend a multidisciplinary approach to organisational resilience 
research with the aim of combining different ontological and methodological approaches, to 
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achieve a more comprehensive understanding of organisational resilience in different 
contexts. 
9.5 Implications for clinical practice 
This research has many implications for clinical practice.  I have developed an organisational 
resilience tool (Chapter 8) to assess the management of unexpected infection events, which 
will assist clinicians and managers in reviewing their approach to infection outbreaks with a 
view to improving practice in the future.  Although there is evidence of learning from 
outbreaks at national and local level, this tool provides a systematic approach to assessing 
and potentially benchmarking practice within and between acute hospital organisations. 
I have created a detailed chronological map of resilience during an outbreak (Chapter 6), 
which will be helpful for clinicians and managers to understand the different stages of an 
outbreak to assist with planning and preparedness prior to an outbreak and strategies to 
manage structural and behavioural issues during an outbreak. 
My systematic review (Chapter 4) provides a structured basis for understanding the 
resilience factors across outbreaks related to different organisms.  This will assist with 
developing more generic, organisational approaches to preparedness for outbreaks, which 
will contribute to developing organisational resilience.    
9.6 Implications for policy 
Nationally, there is an increased interest in organisational resilience particularly in the 
context of disaster planning. Greater governmental awareness exists of the need for 
organisational and system resilience, particularly in relation to issues such as pandemic flu 
or bad weather conditions.  As there is no thorough review of the organisational resilience 
literature in place, my literature review will contribute to the development of policy on 
resilience.  My systematic review has identified resilience factors relating to outbreak 
situations, which will contribute to the policy development on pandemic planning and 
preparedness.  Pandemic preparedness often occurs within the context of a single infective 
organism based on the most recent pandemic to have occurred.  The systematic review 
develops generic factors that cut across individual organisms and have broader usefulness 
for policy.  I have developed a tool for measuring organisational resilience during 
unexpected events which could be used, with further testing, as a benchmarking tool for 
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resilient practice across hospital organisations and as a self-assessment measure to 
facilitate learning following an outbreak. 
10 Conclusion  
In conclusion, this thesis has contributed to the organisational resilience literature on a 
number of levels and to a range of audiences: academics; practitioners, managers and 
policy makers. 
Firstly, a literature review of organisational resilience highlighted the gaps and 
inconsistencies in the literature arising from the ontological differentiation of the literature, 
the uni-disciplinary approaches and the inadequate empirical testing of theoretical models.  
The audience is intended to be academics interested in the study of organisational 
resilience.  A comprehensive and robust literature review of organisational resilience is 
lacking in the literature.  This review addresses that gap, through the critical assessment of 
emerging themes, gaps and areas for future research in the organisational resilience 
literature.    
Secondly, a novel systematic review assessing the resilience of hospital’s responses to 
infection outbreaks provided a unique contribution to the organisational resilience literature 
through the systematic identification of a pattern of resilient factors across the selected 
studies of infection outbreaks.  Potential avenues for future research include the application 
of the systematic review methodology to developing countries.  This systematic review 
contributes to the field of infectious diseases, informing practitioners and managers of 
generic resilient interventions that can be adopted in hospital practice to reduce the impact 
of infection outbreaks.  From a policy making perspective, it informs emergency 
preparedness policy development, in providing an overview of commonly applied practical 
interventions that are effective across a range of infective organisms at organisational level.  
This thematic organisational level approach contrasts to much of the infectious diseases 
literature which has a single organism, clinical or epidemiological bias. 
Thirdly, I identified the concept of ‘intermediate’ resilience in contrast to the polarized 
positions of high and low resilience and incorporated these concepts into a framework with 
associated sensemaking characteristics of culture, cognition and behaviour.  Further 
research in this area might involve comparative studies to further test and refine the 
framework, develop the links to organisational performance and to develop our 
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understanding of the process of sensemaking during an unexpected event.  I contributed to 
the literature on sensemaking and organisational resilience by identifying a process of 
dynamic sensemaking throughout an unexpected event and found that different types of 
sensemaking were related to more or less resilient practices.  This study makes a modest 
contribution to the organisation studies field, in developing category of ‘intermediate’ 
resilience, developing the theory on sensemaking and exploring the relationship between 
sensemaking and organisational resilience.  Within acute hospitals, it will contribute to 
practitioners and managers’ understanding of the impact that the dynamic process of 
sensemaking has on organisational performance and the resilient interventions that can 
contribute to a positive organisational outcome. 
Fourthly, my research exemplified a positive outcome in the use of ICT-enabled national 
infection surveillance programmes, improving the resilience of hospitals to the impact of 
rising MRSA and C.difficile rates.  The adoption of self-surveillance by clinical leaders was 
highlighted as a successful organisational strategy for monitoring and reducing infection 
rates.   This study contributes to the academic literature on ICTs in healthcare, both to the 
organisatiol studies literature on Foucauldian governmentality and to health policy literature 
on macro-level interventions to improve organisational outcomes.  Future research in this 
area, might involve comparative studies that consider the use of novel indirect control modes 
in other sectors to assess whether they impede or encourage organisational resilience and 
the mechanisms by which these occur. 
Finally, at an interdisciplinary level, the identification of five generic constructs of resilient 
practice during an expected event contributes from both a theoretical and empirical 
perspective.  Theoretically, the quantification of organisational resilience contributes to the 
resilient engineering literature as previously, attempts to quantify the construct have been 
undertaken either abstractly or on expected events. The five resilience constructs identified 
in this thesis, whilst a preliminary insight, develop our theoretical understanding of the 
interrelationship between the chronological progression and the resilience components of an 
unexpected event as it unfolds.  Critically, the empirical development and testing of an 
organisational resilience questionnaire contributes to the academic literature by: providing a 
more robust basis for testing an organisation’s approach to an unexpected event; and 
addressing a significant gap in the literature for measurement studies.  The strengths of this 
tool from an academic perspective are that it builds on a prior in-depth qualitative analysis of 
an unexpected event and that it incorporates multidisciplinary theoretical perspectives.    
From a practitioner and management perspective, this tool provides a mechanism for 
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hospitals to review retrospectively their resilience performance and identify areas of low and 
high resilience which can inform strategies for improvement.  The tool can be used to 
compare the responses of different professional groups or specialties, highlighting variances 
that can be addressed.  Further development of this research will involve the refinement of 
the tool and more extensive testing by broadening the sample frame and introducing random 
sampling.  Whilst this tool is currently contextualised as a hospital’s response to an outbreak, 
future research might consider the potential for creating a generic tool that builds on this 
preliminary version that can be tested comparatively across different health or industry 
sectors. 
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Appendix A - Search Strategies for Systematic Review 
A.1 Resilient Unexpected Infection Events Embase 03 Oct 2012 
1. leadership/ 
2. "organization and management"/ 
3. communication/ 
4. in service training/ 
5. professional development/ 
6. hospital management/ or administration, hospital.mp. 
7. practice guideline/ 
8. personnel management/ 
9. adaptive behavior/ 
10. patient safety/ 
11. error correction.mp. 
12. error discovery.mp. 
13. resilience.mp. 
14. coping behavior/ 
15. error recovery.mp. 
16. error prevention.mp. 
17. "task performance"/ 
18. critical incident analysis.mp. 
19. critical incident prevention.mp. 
20. monitor.mp. 
21. sentinel surveillance/ 
22. risk reduction/ 
23. awareness/ 
24. risk management/ 
25. defences.mp. 
26. hospital planning/ 
27. intervention studies/ 
28. scenario planning.mp. 
29. recover.mp. 
30. mitigation.mp. 
31. organizational systems.mp. 
32. redundancy.mp. 
33. competitive behavior/ 
34. hospital bed capacity/ 
35. capacity building/ 
36. organizational structures.mp. 
37. decision making/ 
38. behavior/ 
39. adaptable.mp. 
40. flexible.mp. 
41. patient care/ 
42. role playing/ 
43. bricolage.mp. 
44. organization/ or organisational culture.mp. 
45. (organizational learning or organisational learning).mp. 
46. policy/ or organi?ational policy.mp. 
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47. (organisational strategy or organizational strategy).mp. 
48. organisational innovation.mp. 
49. change management/ or organi?ational change.mp. 
50. behavio?r change.mp. 
51. 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 15 or 16 or 17 or 
18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 24 or 25 or 26 or 27 or 28 or 29 or 30 or 31 or 32 or 33 or 
34 or 35 or 36 or 37 or 38 or 39 or 40 or 41 or 42 or 43 or 44 or 45 or 46 or 47 or 48 or 49 or 
50 
52. Infection Control/ 
53. infection prevention.mp. 
54. infection management.mp. 
55. Cross Infection/ 
56. Staphylococcus aureus/ 
57. Staphylococcus infection/ 
58. Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus/ 
59. Clostridium difficile/ 
60. Clostridium Infection/ 
61. Enterococcus faecium/ 
62. Klebsiella pneumoniae/ 
63. Klebsiella infection/ 
64. Acinetobacter baumanni.mp. 
65. Acinetobacter infection/ 
66. Pseudomonas aeruginosa/ 
67. Influenza A Virus H1N1/ 
68. extended spectrum Beta Lactamase/ 
69. New Delhi Metallo-Beta-lactamase-1.mp. 
70. Norovirus/ 
71. surgical infection/ or surgical site infection.mp. 
72. urinary tract infection/ 
73. hospital acquired pneumonia/ 
74. ventilator associated pneumonia/ 
75. Clostridium difficile associated disease.mp. 
76. bloodstream infection/ 
77. Catheter infection/ 
78. Enterobacter/ 
79. 52 or 53 or 54 or 55 or 56 or 57 or 58 or 59 or 60 or 61 or 62 or 63 or 64 or 65 or 66 or 
67 or 68 or 69 or 70 or 71 or 72 or 73 or 74 or 75 or 76 or 77 or 78 
80. 51 and 79 
81. disaster planning/ 
82. emergency health service/ 
83. unexpected.mp. 
84. emergency/ 
85. emergency preparedness.mp. 
86. (disease outbreak* or outbreak*).mp. or epidemic/ 
87. superbug.mp. 
88. 81 or 82 or 83 or 84 or 85 or 86 or 87 
89. 80 and 88 
90. limit 89 to (human and english language and yr="1999 -Current") 
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A.2 Resilient Unexpected Infection Events HMIC 03 Oct 2012 
1. Leadership/ 
2. Administration/ 
3. Communication/ 
4. Inservice training/ 
5. Professional development/ 
6. Management/ 
7. Hospital administration/ 
8. guideline adherence.mp. or Clinical guidelines/ 
9. Human resources management/ 
10. Feedback/ 
11. Patient safety/ 
12. error correction.mp. 
13. error discovery.mp. 
14. resilience.mp. 
15. error recovery.mp. 
16. error prevention.mp. 
17. Performance/ or Organisational analysis/ 
18. critical incident analysis.mp. 
19. critical incident prevention.mp. 
20. monitor.mp. or Monitoring/ 
21. Disease surveillance/ 
22. risk reduction behaviour.mp. 
23. Awareness/ 
24. Risk Management/ 
25. defences.mp. or defence mechanisms/ 
26. Management Planning/ 
27. intervention stud*.mp. 
28. scenario planning.mp. 
29. recover.mp. 
30. mitigation.mp. 
31. organisational system.mp. 
32. redundancy.mp. 
33. competitive behaviour.mp. or Competition/ 
34. hospital bed capacity.mp. or Bed management/ 
35. Capacity building/ 
36. Organisational structure/ 
37. Decision making/ 
38. exp Power/ 
39. adaptable.mp. 
40. Behaviour adaptation/ 
41. flexible.mp. 
42. Health care teams/ 
43. Role playing/ 
44. bricolage.mp. 
45. Organisational Culture/ or organizational culture.mp. 
46. organizational learning.mp. or Organisational learning/ 
47. exp Policy/ 
48. organizational strategy.mp. or Organisational strategy/ 
49. organizational innovation.mp. or Innovations/ 
50. organizational change.mp. or Organisational change/ 
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51. Behaviour change/ 
52. 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 15 or 16 or 17 or 
18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 24 or 25 or 26 or 27 or 28 or 29 or 30 or 31 or 32 or 33 or 
34 or 35 or 36 or 37 or 38 or 39 or 40 or 41 or 42 or 43 or 44 or 45 or 46 or 47 or 48 or 49 or 
50 or 51 
53. Infection Control/ 
54. infection prevention.mp. 
55. infection management.mp. 
56. Health care associated infection/ 
57. Staphylococcus aureus.mp. 
58. Staphylococcal Infections/ 
59. Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus/ or meticillin resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus.mp. 
60. Clostridium difficile/ 
61. Clostridium Infections/ 
62. Enterococcus faecium.mp. 
63. Klebsiella pneumoniae.mp. 
64. Klebsiella Infections/ 
65. Acinetobacter baumanni.mp. 
66. Acinetobacter infections/ 
67. Pseudomonas aeruginosa.mp. 
68. Influenza A Virus H1N1.mp. 
69. Extended Spectrum Beta-Lactamase.mp. 
70. New Delhi Metallo-Beta-lactamase-1.mp. 
71. Norovirus.mp. 
72. surgical site infections.mp. 
73. Urinary Tract Infections/ 
74. hospital acquired pneumonia.mp. 
75. ventilator associated pneumonia.mp. 
76. Clostridium difficile associated disease.mp. 
77. bloodstream infections.mp. 
78. Catheter infections.mp. 
79. Enterobacter.mp. 
80. 53 or 54 or 55 or 56 or 57 or 58 or 59 or 60 or 61 or 62 or 63 or 64 or 65 or 66 or 67 or 
68 or 69 or 70 or 71 or 72 or 73 or 74 or 75 or 76 or 77 or 78 or 79 
81. 52 and 80 
82. Emergency Planning/ 
83. Emergency Services/ 
84. unexpected.mp. 
85. exp Emergencies/ 
86. emergency preparedness.mp. 
87. (disease outbreak* or outbreak*).mp. 
88. superbug.mp. 
89. 82 or 83 or 84 or 85 or 86 or 87 or 88 
90. 81 and 89 
91. limit 90 to yr="1999 -Current" 
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A.3 Resilient Unexpected Infection Events Medline 03 Oct 2012 
1. Leadership/ 
2. "Organization and Administration"/ 
3. Communication/ 
4. Inservice Training/ 
5. Staff Development/ 
6. Hospital Management.mp. 
7. Hospital Administration/ 
8. Guideline Adherence/ 
9. Personnel Management/ 
10. Feedback, Psychological/ 
11. Patient Safety/ 
12. error correction.mp. 
13. error discovery.mp. 
14. Resilience.mp. 
15. Resilience, Psychological/ 
16. error recovery.mp. 
17. error prevention.mp. 
18. "Task Performance and Analysis"/ 
19. critical incident analysis.mp. 
20. critical incident prevention.mp. 
21. monitor.mp. 
22. Sentinel Surveillance/ 
23. Risk Reduction Behavior/ 
24. Awareness/ 
25. Risk Management/ 
26. defences.mp. 
27. Hospital Planning/ 
28. Intervention Studies/ 
29. scenario planning.mp. 
30. recover.mp. 
31. mitigation.mp. 
32. organizational systems.mp. 
33. redundancy.mp. 
34. Competitive Behavior/ 
35. Hospital Bed Capacity/ 
36. Capacity Building/ 
37. organizational structures.mp. 
38. "Decision making"/ 
39. "Power (Psychology)"/ 
40. adaptable.mp. 
41. Adaptation, Psychological/ 
42. flexible.mp. 
43. Patient Care Team/ 
44. Role/ 
45. bricolage.mp. 
46. Organizational Culture/ or organisational culture.mp. 
47. (organizational learning or organisational learning).mp. 
48. Organizational Policy/ or organisational policy.mp. 
49. (organizational strategy or organisational strategy).mp. 
50. Organizational Innovation/ or organisational innovation.mp. 
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51. (organizational change or organisational change).mp. 
52. behavio?r change.mp. 
53. 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 15 or 16 or 17 or 
18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 24 or 25 or 26 or 27 or 28 or 29 or 30 or 31 or 32 or 33 or 
34 or 35 or 36 or 37 or 38 or 39 or 40 or 41 or 42 or 43 or 44 or 45 or 46 or 47 or 48 or 49 or 
50 or 51 or 52 
54. Infection Control/ 
55. infection prevention.mp. 
56. infection management.mp. 
57. Cross Infection/ 
58. Staphylococcus aureus/ 
59. Staphylococcal Infections/ 
60. Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus/ 
61. Clostridium difficile/ 
62. Clostridium Infections/ 
63. Enterococcus faecium/ 
64. Klebsiella pneumoniae/ 
65. Klebsiella Infections/ 
66. Acinetobacter baumanni.mp. 
67. Acinetobacter infections/ 
68. Pseudomonas aeruginosa/ 
69. Influenza A Virus, H1N1 Subtype/ 
70. Extended Spectrum Beta-Lactamase.mp. 
71. New Delhi Metallo-Beta-lactamase-1.mp. 
72. Norovirus/ 
73. surgical site infections.mp. 
74. Urinary Tract Infections/ 
75. hospital acquired pneumonia.mp. 
76. Pneumonia, Ventilator-Associated/ 
77. Clostridium difficile associated disease.mp. 
78. bloodstream infections.mp. 
79. Catheter-Related Infections/ 
80. Enterobacter/ 
81. 54 or 55 or 56 or 57 or 58 or 59 or 60 or 61 or 62 or 63 or 64 or 65 or 66 or 67 or 68 or 
69 or 70 or 71 or 72 or 73 or 74 or 75 or 76 or 77 or 78 or 79 or 80 
82. 53 and 81 
83. Disaster Planning/ 
84. Emergency Medical Services/ 
85. unexpected.mp. 
86. Emergencies/ 
87. emergency preparedness.mp. 
88. (disease outbreak* or outbreak*).mp. or Disease Outbreaks/ 
89. superbug.mp. 
90. 83 or 84 or 85 or 86 or 87 or 88 or 89 
91. 82 and 90 
92. limit 91 to (english language and humans and yr="1999 -Current") 
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A.4 Resilient Unexpected Infection Events Psych Info 03 Oct 2012 
1. Leadership/ 
2. Organization/ or Management/ 
3. Communication/ 
4. Inservice Training/ 
5. Professional Development/ 
6. hospital management.mp. 
7. Hospital Administration/ 
8. Treatment Guidelines/ or guideline adherence.mp. 
9. Human Resource Management/ 
10. Feedback/ 
11. Safety/ 
12. error correction.mp. 
13. error discovery.mp. 
14. resilience.mp. 
15. Resilience, Psychological/ 
16. error recovery.mp. 
17. error prevention.mp. 
18. Task Analysis/ or Performance/ 
19. critical incident analysis.mp. 
20. critical incident prevention.mp. 
21. monitor.mp. or monitoring/ 
22. sentinel surveillance.mp. 
23. risk reduction behavior.mp. 
24. Awareness/ 
25. Risk Management/ 
26. defences.mp. 
27. Management Planning/ 
28. intervention stud*.mp. 
29. scenario planning.mp. 
30. recover.mp. 
31. mitigation.mp. 
32. organizational systems.mp. 
33. redundancy.mp. 
34. Competition/ 
35. (hospital adj3 bed adj capacity).mp. 
36. capacity building.mp. 
37. organizational structures.mp. 
38. Decision making/ 
39. Interpersonal Control/ 
40. adaptable.mp. 
41. Adaptive Behavior/ 
42. flexible.mp. 
43. Work Teams/ 
44. Role Taking/ 
45. bricolage.mp. 
46. Organizational Climate/ or organisational culture.mp. 
47. Organizational Learning/ or organisational learning.mp. 
48. Policy Making/ or organi?ational policy.mp. 
49. (organizational strategy or organisational strategy).mp. 
50. Innovation/ or organi?ational innovation.mp. 
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51. Organizational Change/ or organisational change.mp. 
52. Behavior Change/ 
53. 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 15 or 16 or 17 or 
18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 24 or 25 or 26 or 27 or 28 or 29 or 30 or 31 or 32 or 33 or 
34 or 35 or 36 or 37 or 38 or 39 or 40 or 41 or 42 or 43 or 44 or 45 or 46 or 47 or 48 or 49 or 
50 or 51 or 52 
54. Infectious Disorders/ or (infection adj control).mp. [mp=title, abstract, heading word, table 
of contents, key concepts, original title, tests & measures] 
55. infection prevention.mp. 
56. infection management.mp. 
57. (cross infection or nosocomial infection).mp. 
58. Staphylococcus aureus.mp. 
59. Staphylococcal infection*.mp. 
60. methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus.mp. 
61. MRSA.mp. 
62. Clostridium difficile.mp. 
63. Clostridium Infection*.mp. 
64. Enterococcus faecium.mp. 
65. Klebsiella pneumoniae.mp. 
66. Klebsiella Infection*.mp. 
67. Acinetobacter baumanni.mp. 
68. Acinetobacter infection*.mp. 
69. Pseudomonas aeruginosa/ 
70. (Influenza A Virus adj H1N1).mp. 
71. Extended Spectrum Beta-Lactamase.mp. 
72. New Delhi Metallo-Beta-lactamase-1.mp. 
73. Norovirus.mp. 
74. surgical site infection*.mp. 
75. urinary tract infection*.mp. 
76. Pneumonia/ 
77. ventilator associated pneumonia.mp. 
78. Clostridium difficile associated disease.mp. 
79. bloodstream infections.mp. 
80. catheter infection*.mp. 
81. enterobacter.mp. 
82. 54 or 55 or 56 or 57 or 58 or 59 or 60 or 62 or 63 or 64 or 65 or 66 or 67 or 68 or 69 or 
70 or 71 or 72 or 73 or 74 or 75 or 76 or 77 or 78 or 79 or 80 or 81 
83. 53 and 82 
84. Disasters/ 
85. Emergency Services/ 
86. unexpected.mp. 
87. Emergency Management/ 
88. Emergency Preparedness/ 
89. (disease outbreak* or outbreak*).mp. or exp Epidemics/ 
90. superbug.mp. 
91. 84 or 85 or 86 or 87 or 88 or 89 or 90 
92. 83 and 91 
93. limit 92 to (human and english language and yr="1999 -Current") 
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Appendix B - What is a sensemaking perspective? 
B.1 Defining Sensemaking 
B.1.1 Interactive Sensemaking 
I adopted the taxonomy of interactive sensemaking to assess the unexpected infection event 
as it derives from an ontological position of social constructionism which recognises the 
dynamic process of interaction amongst organisational actors.(153)  For this reason, I 
consider static sensemaking studies are less relevant for this review.  These studies, which 
form a large part of the sensemaking literature, tend to ignore the dynamics of 
sensemaking.(282)  Instead, they examine the effect of continuous stressors such as 
organisational change and restructuring on individual groups e.g. middle managers and 
overlook the complex interaction between individuals and teams. 
From a resilience perspective, interactive sensemaking is often associated with the initial 
identification of, and response to, an unexpected event.   The contribution of sensemaking 
processes to later stages of an unexpected event  are less well developed in organisational 
resilience frameworks (20;22;138) or empirical studies.  This research will address that gap, 
by examining each stage of an unexpected event using the varied types of sensemaking 
concepts described in Table 10.1 to understand organisational resilience in practice.  In the 
following sections, these sensemaking concepts are reviewed. 
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Table 10.1. Appendix B. Taxonomies of Sensemaking 
Type of Sensemaking/ 
Sensegiving  
Authors  Description Relationship to organisational 
resilience 
Empirical Examples 
S
e
n
s
e
m
a
k
in
g
 
S
ta
ti
c
 
Social Balogun & Johnson 
Luscher & Lewis 
Rouleau 
Dutton et al. 
Dutton & Ashford 
Bartunek et al. 
Bean & Hamilton 
Gioia & Chitipeddi 
Gioia & Thomas 
Isabella 
Social sensemaking that assesses how 
one group influences the other group’s 
understanding of a particular issue. 
In the context of continuous stressors, the 
sensemaking responses of individual 
groups to a change which may improve or 
diminish organisational resilience. 
 
Role of middle 
managers,(238;279;283-
286) organisational 
change(239-
241;287;288) and 
leadership(278;288) 
In
te
ra
c
ti
v
e
 
Social 
 
Weick and Sutcliffe 
Meyerson et al. 
Christianson et al. 
 
Explores the dynamics of sensemaking 
between different groups, often in 
complex contexts.   
In the context of an unexpected event, 
dynamic social sensemaking between 
different groups intensifies and 
organisational resilience strengthens. 
Forest fire fighting(19), 
healthcare(18), 
museums(26) 
Embedded Whiteman and Cooper Embeddedness(deep familiarity with 
intricacies of the local environment/ 
ecology) heightens sensemaking through 
richer awareness of detail 
In all contexts, having awareness of local 
environment/ecology facilitates more 
effective sensemaking and strengthens 
resilient practice. 
Management practices 
of Cree hunters(263) 
Distributed 
 
 
Weick Distributed information access, equivocal 
meaning making and the development of 
different perspectives in complex 
contexts. 
In all contexts, distributed sensemaking 
causes sensemaking fault lines and has 
an adverse effect on organisational 
resilience. 
West Nile virus(276) 
Collective Weick and Sutcliffe Describes a pattern of heedful 
interrelating in a social system 
In all contexts, collective sensemaking 
ensures constructive decision making and 
problem solving and contributes to 
organisational resilience. 
Aircraft carrier flight 
decks(192) 
S
e
n
s
e
g
iv
in
g
 
 
Social Gioia & Chittipeddi 
Maitlis & Lawrence 
Influencing the meaning construction of 
others towards a preferred organisational 
reality 
In the context of an unexpected event, 
sensegiving intensifies between leaders 
and front-line staff or from front-line staff 
up to leaders, improving organisational 
resilience. 
Subartic and forest fire 
fighting(263) 
Leader sensegiving(239) 
Orchestras(289) 
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B.1.2 Social sensemaking 
Social sensemaking can be defined as the dynamic relationship between sensemaking and 
social structures.  The basic process which supports social sensemaking activities is 
described using the enactment theory model which describes the four stages of 
sensemaking in which actors i) sense anomalies and begin to order undifferentiated flux ii) 
notice and bracket the anomalies in the flux (enactment) iii) assess these anomalies by 
labelling and connecting meanings from prior experiences to create a tentative yet plausible 
story (selection) and iv) solidify the story by relating it to past experience, retaining it and 
using it as a guide for future action (retention).(153)   This is a circular process, with the 
results of retention feeding back to the enactment and selection stages.(153;263)  From a 
research perspective, accessing and understanding these cognitive patterns can be difficult 
without rich qualitative primary accounts from those involved in events.  Key empirical 
studies of sensemaking in the literature rely on secondary accounts or documents(18;19), 
which limits the scope for understanding the intricacies of sensemaking cognition.  A further 
issue with the concept of social sensemaking is the increasing use of closely related words, 
such as mindfulness(154), heedful interrelating(192) and behavioural commitment(18) by the 
same authors that originally developed the sensemaking concept.  There is a risk that the 
simplicity of the concept is confused by later, related terminology which may describe 
behavioural elements of the cognitive concept.  
 
B.1.3 Embedded sensemaking 
Whiteman and Cooper define embedded sensemaking as deep familiarity with the local 
peculiarities and interactive effects of the environment and local ecology.(263)  Familiarity 
with the local ecology enables actors to access a richer repertoire of meanings and actions 
and be alert to likely consequences.  Ecological embeddedness can enable ecological 
sensemaking as an individual’s embedded knowledge and heightened awareness facilitates 
attention to anomalies, the ability to notice and bracket local cues, expand their skills and 
facilitate learning.  I propose that a similar form of embeddedness could be transposed onto 
the clinical environment.  In this case, clinically embeddedness might involve deep familiarity 
with the hospital environment, understanding of the local conditions, e.g. winter pressures on 
bed capacity, epidemiology of infections, typical case mix of patients, local population 
demographics and knowledge of individuals and groups within the hospital. 
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B.1.4 Distributed Sensemaking 
Distributed sensemaking is a process in which individuals, but also groups, access 
distributed information, form different perspectives and develop equivalent rather than 
shared meanings of events.  As significant effort would be involved in integrating these 
different perspectives across the various interest groups, ambiguity continues.(153)  This 
type of sensemaking occurs when organisations are loosely connected and each individual 
or group within an organisation has a partial image of their complex environment. (276) 
Common features of distributed sensemaking in organisations include: coalitions of interest 
groups, unplanned organisational designs and the use of incomplete information to justify 
existing decisions or positions.(290)  Weick suggests that distributed sensemaking can result 
in failures in sensemaking, where anomalies are normalised, categorised too quickly and 
confirmed on the basis of existing categorisations.(276)  Individuals may rely too heavily on 
authority rather than mindfulness, are overconfident in their capabilities and are reactive to 
rather than anticipate cues.  Distributed sensemaking can be overcome through interaction 
between interest groups which can build an organisational representation that is greater than 
the sum of its parts.  Collective sensemaking, supported by heedful interacting, which will be 
defined in the next section, is the antidote to distributed sensemaking. 
B.1.5 Collective Sensemaking 
Collective sensemaking, also known as the ‘collective mind’(192) is another sub-type of 
interactive sensemaking.  The collective mind creates greater capacity amongst team 
members to make sense of unexpected events that unfold rapidly.  It can be defined as a 
pattern of heedful interrelating in a social system and is more often found in a highly reliable 
organisations.(192)  Weick and Roberts describe three elements in the conceptualisation of 
the collective mind; contributions (contributions by individual actors within the social system), 
representation (recognition that the system consists of connected actions between 
themselves and others) and subordination (appreciation of the interrelatedness of their 
actions within the system).(192)  Heedful interrelating ensures greater interconnectedness 
and interrelation within the system, creating greater shared understanding between team 
members of the complexity of the system and ensuring fewer errors.  When heedless 
interrelating occurs, attention becomes focused on the local situation, rather than the shared 
situation.(192)   In this scenario, there is a greater chance of errors as the three elements of 
the collective mind break down: contributions become less complete, representation of the 
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system becomes narrower and subordination becomes less effective.  Individuals become 
more isolated and the collective mind of the organisation is simplified. 
A second feature of collective sensemaking is collective efficacy.  This constitutes a group’s 
shared belief in their conjoint capabilities to organise and execute the actions needed to 
produce the required results.  Collective efficacy has been found to have a very positive 
effect on performance in adversity.(258;291)   Characteristics are of an emergent group-level 
attribute that develops from individual’s perceptions of a group’s functioning and is a product 
of the interactive and coordinative dynamics amongst team members(258)  Factors that 
contribute to these interactive dynamics include how well a group is led, structured and 
coordinated, the strategies that it adopts and the mix of knowledge and competencies in the 
group(258;259)  If these factors are positive, this assists in loosening control to move 
decision making and problem solving to those who have the greatest expertise and ensuring 
that all the emotional, cognitive and behavioural resources that are available are 
utilised.(258) 
B.1.6 Sensegiving 
Described as a variant of sensemaking, sensegiving is undertaken to create meanings for a 
specific audience.(153)   The process of sensegiving links individual meaning making across 
actors and is described by Gioia and Chittipeddi as ‘the process of attempting to influence 
the sensemaking and meaning construction of others toward a preferred redefinition of 
organisational reality.’(239)p442  Symbols, symbolic gestures and actions may be used to 
communicate and influence a change from one scheme of sensemaking to another.(239) 
Whiteman and Cooper suggest that sensegiving activities are dependent on a strong form of 
trust which either depend on established relationships based on experience or the rapid 
establishment of trust within temporary relationships termed ‘swift trust.’(263) Meyerson et al 
argue that trust formed in temporary systems is different to conventional trust relations in 
more permanent systems.  The former has unique properties of collective perception and 
relating that can be effective in coping with issues of risk, uncertainty and complexity.  Swift 
trust can reflect a pragmatic strategy to cope with the uncertainties of a rapidly unfolding 
event that requires complex, interdependent actions using the specialist skills of relatively 
unknown individuals.  However, when faced with high uncertainty, individuals may choose to 
adopt a position of either complete trust or total distrust, as this uses up less time than 
monitoring a partial trust position.(292)  In this study we examine a scenario where not only 
are temporary groupings formed in a situation of high uncertainty but also individuals are 
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adopting different roles within those groups as a function of existing role systems breaking 
down and new, hybrid or extended roles being adopted to cope with the crisis.  Trust is a 
critical component of managing uncertainty and is of particular relevance in this case, in 
understanding the dynamics of temporary groups that have formed to manage unexpected 
events.
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Appendix C - Interview Schedule Trust staff 
Topic area Questions 
Introduction  Participant to sign consent form before proceeding (if not already signed) 
 Turn voice recorder on 
 Confirm interview being recorded and will last for up to an hour 
 Interviewer to introduce themselves 
 Confirm confidentiality of information 
 Confirm that if there are any questions, participant does not wish to answer, 
they don’t have to 
 Confirm participants profession, grade and title (if consent provided) 
 When research analysed, ask participant for agreement to check back 
intended meaning and themes with them [member checking] 
 
Role of 
participant in 
Trust 
 Describe your current role in relation to infection prevention and control? 
 Has your role changed over the last five years (2003-2008)? 
Pinpointing 
critical 
incidents 
 Explanation of critical incidents – over the past five years, recall the times 
when infection problems/outbreaks occurred (take notes of incidents so that 
each can be referred to in turn) 
 Confirm dates as accurately as possible 
 What was your role in relation to each of these incidents? 
Critical 
incident 1 
 Describe the infection problem/outbreak that stood out for you? 
 Why did it stand out? 
 What were the circumstances of that outbreak? 
 How long did the outbreak last? 
 When did you become aware of the outbreak? [Testing awareness of 
failures] 
[Prompt – how far in, how many cases]  
 Did you, or any other staff anticipate the outbreak? [Testing mindfulness, 
response to unexpected or unplanned events/experts relation to authority] 
 What data was available on the outbreak? [Managing failures] 
[Prompt - Did you trust it? How was the outbreak measured?] 
 Were there any indicators that the outbreak might be about to happen? 
[Testing preoccupation with failure/opacity] 
 Were there any significant stresses linked to the outbreak? [Testing 
stressors] 
[Prompt – short term, long term, continuous, internal, external, individual, team, 
organisational?] 
 What factors influenced the outbreak? [Testing contributory factors/new 
organisational structures] 
[Prompt: type of infection, internal issues: financial, workforce, leadership, capacity, 
operational; external issues: policy, political, social ] 
 Were you/your team prepared for the outbreak? [Testing preparedness] 
[Prompt: what was in place, how quickly, state of readiness] 
 How flexible/adaptable were you in being able to respond to the outbreak?  
[Testing flexibility/responding rapidly to events] 
 How flexible/adaptable were others in being able to respond to the 
outbreak? [Testing flexibility/responding rapidly to events] 
 How open were staff to the fact of the outbreak happening? [Testing 
learning culture, just culture] 
[Prompt: denial or reform] 
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 Did the leaders in the organisation support the management of the 
outbreak? [Testing leadership/management commitment/balance of safety v 
performance/experts relation to authority] 
[Prompt: which leaders, at which levels, managers/clinicians, style of 
management, nature of support] 
 How was the outbreak managed?  [Testing decision making/collective 
mindfulness/organisational structures/communications] 
[Prompt: structure to manage outbreak, who was involved, at which levels, were 
decisions made ,timeliness of decision making,  who made them, how were they 
communicated, were they implemented] 
 What resources were used to manage the outbreak? [Testing resource 
levels/mobilisation of resources/management of front line operations] 
[Prompt: nature of resource, e.g. financial, human, equipment etc, were they 
readily available, who made them available, when were they made available, 
prioritisation of operational/safety] 
 What role, if any, did external organisations play in the outbreak? [Testing 
changing environment/ heightened public and political 
awareness/performance demands] 
[Prompt: policy, monitoring, support, penalties] 
 Do you think there were any other significant issues in how the outbreak 
was managed? 
 What happened after the outbreak? [Testing capabilities for resilience] 
[Prompt: if changes made, were they maintained, did changes occur 
subsequently, checks and balances developed or not, systems, meetings, 
processes, procedures, behaviours, who led them, how sustainable were they] 
Other critical 
incidents – 
prior to 
significant 
incident 
 Reflecting back on the infection incidents that occurred prior to this one, 
were they different in any way? 
 Were the conditions in/outside the organisation different or similar? 
 Did people react in the same way? 
 Were there any aspects of previous incidents that influenced the 
management of this incident? 
 Is there anything you would like to add? 
Other critical 
incidents – 
post 
significant 
incident 
 Reflecting back on the infection incidents that occurred after this one, were 
they different in any way? 
 Were the conditions in/outside the organisation different or similar? 
 Did people react in the same way? 
 Were there any aspects of the incident that stood out for you that influenced 
the management of subsequent incidents? 
 Were any changes made in the organisation? 
 How effectively were they implemented? 
 Were preventative methods put in place? 
 Is there anything you would like to add? 
Routine 
events 
 When things are calm, what routine tasks are undertaken in relation to 
infection control?  
Further 
questions 
 Do you have any questions? 
 Thank participant for their time 
Provide contact details of Quality and Safety team 
Remind them that you will arrange a mutually convenient time to check back themes 
with them [if agreement given] 
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Appendix D - Interview schedule Arm’s Length Body staff 
Version 2 - 06.11.08 
Topic area Questions 
Introduction  Participant to sign consent form before proceeding (if not already 
signed) 
 Turn voice recorder on 
 Confirm interview being recorded and will last for up to an hour 
 Interviewer to introduce themselves 
 Confirm confidentiality of information 
 Confirm that if there are any questions, participant does not wish to 
answer, they don’t have to 
 Confirm participant’s job role and title (if consent provided) 
 When research analysed, ask participant for agreement to check 
back intended meaning and themes with them [member checking] 
 
Organisation’s 
aims and 
objectives 
 Please can you describe your organisation’s aims? 
 Please can you describe your organisation’s objectives? 
 Please can you describe your role in the organisation? 
Role in 
relation to 
infection 
prevention 
and control 
 Please can you describe the organisation’s role in relation to 
infection prevention and control? 
 Has that role changed in the last five years? 
 What has influenced any changes that have occurred? 
External 
environment 
 
 What, if any, external issues have your organisation faced over the 
last five years? 
[Prompt: nature of issues, other organisations involved, political 
perspective, media influence] 
 
Approach with 
NHS Trusts 
 What is your organisation’s stated approach/style with NHS 
Trusts? 
 Does this equate to the actual approach/style in practice? 
 
[Prompt: impact of foundation trusts, private sector providers, Trust 
compliance] 
Policy 
approach 
 
 How would you describe your policy approach? 
[Prompt: style of approach; influencing, advisory, educational, instructive?]  
 Has that changed in the last five years? 
 What has influenced any changes that have occurred? 
 
Effectiveness 
of 
 What are the key interventions that your organisation has made in 
relation to infection control over the last five years? 
 How effective do you feel these interventions have been? 
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interventions 
 
 Would you adjust/alter any of them in hindsight? 
Areas for 
change 
 What are the key areas of change identified for the future for 
infection prevention and control in your organisation? 
Areas of key 
improvements 
in infection 
control and 
prevention 
 What do you see as the key improvements nationally in infection 
prevention and control? 
 What has been your organisation’s contribution to those 
improvements? 
Areas of 
outstanding 
concern in 
infection 
control and 
prevention 
 What do you see as the main areas of outstanding concern 
nationally in infection prevention and control? 
 What do you see your organisation’s role being in relation to these 
concerns in the future? 
Further 
questions 
 Do you have any questions? 
 Thank participant for their time 
Remind them that you will arrange a mutually convenient time to check 
back themes with them [if agreement given] 
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Appendix E - Consent Form for Interviews 
Version 2  6.11.08 
Title of study: an exploration of organisational resilience, focusing on infection 
prevention and control 
 
 I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study.  
I have had the opportunity to consider the information and ask questions and these 
have been answered satisfactorily. 
 
 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time, without any reason, and without my legal rights being affected. 
 
 I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this study 
only and understand that my information will not be used for any other purpose by 
the investigators.  I understand that my information will be treated as strictly 
confidential and handled in accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 
1998. 
 
 I understand that data collected during the study may be looked at by responsible 
individuals from Imperial College, London or certain regulatory authorities, where it is 
relevant to my taking part in the research.  I give permission for these individuals to 
have access to my records. 
 
 I consent/refuse consent [please circle preferred option] for my job title to be used in 
the research study to provide context to the study information. 
 
 I consent to the interview being recorded. 
 
 I consent to take part in the above study. 
 
________________________ _______________________  ____________ 
Name of participant   Signature    Date 
 
 
________________________ _______________________  ____________ 
Name of interviewer   Signature    Date
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Appendix F - Organisational Resilience Questionnaire 
  
Appendix G - Characteristics of Questionnaire Responses 
 N Mean Median Mode Std. 
Deviation 
Variance Skewness Std. Error of 
Skewness 
Kurtosis Std. 
Error of 
Kurtosis 
Range 
Valid Missing 
Minor infection 
outbreaks were 
managed 
effectively 
150 0 4.2600 4.0000 4.00 .64952 .422 -.910 .198 2.158 .394 3.00 
Monthly infection 
control data was 
provided to clinical 
areas 
149 1 4.1342 4.0000 5.00 1.01780 1.036 -1.326 .199 1.167 .395 4.00 
Performance 
targets for infection 
were used in 
clinical areas 
150 0 4.0467 4.0000 4.00 1.05128 1.105 -1.218 .198 .838 .394 4.00 
Clinical teams were 
accountable for 
their infection 
performance 
148 2 3.7568 4.0000 4.00 1.03425 1.070 -.805 .199 .034 .396 4.00 
Infection policies 
were ignored in 
practice by clinical 
teams (inverted) 
150 0 3.3733 4.0000 4.00 .99358 .987 -.267 .198 -.712 .394 4.00 
Ward staff were 
willing to 
implement new 
infection practices 
147 3 3.8571 4.0000 4.00 .74943 .562 -.848 .200 1.496 .397 4.00 
The outbreak was 
identified within 48 
hours 
150 0 4.2133 4.0000 4.00 .85598 .733 -1.403 .198 2.460 .394 4.00 
The outbreak was 
escalated to Trust 
executive directors 
within 48 hours 
148 2 4.2297 4.0000 5.00 .88136 .777 -1.254 .199 1.680 .396 4.00 
Staff understood 
the necessary 
measures to 
manage the 
outbreak within 36 
hours of the 
outbreak being 
identified 
149 1 4.0940 4.0000 4.00 .89550 .802 -1.217 .199 1.596 .395 4.00 
The ward closure 
policy was clear to 
all staff 
149 1 4.0336 4.0000 4.00 .83355 .695 -.773 .199 .306 .395 3.00 
Clinical leaders 
were involved in 
decision making 
149 1 4.2416 4.0000 4.00 .70376 .495 -.849 .199 1.115 .395 3.00 
The significance of 
the outbreak was 
underestimated 
(inverted) 
149 1 3.5101 4.0000 4.00 1.19468 1.427 -.615 .199 -.677 .395 4.00 
A clear structure 
was implemented 
to manage the 
outbreak 
150 0 4.1733 4.0000 4.00 .69269 .480 -1.104 .198 2.535 .394 3.00 
Information on 
cases was 
available daily 
150 0 4.3400 4.0000 4.00 .72195 .521 -1.267 .198 2.249 .394 3.00 
Bed capacity was 
created rapidly 
150 0 3.4267 4.0000 4.00 1.05134 1.105 -.401 .198 -.499 .394 4.00 
A clinical strategy 
for controlling the 
outbreak was 
implemented 
149 1 4.2617 4.0000 4.00 .61946 .384 -.411 .199 .278 .395 3.00 
The isolation policy 
operated effectively 
150 0 4.1000 4.0000 4.00 .73958 .547 -.767 .198 .870 .394 3.00 
  
Staff groups were 
willing to work 
flexibly during the 
outbreak (e.g. 
working different 
roles) 
150 0 3.4933 4.0000 4.00 .87275 .762 -.041 .198 -.662 .394 3.00 
Additional 
resources were 
made available 
when needed 
150 0 3.6933 4.0000 4.00 .97586 .952 -.535 .198 -.497 .394 4.00 
Innovative 
solutions were 
developed for 
unplanned 
problems 
149 1 3.5168 4.0000 4.00 .88991 .792 -.226 .199 -.429 .395 4.00 
An effective leader 
took control of the 
outbreak 
148 2 4.1486 4.0000 4.00 .83597 .699 -1.137 .199 1.546 .396 4.00 
The balance 
between patient 
safety and 
performance goals 
was achieved 
148 2 3.8716 4.0000 4.00 .85937 .739 -.792 .199 .872 .396 4.00 
Communication to 
clinical teams was 
haphazard during 
the outbreak 
(inverted) 
149 1 3.7584 4.0000 4.00 1.03748 1.076 -.972 .199 .476 .395 4.00 
The elective 
pathway was 
severely impacted 
by the outbreak 
(inverted) 
149 1 2.8859 3.0000 2.00 1.19983 1.440 .104 .199 -1.003 .395 4.00 
Outbreak-related 
policies were 
implemented 
rigorously 
148 2 4.0000 4.0000 4.00 .73771 .544 -.824 .199 1.149 .396 3.00 
The hospital Trust 
recovered rapidly 
from the outbreak 
150 0 4.0400 4.0000 4.00 .80168 .643 -1.261 .198 2.662 .394 4.00 
Policies resulting 
from the outbreak 
were implemented 
systematically 
149 1 3.7919 4.0000 4.00 .75583 .571 -.300 .199 -.107 .395 3.00 
Learning from the 
outbreak informed 
future outbreak 
management 
150 0 4.1400 4.0000 4.00 .75999 .578 -.613 .198 .059 .394 3.00 
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Appendix H - Kendall’s tau: non-parametric correlation 
Kendall's tau 
 
Routine practice Discovery of Outbreak Immediate Management of 
Outbreak 
Ongoing management of Outbreak Aftermath of 
Outbreak 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
c. Listwise N = 132 
 
Thresholds for effect sizes 
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Minor infection outbreaks were managed effectively Correlation 
Coefficient 
1.000 .304** .373** .263** .131 .050 .226** .261** .270** .310** .273** .163* .429** .309** .158* .398** .281** .237** .294** .167* .423** .372** .330** .020 .346** .286** .141 .218** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 .000 .001 .095 .539 .006 .001 .001 .000 .001 .037 .000 .000 .042 .000 .001 .003 .000 .034 .000 .000 .000 .796 .000 .000 .078 .007 
Monthly infection control data was provided to clinical 
areas 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.304** 1.000 .589** .418** .136 .130 .244** .272** .352** .324** .309** .186* .335** .362** .173* .304** .312** .172* .162* .179* .336** .255** .139 .096 .217** .224** .254** .287** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . .000 .000 .072 .096 .002 .001 .000 .000 .000 .014 .000 .000 .022 .000 .000 .024 .033 .019 .000 .001 .070 .199 .006 .005 .001 .000 
Performance targets for infection were used in clinical 
areas 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.373** .589** 1.000 .522** .193* .186* .260** .295** .319** .333** .335** .062 .352** .437** .253** .359** .275** .162* .163* .170* .478** .292** .207** .076 .296** .200* .237** .268** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 . .000 .011 .017 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .413 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .033 .031 .026 .000 .000 .007 .305 .000 .011 .002 .001 
Clinical teams were accountable for their infection 
performance 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.263** .418** .522** 1.000 .226** .241** .296** .261** .368** .269** .308** .158* .329** .324** .208** .334** .295** .223** .238** .297** .353** .357** .206** .111 .385** .222** .170* .213** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000 .000 . .002 .002 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .034 .000 .000 .005 .000 .000 .003 .001 .000 .000 .000 .006 .128 .000 .004 .026 .005 
Infection policies were ignored in practice by clinical 
teams (inverted) 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.131 .136 .193* .226** 1.000 .170* .051 .003 .175* .045 .115 .236** .208** .207** .073 .216** .097 .066 .094 .141 .237** .089 .261** .097 .147 .045 .127 .083 
Sig. (2-tailed) .095 .072 .011 .002 . .026 .508 .968 .022 .548 .138 .001 .007 .008 .319 .006 .206 .375 .204 .058 .002 .235 .000 .182 .054 .560 .094 .273 
Ward staff were willing to implement new infection 
practices 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.050 .130 .186* .241** .170* 1.000 .114 .080 .217** .096 .259** .048 .150 .244** .190* .364** .298** .263** .217** .172* .198* .171* .238** .006 .251** .106 .180* .283** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .539 .096 .017 .002 .026 . .148 .307 .006 .218 .001 .524 .061 .002 .012 .000 .000 .001 .004 .025 .012 .027 .002 .940 .001 .178 .021 .000 
The outbreak was identified within 48 hours Correlation 
Coefficient 
.226** .244** .260** .296** .051 .114 1.000 .430** .509** .334** .475** .249** .344** .326** .197** .434** .493** .165* .223** .246** .293** .175* .181* -.001 .286** .252** .179* .158* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .006 .002 .001 .000 .508 .148 . .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .010 .000 .000 .033 .004 .001 .000 .025 .020 .989 .000 .002 .023 .046 
The outbreak was escalated to Trust executive Correlation .261** .272** .295** .261** .003 .080 .430** 1.000 .411** .368** .488** .194* .419** .423** .220** .415** .273** .030 .205** .205** .380** .333** .275** .036 .302** .313** .227** .241** 
r=0.5 (large effect)  
r=0.3 (medium effect) 
-  
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directors within 48 hours Coefficient 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .001 .000 .001 .968 .307 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .010 .000 .000 .004 .000 .001 .699 .007 .007 .000 .000 .000 .634 .000 .000 .004 .002 
Staff understood the necessary measures to manage 
the outbreak within 36 hours of the outbreak being 
identified 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.270** .352** .319** .368** .175* .217** .509** .411** 1.000 .441** .505** .441** .421** .459** .183* .433** .409** .199** .263** .231** .415** .207** .275** -.027 .398** .278** .276** .315** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000 .000 .000 .022 .006 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .015 .000 .000 .009 .001 .003 .000 .007 .000 .718 .000 .000 .000 .000 
The ward closure policy was clear to all staff Correlation 
Coefficient 
.310** .324** .333** .269** .045 .096 .334** .368** .441** 1.000 .440** .184* .300** .332** .235** .391** .329** .286** .285** .231** .414** .359** .146 -.009 .378** .348** .241** .220** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .548 .218 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .014 .000 .000 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000 .002 .000 .000 .056 .899 .000 .000 .002 .005 
Clinical leaders were involved in decision making Correlation 
Coefficient 
.273** .309** .335** .308** .115 .259** .475** .488** .505** .440** 1.000 .290** .511** .506** .308** .654** .511** .236** .316** .295** .506** .423** .308** .006 .501** .382** .382** .315** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000 .000 .000 .138 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .933 .000 .000 .000 .000 
The significance of the outbreak was underestimated 
(inverted) 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.163* .186* .062 .158* .236** .048 .249** .194* .441** .184* .290** 1.000 .343** .154* -.003 .229** .201** .024 .114 .056 .194* .141 .322** .156* .229** .276** .250** .095 
Sig. (2-tailed) .037 .014 .413 .034 .001 .524 .001 .010 .000 .014 .000 . .000 .049 .964 .003 .009 .745 .121 .450 .011 .059 .000 .031 .003 .000 .001 .212 
A clear structure was implemented to manage the 
outbreak 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.429** .335** .352** .329** .208** .150 .344** .419** .421** .300** .511** .343** 1.000 .531** .362** .551** .468** .225** .266** .220** .471** .479** .425** .010 .502** .423** .293** .332** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .007 .061 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 .004 .001 .005 .000 .000 .000 .898 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Information on cases was available daily Correlation 
Coefficient 
.309** .362** .437** .324** .207** .244** .326** .423** .459** .332** .506** .154* .531** 1.000 .434** .535** .357** .113 .301** .292** .442** .391** .284** .038 .408** .301** .348** .326** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .008 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .049 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .151 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .621 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Bed capacity was created rapidly Correlation 
Coefficient 
.158* .173* .253** .208** .073 .190* .197** .220** .183* .235** .308** -.003 .362** .434** 1.000 .363** .331** .310** .405** .352** .262** .364** .140 .112 .365** .230** .274** .253** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .042 .022 .001 .005 .319 .012 .010 .004 .015 .002 .000 .964 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .059 .118 .000 .002 .000 .001 
A clinical strategy for controlling the outbreak was 
implemented 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.398** .304** .359** .334** .216** .364** .434** .415** .433** .391** .654** .229** .551** .535** .363** 1.000 .542** .316** .417** .393** .582** .495** .363** .030 .629** .446** .397** .482** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .006 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .694 .000 .000 .000 .000 
The isolation policy operated effectively Correlation 
Coefficient 
.281** .312** .275** .295** .097 .298** .493** .273** .409** .329** .511** .201** .468** .357** .331** .542** 1.000 .315** .342** .336** .393** .366** .212** .036 .440** .445** .304** .262** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000 .000 .000 .206 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .009 .000 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .006 .629 .000 .000 .000 .001 
Staff groups were willing to work flexibly during the 
outbreak (e.g. working different roles) 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.237** .172* .162* .223** .066 .263** .165* .030 .199** .286** .236** .024 .225** .113 .310** .316** .315** 1.000 .452** .274** .188* .326** .083 .032 .324** .236** .111 .153* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .024 .033 .003 .375 .001 .033 .699 .009 .000 .002 .745 .004 .151 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .014 .000 .270 .663 .000 .002 .144 .045 
Additional resources were made available when 
needed 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.294** .162* .163* .238** .094 .217** .223** .205** .263** .285** .316** .114 .266** .301** .405** .417** .342** .452** 1.000 .409** .336** .420** .248** .156* .464** .364** .252** .329** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .033 .031 .001 .204 .004 .004 .007 .001 .000 .000 .121 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .001 .032 .000 .000 .001 .000 
Innovative solutions were developed for unplanned 
problems 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.167* .179* .170* .297** .141 .172* .246** .205** .231** .231** .295** .056 .220** .292** .352** .393** .336** .274** .409** 1.000 .405** .440** .091 .041 .453** .215** .406** .409** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .034 .019 .026 .000 .058 .025 .001 .007 .003 .002 .000 .450 .005 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .223 .579 .000 .005 .000 .000 
An effective leader took control of the outbreak Correlation 
Coefficient 
.423** .336** .478** .353** .237** .198* .293** .380** .415** .414** .506** .194* .471** .442** .262** .582** .393** .188* .336** .405** 1.000 .566** .317** .029 .509** .382** .319** .408** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .002 .012 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .011 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .014 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .703 .000 .000 .000 .000 
The balance between patient safety and performance 
goals was achieved 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.372** .255** .292** .357** .089 .171* .175* .333** .207** .359** .423** .141 .479** .391** .364** .495** .366** .326** .420** .440** .566** 1.000 .272** .089 .510** .425** .266** .338** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .001 .000 .000 .235 .027 .025 .000 .007 .000 .000 .059 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .229 .000 .000 .001 .000 
Communication to clinical teams was haphazard during 
the outbreak (inverted) 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.330** .139 .207** .206** .261** .238** .181* .275** .275** .146 .308** .322** .425** .284** .140 .363** .212** .083 .248** .091 .317** .272** 1.000 .180* .282** .244** .205** .205** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .070 .007 .006 .000 .002 .020 .000 .000 .056 .000 .000 .000 .000 .059 .000 .006 .270 .001 .223 .000 .000 . .014 .000 .002 .007 .008 
The elective pathway was severely impacted by the 
outbreak (inverted) 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.020 .096 .076 .111 .097 .006 -.001 .036 -.027 -.009 .006 .156* .010 .038 .112 .030 .036 .032 .156* .041 .029 .089 .180* 1.000 -.072 .161* -.052 -.002 
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Sig. (2-tailed) .796 .199 .305 .128 .182 .940 .989 .634 .718 .899 .933 .031 .898 .621 .118 .694 .629 .663 .032 .579 .703 .229 .014 . .337 .033 .487 .974 
Outbreak-related policies were implemented rigorously Correlation 
Coefficient 
.346** .217** .296** .385** .147 .251** .286** .302** .398** .378** .501** .229** .502** .408** .365** .629** .440** .324** .464** .453** .509** .510** .282** -.072 1.000 .475** .497** .399** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .006 .000 .000 .054 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .337 . .000 .000 .000 
The hospital Trust recovered rapidly from the outbreak Correlation 
Coefficient 
.286** .224** .200* .222** .045 .106 .252** .313** .278** .348** .382** .276** .423** .301** .230** .446** .445** .236** .364** .215** .382** .425** .244** .161* .475** 1.000 .339** .244** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .005 .011 .004 .560 .178 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .002 .000 .000 .002 .000 .005 .000 .000 .002 .033 .000 . .000 .002 
Policies resulting from the outbreak were implemented 
systematically 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.141 .254** .237** .170* .127 .180* .179* .227** .276** .241** .382** .250** .293** .348** .274** .397** .304** .111 .252** .406** .319** .266** .205** -.052 .497** .339** 1.000 .503** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .078 .001 .002 .026 .094 .021 .023 .004 .000 .002 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .144 .001 .000 .000 .001 .007 .487 .000 .000 . .000 
Learning from the outbreak informed future outbreak 
management 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.218** .287** .268** .213** .083 .283** .158* .241** .315** .220** .315** .095 .332** .326** .253** .482** .262** .153* .329** .409** .408** .338** .205** -.002 .399** .244** .503** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .007 .000 .001 .005 .273 .000 .046 .002 .000 .005 .000 .212 .000 .000 .001 .000 .001 .045 .000 .000 .000 .000 .008 .974 .000 .002 .000 . 
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Appendix I - Organisational Resilience Questionnaire Reliability 
I describe the process of testing the internal consistency of the structure of the 
organisational resilience questionnaire.  The aim of undertaking reliability analysis was to 
test the reliability of the scale to check whether it was a consistent manifestation of the 
construct it was measuring.  Cronbach’s alpha was used, as a common measure of scale 
reliability.(267)  Prior to conducting reliability analysis, the four reverse-phrased items’ 
scores on the questionnaire were inverted, as reverse-scored items affect Cronbach’s Alpha 
equation.(267)  As a preliminary step, the mean scores of all the items on the questionnaire 
were ranked in descending order (see Appendix J) to assess whether any items should be 
excluded.  It is proposed that the last, lowest scoring item, ‘the elective pathway was 
severely impacted by the outbreak (inverted)’ is excluded as the confidence intervals were 
outside those of the other items. 
As the questionnaire was based on five chronological stages of outbreak management, 
Cronbach’s alpha was applied separately to each of these stages in the first instance (see 
Table 10.2), in line with Cronbach’s guidance(293) leaving in the proposed excluded item in 
the equation: ‘the elective pathway was severely impacted by the outbreak’ (inverted) to test 
how it affected the reliability analysis.    Field proposes that a Cronbach’s Alpha in the 
magnitude of .7 - .8 is an acceptable value and that anything lower indicates an unreliable 
scale.(267)  All stages of outbreak management indicated a Cronbach’s Alpha score of over 
.7 with the exception of the aftermath of the outbreak which showed a score of .63.   Having 
assessed the Cronbach’s Alpha of each item if it were deleted, five items were identified that 
had a corrected item-total correlation score of less than .3 (see Table 10.3).  The corrected 
item-total correlation score identifies items that fail to correlate with the overall score from 
the scale.  Field proposes that any item with a low correlation (less than .3) should be 
reviewed and potentially excluded as that item would reduce scale reliability.(267)  The 
identified items were excluded on this basis as all other items had a corrected item – total 
correlation score of greater than .3 and revised Cronbach’s Alpha scores were recalculated 
for each stage of outbreak management indicated by the revised scores in brackets in Table 
10.2.  All revised scores were over .7, indicating that the remaining subscale items were a 
reliable measure of the subscale construct. 
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Table 10.2.  Appendix I. Cronbach's Alpha by Stage of Outbreak 
 
 
Chronological 
Stage of Outbreak 
Management 
Case Processing Summary Reliability Statistics 
 
N % 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Based on 
Standardized 
Items 
N of Items 
(28 prior to 
revision) 
 
Routine Practice 
Cases Valid 144 96.0 .722 
 
(Revised     .795 
.713 
 
.792 
6 
 
4) 
Excluded
a
 6 4.0 
Total 150 100.0 
 
Discovery 
Cases Valid 145 96.7 .771 .785 6 
Excluded
a
 5 3.3 
Total 150 100.0 
Immediate 
Management 
Cases Valid 149 99.3 .774 .796 5 
Excluded
a
 1 .7 
Total 150 100.0 
Ongoing 
Management 
Cases Valid 142 94.7 .734 
 
(Revised    .810 
.760 
 
.813 
8 
 
6) 
Excluded
a
 8 5.3 
Total 150 100.0 
Aftermath Cases Valid 149 99.3 .629 
 
(Revised    .733 
.633 
 
.733 
3 
 
2) 
Excluded
a
 1 .7 
Total 150 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
Table 10.3. Appendix I. Question items for deletion 
 
Questionnaire Item 
Corrected 
item – total 
correlation 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha if item 
deleted 
Routine practice 
Infection policies were ignored in practice by clinical teams (inverted) .232 .750 
Ward staff were willing to implement new infection practices .224 .740 
Ongoing management 
Communication to clinical teams was haphazard during the outbreak (inverted) .264 .742 
The elective pathway was severely impacted by the outbreak (inverted) .165 .775 
Aftermath 
The hospital Trust recovered rapidly from the outbreak .291 .733 
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Appendix J - Mean ranked scores of questionnaire items with 95% confidence intervals 
 257 
 
Appendix K - Thesis-related publications and presentations 
 
K.1 Published papers 
 Murray E; Holmes AH. (2012). Addressing healthcare-associated infections and antimicrobial 
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Oral and paper presentation at the 28th European Group of Organization Studies Colloquium, 
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 Murray EJ; Holmes A; Vincent C; Ferlie E. Characterising organisational control modes in 
healthcare: the case of infection prevention and control. Oral and paper presentation at the 
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2011). 
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